THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


Imperiled  America 


IMPERILED  AMERICA 


A  discussion  of  the  complications 

forced  upon  the  United  States  by 

the  World  War 


By 

John  Callan  O'Laughlin,  a.m.,  ll.d. 

Former  Assistant   Secretary   of   State;    Secre- 
tary, United  States  Commission  to  Japan; 
Member    American    Society    of    Inter- 
national Law 


The  Reilly  &  Britton  Co. 

Chicago 


Copyright,  1916 

by 

The   Reilly  &   Britton   Co. 


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To  my  guide,  my  counselor,  my  friend 

My  Wife 


211S01 


PREFACE 

At  a  time  when  high  government  offi- 
cials and  eminent  statesmen  are  demanding 
that  the  country  be  prepared  against  war, 
it  is  important  for  the  people  to  be 
informed  of  the  causes  moving  them.  In 
the  following  pages  I  have  tried  as  an 
American  proud  of  his  birthright  and 
jealous  of  the  honor  and  integrity  of  his 
country,  to  set  forth  our  perilous  situation 
in  a  world  at  war.  I  have  refrained  pur- 
posely from  excessive  detail,  and  present 
the  facts  in  a  fashion  which  I  hope  will 
bring  home  to  those  who  read  what  I  have 
written  our  actual  points  of  international 
contact  and  international  conflict. 

It  is  true  to-day  as  in  past  ages  that  "  in 
union  there  is  strength."  Above  all  things, 
the  American  people  must  be  united.  They 
must  learn  the  facts  underlying  our  foreign 
relations  and  apply  to  them  their  common 


Preface 

sense,  in  order  to  develop  policies  which 
will  make  for  right  and  justice  and  assure 
their  prosperity  in  the  prosperity  of 
humanity. 

John  Callan  O'Laughlin 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I     Points  of  Contact 11 

II     Our  Internal  Situation  and  the 

War 29 

III  The  World   and   the   Monroe 

Doctrine 50 

IV  The  Caribbean  Sea  Problem.  .     82 
V     The     United     States     in     the 

Pacific    102 

VI     Shutting  the  Open  Door 123 

VII     The  Japanese  Portent 141 

VIII     The  War  on  American  Life.  .  158 
IX     The  War  and  American 

Dollars 184 

X    Where    We    Stand    with    the 

Allies   202 

XI     The  Central   Powers   and 

America 221 

XII     America    in    the    World    to 

Come   240 

Index 259 


IMPERILED  AMERICA 


chapter  i 
Points  of  Contact 

The  great  war  which  brought  Arma- 
geddon to  Europe  in  August,  1914, 
confronted  the  American  people  with 
facts  of  which  they  were  ignorant  or  at 
the  most  dimly  cognizant.  It  made  them 
realize  that  their  "splendid  isolation" 
had  vanished;  that  their  "detached  and 
distant  situation,"  to  which  Washington 
referred  as  an  important  element  of  their 
security,  no  longer  existed.  The  sea,  once 
a  barrier,  had  become  an  avenue.  Progress 
in  science  and  invention  had  overcome 
space  and  lessened  time.  The  separate 
interests  of  nations  had  become  the  inter- 
related     interests      of      mankind.       What 

11 


/ 

/ 


12        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

happened  in  Servia  became  of  vital 
moment  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  just 
as  what  happened  in  the  United  States 
provoked  the  unremitting  attention  and 
the  direct  concern  of  foreign  countries. 

The  American  people  know  now,  as 
they  never  knew  before,  that  they  belong 
to  a  great  system  of  humanity,  every  part 
of  which  is  affected  by  the  prosperity  or 
distress  of  every  other  part.  The  war, 
beginning  in  Europe,  spread  to  every 
continent  and  every  ocean,  dislocating 
political  affiliations,  shaking  economics 
and  rocking  finance.  It  inaugurated  a 
reign  of  lawlessness  on  land  and  sea, 
wherein  might  rode  roughshod  over 
humanity  and  right.  The  actual  or 
fancied  necessities  of  belligerents  were 
offered  as  an  excuse  for  measures,  with- 
out justice  and  frequently  without  reason, 
directed  not  only  against  each  other  but 
against  nations  which  were  not  parties  to 
their  conflict.  Thus,  the  maritime  rights 
of  the  United  States,  in  respect  of  persons 
and   property,   have  been  violated.     This 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         13 

country  has  sufifered  interruption  of  its 
commerce  and  disturbance  of  its  industy. 
Its  internal  security  and  neutrality  have 
been  threatened  by  plots  hatched  by  for- 
eign nations.  It  has  felt,  and,  throughout 
the  war  —  indeed,  throughout  its  life  — 
will  continue  to  feel  the  pressure  of  out- 
side forces.  In  spite  of  the  earnest  wish 
of  the  American  people  to  be  let  alone, 
in  spite  of  their  fervent  desire  to  remain  at 
peace,  they  have  come  to  realize  that  there 
are  points  of  conflict  which  menace  them 
with  war. 

Let  us  see  where  these  danger  points 
are:  Do  they  lie  within  as  well  as  with- 
out ourselves?  Are  we  aggressive  with- 
out being  military?  Do  we  lack  the 
patriotism  that  inspires  self-sacrifice? 
Are  the  conglomerate  elements  of  which 
we  are  made,  separate  in  their  allegiance 
and  disloyal  to  the  point  of  revolution, 
as  the  German  government  believes?  Is 
the  strength  we  claim,  in  reality  weak- 
ness? Does  bluster  take  the  place  of 
courage,  bluff,  the  place  of  decision?    Are 


14        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

we  become  another  China  as  a  result 
of  our  pursuit  of  wealth  during  the  period 
following  the  Civil  War?  Will  we  suffer 
any  humiliation  rather  than  the  pain 
which  just  action  may  cause? 

And  then,  turning  to  our  international 
situation:  Are  we  determined  to  protect 
the  commerce,  valued  at  more  than  five 
billion  dollars  a  year,  which  our  industry 
and  activity  have  produced?  Do  we 
realize  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  as 
necessary  to  our  peace  and  safety  now  as 
it  was  when,  militarily  weak,  we  enun- 
ciated it?  Have  we  built  the  Panama 
Canal  at  an  expenditure  of  more  than 
$400,000,000,  for  the  benefit  of  another 
power  of  sufficient  strength  and  vigor  to 
take  it?  Why  did  we  proclaim  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  integrity  of  China  and  the 
Open  Door  in  that  empire?  Was  it  for 
the  purpose  of  assuring  equal  opportun- 
ity for  our  commerce,  or  was  it  a  foolish 
expression  of  American  buncombe,  with- 
out rhyme  or  reason,  intended  merely  to 
minister  to  our  pride   as   a  world   power 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         15 

and  for  political  effect  at  home?  We 
sought  to  "  neutralize "  the  Trans- 
Manchurian  railroad.  What  was  the 
object  and  what  the  result  of  this  inter- 
vention in  the  vast  northern  province  of 
China? 

We  have  acquired  a  chain  of  islands 
across  the  Pacific  Ocean.  For  what  pur- 
pose? We  took  the  Philippines  and  are 
now  paving  the  way  for  their  inde- 
pendence. Yet  we  have  no  thought  of 
withdrawing  from  Guam  in  the  near-by 
Ladrone  Islands!  We  got  out  of  the  tri- 
partite alliance  with  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  respecting  the  Samoan  Islands, 
and  retained  possession  of  Tutuila  in  that 
group.  At  intervals,  we  have  endeavored 
to  purchase  the  Galapagos  Islands  be- 
longing to  and  lying  off  the  coast  of 
Ecuador,  which  command  the  Pacific 
entrance  to  the  Panama  Canal.  We  are 
seeking  to  make,  and  we  proudly  call, 
the  Caribbean  Sea  an  American  lake. 
Why   all   these  measures? 

We  hold  Porto  Rico  and  Culebra;  we 


16        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

have  a  protectorate  over  Cuba  and  a  naval 
station  at  Guantanamo,  on  the  south- 
eastern shore  of  that  island;  we  are  main- 
taining a  financial  protectorate  over 
Santo  Domingo;  we  are  applying  the  same 
system  to  Haiti  and  Nicaragua,  and  have 
arranged  for  the  purchase  of  the  Danish 
West  Indies.  We  kept  a  dictator  out  of 
Venezuela  and  drove  another  out  of  Nica- 
ragua. We  interfered  to  save  the  former 
country  from  European  exploitation  and 
frustrated  a  German  plot  to  control  the 
latter.  To  what  end  have  we  done  these 
things? 

We  have  been  troubled  for  some  years 
by  anarchy  in  the  neighboring  "  Repub- 
lic "  of  Mexico,  for  which  we  are  largely 
responsible,  and  have  prevented  other 
nations  from  restoring  order  and  protect- 
ing their  nationals  and  interests.  Is  this 
advisable?  We  mediated  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  used  successfully  our  good 
offices  with  the  European  powers  in  the 
interest  of  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
Moroccan  Dispute  of  1905,  and  are  keenly 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         17 

watchful  for  a  chance  to  end  the  present 
gigantic  struggle.  What  enabled  us  to  act 
in  the  instances  referred  to?  What  is  back 
of  our  aspiration  to  restore  peace  out  of 
the  present  condition?  Has  our  policy 
brought  us  friendlier  relations,  and  will 
it  do  so?  Has  it  moved  to  our  advan- 
tage, and  will  it  continue  to  have  such 
effect?  What  are  the  consequences  of 
our  representations  in  behalf  of  the  Jews 
in  Russia  and  in  the  Balkan  States,  in 
behalf  of  the  Armenians  in  Turkey  and 
the  natives  of  the  Congo  in  Africa?  Our 
negroes  founded  the  Republic  of  Liberia. 
Shall  we  continue  to  exercise  ourselves 
for  the  continuance  of  that  country  as  a 
free   State? 

The  commerce  of  the  United  States 
flows  along  broad  lines  to  every  settled 
land.  By  parallel  routes  come  back  to 
us,  from  far  and  near,  things  which  we 
do  not  produce  but  which  necessity  or 
luxury  causes  us  to  buy.  Our  wheat  fills 
English  stomachs,  our  meats  make  Ger- 
man  brawn.     Our  cotton   runs   the  looms 


18         IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  England  and  France  and  Japan  and 
Germany.  These  countries  are  more  eager 
for  this  product  in  time  of  war  than 
they  were  in  time  of  peace,  for  it  is  the 
base  of  high  explosives.  Our  agricul- 
tural  implements  are  used  in  Russia,  in 
Argentina  and  other  countries.  Our  steel 
makes  rails  for  steam  and  electric  roads 
in  India  and  China,  Egypt  and  South 
America.  Transformed  into  weapons  of 
war,  it  has  been  of  the  greatest  value  to 
the  Allies,  and  has  provoked  the  German 
charge  that  American  munitions  pre- 
vented an  early  and  victorious  peace. 
Our  oil  is  lubricating  the  engines  of  war 
and  our  gasoline  running  the  motors  of 
the  land  transports  and  warships  of  the 
Allies.  Our  manufactured  products, 
grown  to  a  stupendous  volume,  are  com- 
peting with  European  wares  in  markets 
everywhere.  We  have  been  dependent 
upon  Germany  for  dyestuffs  with  which 
to  make  our  cotton  and  woolen  goods  at- 
tractive to  the  eye. 

The  United   Kingdom  and  France  con- 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         19 

tribute  heavily  to  our  supplies  of  cloths 
and  laces  and  ornaments.  Great  Britain 
sells  us  immense  quantities  of  crude 
rubber.  Japan,  China,  France  and  Italy 
provide  us  with  silks.  France  sells  us 
champagne  and  other  wines  and  liquors; 
Japan  and  China,  teas.  We  have  no  mer- 
chant marine;  therefore  we  pay  immense 
freight  bills  to  England,  Norway,  Japan 
and  other  states.  We  have  no  direct  sys- 
tem of  exchange,  and  as  a  result  hand 
heavy  commissions  to  London  and  Paris. 
We  owe  immense  sums  to  foreign 
investors,  principally  English  and  French, 
and  our  goods  pay  the  interest.  Our 
business  at  once  took  advantage  of 
Europe's  fight  for  life,  to  extend  its  mar- 
kets, to  build  up  a  merchant  marine,  to 
establish  banks  in  foreign  lands  in  order 
to  save  commissions  on  exchange,  and  to 
displace  English,  French  and  German 
investments  by  American  capital  and 
thereby  to  force  others  to  work  for  us. 

Do  these  activities  make  for  friendship 
or     irritation?     Does     the     other     fellow 


20        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

regard  them  as  a  mean  advantage  taken 
of  him  when  he  is  down? 

Recall  what  history  teaches.  If  there  is 
any  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  the  past 
of  the  modern  world  it  is  that  the  great 
war-producing  factor  is  the  ''peaceful 
struggle"  for  the  control  of  trade.  Nations 
which  once  sank  their  teeth  in  each  other's 
throats  for  dynastic  or  religious  reasons, 
now  fight  in  order  that  they  may  sell. 
Peaceful  penetration  frequently  has  served 
as  a  preliminary  to  forcible  intervention. 
We  like  to  say  the  war  with  Spain  was  an 
expression  of  fine  altruism.  It  was,  in 
part;  and  nothing  could  have  been  more 
generous  than  our  withdrawal  from  Cuba. 
But  President  McKinley,  in  describing 
the  grounds  for  intervention  in  that  island, 
specifically  stated  among  them:  "The 
right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the 
very  serious  injury  to  commerce,  trade 
and  business  of  our  people,  and  by  the 
wanton  destruction  of  property  and  devas- 
tation of  the  island." 

When  the  European  war  broke  out,   a 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         21 

congressman  observed  that  "  the  present 
insanity  of  Europe  is  the  logical  result 
of  the  great  nations  abroad  having  per- 
mitted their  souls  to  become  corrupt, 
hard,  cruel  and  atrophied,  just  to  acquire 
v^ealth  and  power  and  imperialism."  It 
is  an  obvious  fact  that  morality  is  based 
upon  condition.  A  standard  in  a  rich, 
opulent  and  ^'  civilized "  country  is  not 
necessarily  the  standard  in  another  where 
the  struggle  for  life  is  keener.  God  has 
infinite  ways  to  find  expression.  So,  in 
Germany  we  find  the  people,  moved  by 
the  memory  of  the  sufferings  of  their 
ancestors  under  Napoleon,  struggling  for 
freedom,  for  unity,  for  empire,  accepting 
militarism  as  an  evil  of  necessity,  and 
burdened  by  the  taxes  of  excessive  arma- 
ments. We  find  them  growing  in  popu- 
lation, increasing  tremendously  their 
output  of  manufactures,  believing  them- 
selves deprived  of  that  ''  place  in  the  sun  " 
which  the  Germans  regard  as  their  due. 

Occupied   as   they  were  for  years  with 
their    internal     development,     they    stood 


22        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

aloof,  careless  that  rivals  were  taking  rich 
tracts  of  land  throughout  the  world;  and 
when  they  awoke,  and  looked  for  places 
to  seize,  they  discovered  that  those  of  any 
value  had  already  been  sequestrated  by 
other  states.  They  found  their  country 
bottled-up,  their  water-borne  trade  men- 
aced, as  their  militarists  taught,  by  English 
control  of  both  exits  from  the  North  Sea, 
and  competing  in  foreign-controlled  mar- 
kets under  unfavorable  conditions.  The 
Germany  that  prepared  for  ''  The  Day," 
that  seized  the  moment  of  her  greatest 
strength  and  her  adversaries'  greatest 
weakness,  that  violated  solemn  treaties,  was 
not  the  mystic  Germany  the  world  loved. 
It  was  a  Germany  that  had  turned  from 
Kant  and  Goethe  and  Schiller,  to 
Treitschke  and  Bernhardi  and  Krupp; 
from  the  expression  of  the  soul  to  the 
materialism   of   the   body. 

England,  France,  Russia  and  the  United 
States  are  in  no  such  territorial  situation 
as  Germany.  England  owns  one-third  of 
the  earth.     France  has  an  area  one-third 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         23 

larger  than  that  of  the  United  States. 
Russia  has  practically  an  unlimited  area. 
The  population  of  France  is  stationary, 
that  of  Great  Britain  is  increasing  at  the 
rate  of  eleven  per  thousand,  of  Russia  at 
about  fourteen  per  thousand,  of  Germany 
at  fourteen  per  thousand.  England, 
France  and  Russia  have  ample  room  in 
which  to  turn  around,  ample  preferential 
markets  for  their  products.  The  United 
States,  still  with  plenty  of  unoccupied 
land,  has  concerned  itself  largely  with 
internal  affairs,  and  only  in  a  haphazard 
way  has  it  pushed  its  interests  abroad. 
England,  France  and  the  United  States 
prefer  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo, 
and  have  been  avowed  advocates  of  inter- 
national peace.  Change,  to  them,  has 
meant  and  means  danger  and  perhaps 
destruction.  This  is  the  reason  for  the 
strong  hold  the  doctrine  of  pacificism 
has  gained  upon  their  peoples.  No  nation 
thinks  of  war  unless  it  expects  to  profit 
thereby.  England  and  France  stood  to 
lose    if    forced    to    battle.      Because    her 


24        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

immense  land  holdings  filled  her  needs 
though  not  her  capacity,  Russia  produced 
a  party  of  peace  headed  by  the  Czar,  who 
called  the  first  Hague  Conference.  But 
this  party  could  not  stand  against  the 
centuries-old  desire,  the  centuries-old 
need,  to  win  free  access  to  the  open  sea. 
To  a  lesser  extent,  but  equally  important 
to  her  people,  the  same  desire  propelled 
Servia  into  war.  Back  of  great  events  there 
are  sometimes  what  to  outsiders  seem  such 
little  things!  One  of  the  interesting 
bases  of  Servia's  dream  of  greatness  lay 
in  her  inability  to  get  her  pigs  to  foreign 
markets  save  by  the  payment  of  taxes  to 
surrounding  states. 

Austria-Hungary,  touching  the  sea  only 
by  way  of  the  Adriatic,  which  is  under 
the  guns  of  Italy,  sought  an  outlet  into 
the  Aegean  Sea  and  through  it  to  the 
world,  unfettered  by  the  proximity  of  a 
strong  power.  Japan,  poor,  heavily  bur- 
dened by  debt,  crowded  to  the  point  of 
bursting,  was  forced  into  Korea  and  Man- 
churia,  and  expects,   through   the  control 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         25 

of  China,  to  become  a  second  Great 
Britain.  The  war  has  made  Japan 
dominant  in  Asia,  and  enabled  her  to  take 
a  forward  step  in  the  direction  of  the 
mastery  of  the  Pacific.  Only  one  nation 
—  the  United  States  —  and  that  not  a  mili- 
tary nation,  a  nation  that  yearns  for  peace 
(some  favor  it  at  any  price),  is  at  this 
time  in  any  position  to  dispute  her  desire. 
It_may  astonish  Americans  to  know  that 
their  country  has  but  one  friend  in  the 
world  —  the  United  States.  There  are 
people  who  say  self-interest  will  prevent 
England  from  ever  making  war  upon  us, 
that  without  our  foodstuffs  and  raw  mate- 
rials she  would  starve  to  death  and  die 
commercially,  that  her  tremendous  invest- 
ments in  this  country  are  and  must  be  a 
great  factor  for  peace,  and  that  Canada 
constitutes  a  hostage  the  value  of  which 
can  not  be  overestimated.  To  some 
extent  this  is  true;  but  as  an  offset  to 
our  wheatfields  there  are  the  whcatfields 
of  Argentina  and  Russia;  and  England 
has  been  battling  to  gain   access   to   those 


26        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  the  latter  through  the  Dardanelles. 
Investments  are  capable  of  discharge 
prior  to  war  or  can  not  be  permanently 
destroyed  thereby,  and  the  loss  of  Canada 
could  be  made  good  by  Great  Britain's 
seizure  of  the  Panama  Canal,  to  say 
nothing  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  Hawaii 
and  the  Philippines.  Moreover,  the  Ameri- 
can people  ought  not  to  delude  them- 
selves with  the  idea  tht  Great  Britain  is 
looking  with  complacency  upon  our  efforts 
to  get  her  trade  and  the  trade  of  Germany, 
for  which  she  has  poured  out  blood  and 
treasure  in  unstinted  measure.  Trade  is 
her  life,  and  she  will  hold  and  increase  it 
at  whatever  cost. 

With  France,  we  have  fewer  points  of 
conflict  than  with  most  nations.  But 
France  was  disposed  to  enter  into  a 
European  coalition  against  us  in  favor 
of  Spain  prior  to  and  during  the  war 
of  1898.  Russia  can  not  understand 
American  hostility,  as  evidenced  during 
her  war  with  Japan  and  by  the  denuncia- 
tion of   the  treaty  of    1833   by  the  Taft 


POINTS  OF  CONTACT         27 

administration.  Besides,  Russia  has  found 
her  aims  in  the  Far  East  thwarted  by 
the  activity  of  the  American  government. 
Germany  never  has  recognized,  indeed 
always  has  been  antagonistic  to,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  She  desired  land  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  and  resented  our 
claim  of  a  ''  sphere  of  influence "  which 
she  and  other  nations  must  not  penetrate. 
Her  feeling  against  us  has  been  accentu- 
ated by  the  general  sympathy  we  enter- 
tain for  the  cause  of  the  Allies.  Japan 
regards  our  claim  and  her  own  in  Asia 
and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  as 
conflicting. 

Thus,  even  a  bird's-eye  view  of  interna- 
tional relations  discloses  many  points  of 
concentration  for  all  the  nations  against 
the  United  States.  Let  no  one  think  our 
potential  strength  will  act  as  a  bar  against 
European  protection  of  European  interests 
wherever  the  latter  are  menaced.  When 
the  Great  War  ends,  Europe  will  be 
equipped  with  superb  fleets  and  armies 
of    millions    of    veterans.      Will    they    be 


1-' 


28  IMPERILED  AMERICA 

used  for   the   purpose   of   making   Uncle 

Sam  pay   at   least   a   share   of   the   heavy 

debt  the  war  has  created? 


chapter  ii 

Our  Internal  Situation  and  the  War 

It  is  obvious  that  for  a  democracy,  such 
as  the  United  States,  to  play  an  effective 
role  in  international  affairs,  it  must  pre- 
sent a  united  front  and  speak  with  a 
united  voice.  It  may  have  divergent 
views  upon  purely  internal  questions,  for 
the  effect  in  such  cases  is  domestic  only. 
It  ought  not  to  show  division  upon 
foreign  questions,  for  it  thereby  gives 
evidence  of  uncertainty  and  indecision 
which  lends  strength  to  its  adversary.  It 
should  be  cognizant  of  its  vital  interests 
and  prepared  to  protect  them.  Above 
all,  it  should  be  inspired  by  the  ideals 
of  the  spirit  and  seek  to  give  them  reali- 
zation. If  it  is  to  live,  it  cannot  hold 
back  in  a  great  moral  situation  from  fear 
of  self-hurt.    It  must  take  its  stand  boldly, 

29 


30        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

courageously,    and    press    on    to    its    goal 
without  count  of  cost. 

Did  the  United  States  during  the  long 
months  of  the  great  war  show  a  united 
front,  speak  with  a  united  voice?  Did  it 
mark  out  and  pursue  a  definite  course  of 
action,  in  which  ideals  and  vital  inter- 
ests were  blended?  Neither  question  can 
be  answered  in  the  affirmative.  There 
were  occasions  when  it  did  take  a  bold 
stand,  but  did  it  press  on  to  achieve  the 
things  demanded?  Again  the  answer 
must  be  in  the  negative.  The  reasons  for 
these  inconsistencies,  these  failures,  lie  in 
a  variety  of  causes,  the  first  of  which  is  to 
be  found  in  the  lack  of  real  leadership  and 
the  second  in  the  absence  of  a  militant 
nationalism.  The  president  of  the  United 
States,  especially  in  foreign  affairs,  should 
not  wait  to  ascertain  the  will  of  the  people 
before  taking  action.  They  can  not  know 
the  facts  as  he  knows  them.  Again,  he 
is  or  should  be  familiar  with  the  cross 
currents  that  develop  in  connection  with 
any  important  event,  of  which  they  neces- 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    31 

sarily  are  ignorant.  It  is  for  the  presi- 
dent, when  he  has  made  himself  acquainted 
with  the  facts  and  the  law,  to  act,  in  other 
words,  to  lead.  How  often  during  the  war, 
President  Wilson  delayed  representation, 
how  often  modified  or  strengthened  com- 
munications to  foreign  governments  because 
of  the  interpretation  he  gave  to  the  will  of 
the  people!  In  a  note  to  Germany  dated 
February  10,  1915,  for  example,  protest- 
ing against  the  establishment  of  a  war 
zone  about  the  British  Isles,  he  declared 
that  the  Berlin  government  would  be  held 
to  a  "  strict  accountability,"  if  any  Ameri- 
can ships  were  attacked  or  any  American 
lives  lost.  During  the  next  few  months  the 
British  liners  Falaba,  Lusitania  and 
Arabic  were  destroyed,  American  citizens 
were  drowned,  and  attacks  were  made 
upon  various  American  ships.  The  Presi- 
dent sent  vigorous  notes;  they  are  master- 
pieces in  respect  of  the  demands  made 
and  the  language  used.  But  because  the 
Adminstration  felt  the  people  were  con- 
tent with  expression  and  averse  to  action, 


32        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

it  allowed  the  questions  raised  to  drift 
into  the  realm  of  discussion,  and  when 
this  occurred  the  end  could  be  fore- 
casted with  a  reasonable  degree  of  cer- 
tainty. The  really  important  features  of 
the  Lusitania  note  were  the  declaration 
that  submarines  could  not  be  employed 
as  commerce  destroyers,  and  the  demand 
for  a  disavowal.  Eight  months  later  the 
United  States  gave  formal  recognition  to 
the  submarine  as  a  commerce  destroyer 
and  to  the  German  contention  that  under 
certain  conditions  war  on  American  life 
was  permissible.  (1)  Subsequently,  to  the 
confusion  of  Europe,  and  to  the  injury 
of  our  influence  abroad,  the  President 
switched  back  to  the  position  that  Ameri- 
cans were  entitled  to  travel  in  safety  upon 
the  sea.    The  agreement  which  was  reached 

(1)  See  note  of  January  18,  1916,  sent  by- 
Secretary  Lansing  to  the  British,  Russian, 
French  and  Italian  Ambassadors,  in  which 
he  proposed  abandonment  of  the  American 
principle  that  merchantmen  could  be  armed 
for  defensive  purposes  and  announced  that 
the  government  thereafter  was  disposed  to 
treat  all  such  vessels  as  auxiliary  cruisers. 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    33 

in  February,  1914,  in  settlement  of  the 
Lusitania  controversy,  but  not  accepted  by 
the  President  at  the  time  because  of  the 
return  of  the  Central  Powers  to  their  sub- 
marine operations,  was  in  no  sense  a 
disavowal,  and  while  construed  by  the 
Administration  as  an  admission  of  ille- 
gality, was  not  so  regarded  by  Germany. 

The  lack  of  a  consistent  American  - 
nationalism,  which  the  war  brought  home 
to  the  people,  was  realized  abroad  far 
more  than  in  the  United  States.  We 
accepted  without  comment  the  existence 
of  a  German- American  vote,  an  Irish' 
American  vote,  a  Scandinavian-American 
vote,  a  Polish-American  vote,  a  Jewish- 
American  vote,  etc.  Likewise  without 
comment,  we  recognized  the  political 
necessity  of  seeking  the  ballots  of  these 
citizens  from  over  the  sea  by  the  selection 
of  candidates  of  their  respective  nativities 
for  office.  The  constitution  wisely  pro- 
vides that  only  an  American-born  citizen 
may  be  president  of  the  United  States. 
This  qualification  has  no  application  to  the 


34        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

membership  of  the  Senate  or  House  of 
Representatives  or  to  any  other  federal  or 
state  office.  The  races  which  alone  are 
excluded  from  the  polls  are  the  Chinese 
and  Japanese.  To  secure  the  backing  of 
the  foreign  elements  that  can  vote,  national 
administrations  have  deemed  it  expedient 
to  insult  and  flout  foreign  states  and 
thereby  to  sow  seeds  of  dislike  which 
some  day  may  sprout  a  Jasonic  harvest 
of  spears. 

In  a  world-wide  war,  such  as  broke  out 
on  that  fateful  day  of  August,    1914,   the 
great  questions  facing  the  powers  involved, 
included  the  attitude  of  the  United  States. 
Had  this  country  intervened,  as  Theodore 
Roosevelt  intervened  in  the  Morocco  con- 
troversy in  1905,  the  war  might  not  have 
occurred.     But  nothing  was  done,  beyond 
the  suggestion  that  the  powers  observe  the 
Bryan  Peace  Plan,  contemplating  an  inves- 
tigation   of    the    causes    of    the    Austro- 
Servian    dispute.      Germany    rejected    this 
suggestion,  just  as  she  had   refused   prior 
to  the  war  to  enter  into  a  treaty  based  upon 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    35 

the  Bryan  plan.  When  Belgium  was  in- 
vaded, and  the  guaranteed  neutrality  of  that 
nation  was  violated,  the  United  States, 
bewildered,  confused,  appalled,  by  the 
approach  of  the  conflagration,  sought 
refuge  in  "  safety  first."  President  Wilson 
adjured  the  people  to  be  neutral  in  thought 
and  act,  when  every  person  in  the  country 
of  any  intelligence  had  made  up  his  mind 
as  to  the  right  and  wrong  of  the  struggle, 
and  had  squarely  placed  the  responsibility 
for  its  occurrence  on  one  side  or  the  other. 
But  more  than  this,  the  impossibility 
of  neutrality  in  thought  and  act  lay  in 
the  character  of  the  American  people. 
There  was  not  a  foreign  government 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  "  melting 
pot "  had  become  full  and  that  there  had 
fallen  over  its  sides,  unscarred  or  barely 
scarred  by  the  heat  of  the  American 
spirit,  solid  blocks  of  foreign  nationalities 
imbued  with  the  Old  Country  culture  and 
responsive  to  some  extent  to  the  Old 
Country  influence.  Upon  the  vast  number 
of  immigrants  who,  because  of  economic 


36        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

or  political  conditions  at  home,  have  come 
to  the  United  States,  we  have  succeeded 
in  stamping  our  language,  our  laws  and 
our  literature.  From  their  cross  has 
developed  a  virile,  aggressive  race,  which, 
by  virtue  of  its  numbers  and  "  push," 
has  made  us  one  of  the  great  world 
powers. 

Nearly  fifteen  per  cent  of  our  total 
population  to-day  is  foreign  born.  One- 
fifth  of  this  is  German  born,  which  by 
far  is  the  largest  proportion.  Half  of  the 
foreigners  we  have  are  of  northwestern 
European  stock,  than  which  there  is  no 
better.  An  equally  large  proportion  has 
become  naturalized  and  the  vast  majority 
are  loyal  to  their  adopted  country.  But 
practically  all  of  them  remember  the 
agony  of  their  Mother  Land.  So  we 
find  most  of  those  of  German  extraction 
not  only  sympathetic  with  the  German 
nation  in  its  struggle,  for  which  they  can 
not  be  criticized,  but,  what  is  reprehen- 
sible in  the  highest  degree,  many  of  them 
seeking  to  influence  the  policy  of  the  gov- 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    37 

ernment  at  Washington  in  the  interest 
of  that  nation.  Action  along  the  lines  for 
which  they  agitate  would  provoke  the 
Allies  and  precipitate  us  into  war  with 
that  powerful  combination.  There  are 
professional  politicians  of  Irish  birth  who 
are  aiding  and  abetting  efforts  of  the 
unpatriotic  Americans  of  German  birth, 
not  because  they  have  love  for  Germany, 
but  because  of  their  belief  that  it  will  be 
to  their  personal  advantage  to  clamor 
against  England.  There  are  but  few  Amer- 
icans of  English  and  French  birth  who 
pursue  the  equally  reprehensible  course  of 
urging  an  unneutral  attitude  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  Allies.  All  these  men 
deserve  the  severe  judgment  of  the  real 
American,  who  may  be  sympathetic  with 
one  side  or  the  other,  but  who  places  his 
country's  interests  first. 

It  is  an  unfortunate  fact  that  the  sound 
advice  of  our  first  President  should  fall 
upon  deaf  ears  to-day  as  it  did  when  he 
;lt  impelled  to  give  it. 

"  Our     citizens,"     wrote     Washington, 


SliSOl 


38        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

"  would  advocate  their  own  cause  instead 
of  that  of  any  other  nation  under  the  sun; 
that  is,  if  instead  of  being  Frenchmen  or 
Englishmen  in  politics  they  would  be 
Americans,  indignant  at  any  attempt  of 
either,  or  any  other  power,  to  establish  an 
influence  in  our  councils  or  presume  to 
sow  the  seeds  of  discord  or  disunion  among 


us." 


Let  us  hark  back  over  our  history  and 
see  how  administrations,  in  spite  of  Wash- 
ington's injunction,  have  permitted  their 
foreign  policies  to  be  guided  by  the 
vote.  Professional  Irish  politicians  for 
years  sensibly  influenced  our  national  atti- 
tude toward  England;  our  Jews  compelled 
diplomatic  intervention  in  behalf  of  their 
coreligionists  in  Russia  and  the  Balkan 
States;  our  Hungarians  brought  us  into 
strained  relations  with  Austria;  our 
Armenians,  supported  by  well-meaning 
missionaries,  almost  precipitated  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Turkey. 

The  government,  in  the  course  it 
adopted   in   these   several   matters,   claims 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    39 

to  have  been  actuated  by  the  broad  prin- 
ciples of  humanity.  Can  not  such  a  jus- 
tification in  fact  be  construed  as  a 
reflection  upon  and  an  insult  to  the  state 
approached?  Certainly  it  aroused  irrita- 
tion which  has  found  expression  occa- 
sionally to  our  embarrassment.  The 
American  people  as  a  whole,  however,  have 
remarked  the  steps  taken  with  general 
approval,  largely  because  of  their  strong, 
pulsing  sympathy  for  the  oppressed, 
and  because  of  indifference  or  ignorance 
as  to  the  effects  upon  themselves  of  unwise 
and  ill-timed  action.  For  example,  the 
condition  of  the  Belgians,  resulting  from 
their  conflict  with  the  Germans  in  the 
present  war,  caused  a  spontaneous  move- 
ment for  the  relief  of  the  sufferers.  No 
one  stopped  to  think  of  the  principle  of 
war  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  conqueror 
to  succor  the  conquered.  No  one  stopped 
to  think  that  the  lifting  of  this  burden 
from  German  shoulders  would  irritate 
Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  which 
realize   that   the   one  sure   way   for   them 


v, 


40        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

to  compass  the  defeat  of  their  enemy  is 
through  the  exhaustion  of  his  supply  of 
foodstufifs.  For  America  to  feed  the 
Belgians  was  to  enable  Germany,  in  their 
view,  to  carry  on  the  war  that  much  longer^ 
This  consideration  caused  the  Allies  to 
decline  to  permit  American  charity  to 
reach  the  Poles. 

/And  yet,  after  all,  there  is  something 
fine  about  our  meddlesome  conduct,  some- 
thing that  appeals  to  the  nobler  instincts, 
even  of  the  states  we  addressed  and  pos- 
sibly injured.y  We  had  nothing  to  gain  by 
recognizing,  in  the  person  of  the  great 
Kossuth,  the  Hungarian  movement  for 
freedom;  by  agitating  against  England 
for  a  wiser  policy  toward  the  Irish;  by 
constantly  seeking  to  better  the  condition 
of  foreign  Jews;  by  protesting  against  the 
wanton  massacre  of  the  Armenians;  by 
insisting  upon  the  observance  of  a  policy 
of  humanity  toward  the  natives  of  the 
Congo  and  Peru.  Had  Germany,  instead 
of  invading  Belgium,  first  turned  her 
attention   to  Russia,   the  sympathy  of  the 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    41 

American  people  probably  would  have 
gone  out  to  the  Vaterland.  But,  on  the 
ground  of  necessity,  the  German  armies 
swept  into  and  through  Belgium,  an 
inoffensive  bystander,  with  the  intention 
of  thrashing  France,  and  when  this  task 
was  accomplished  they  proposed  to  deal 
with  the  Russian  Bear.  The  spirit  of  fair 
play  and  respect  for  the  innocent  and 
weak,  are  two  of  the  most  dominant  char- 
acteristics of  the  American  people.  They 
saw  Germany  pouncing  upon  a  peaceful 
nation  with  which  she  had  no  quarrel, 
merely  as  a  matter  of  expediency,  and 
their  sympathy  swelled  out  to  that  nation 
more  unitedly  than  could  have  been 
expected  in  a  land  among  whose  inhabi- 
tants ten  per  cent  at  least  are  of  German 
origin  or  extraction.  Germany  com- 
plained that  through  English  control  of 
cables  a  false  color  had  been  put  on  all 
news  dispatches,  and  that  the  real  truth  was 
that  Belgium,  France  and  England  had 
combined  to  attack  her.  It  is  unnecessary 
here   to   say   more   than    this:     The   bulk 


42        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  the  American  people  based  their 
judgment  upon  the  fact  that  German 
troops  were  the  first  to  enter  Belgium 
and  that  this  had  been  preceded  by 
an  ultimatum  either  to  permit  them  to 
pass  without  molestation  or  to  sufifer  the 
consequences.  Moreover,  events  quickly 
demonstrated  that  England,  France  and 
Russia  were  not  ready  for  war,  while  Ger- 
many was  prepared,  down  to  the  double 
set  of  suspender  buttons  upon  the  trousers 
of  her  soldiers. 

So  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
entered  upon  the  war  under  a  serious 
handicap  so  far  as  the  feeling  of  the 
American  people  was  concerned.  Blun- 
der followed  on  blunder.  The  careful 
diplomacy  of  years  designed  to  cultivate 
American  friendship  was  abandoned  for 
a  course  of  action  which  aroused  resent- 
ment and  tended  toward  the  development 
of  effective  nationalism.  There  were 
efforts  made  to  coerce  the  administration 
to  adopt  a  pro-German  policy  by  threat- 
ening    it    with     the     opposition     of     the 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    43 

German-American  vote.  There  was  an 
attempt  to  form  a  political  party  designed 
to  further  German  aims.  It  was 
announced  that  German-Americans  would 
not  support  any  candidate  for  office  who 
did  not  declare  himself  favorable  to  a 
pro-German  neutrality.  The  Administra- 
tion, during  the  political  campaign  of 
1915,  was  refused  democratic  endorsement 
because  of  German-American  opposition. 
There  were  movements  directed  against 
our  peace  and  security;  there  were 
attempts,  some  successful,  to  destroy  our 
industrial  plants;  there  were  measures 
enforced  to  violate  our  neutrality  and 
to  make  us  the  base  for  one  or  the  other 
of  the  contending  parties;  there  were 
intrigues,  plots,  conspiracies,  designed  to 
involve  us  in  the  struggle,  and  there  were 
even  formulated  plans  contemplating  an 
internal  revolution  in  order  to  cripple  us 
in   case  of  war  with   Germany. 

It  is  apparent,  even  to  the  most  super- 
ficial observer,  that  such  events  as  occurred 
during   the   first  year  and   a   half   of   the 


44         IMPERILED  AMERICA 

war  could  not  have  been  produced  save 
by  years  of  careful,  methodical  prepara- 
tion. Great  Britain  long  prior  to  the  war 
had  ceased  to  interfere  in  our  internal 
affairs  and  had  sought  by  consideration 
of,  and  concessions  to,  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  to  provide  for  a  state 
of  relations  based  upon  reciprocal  under- 
standing and  on  mutuality  of  interest. 
Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  labored 
to  undermine  the  government  of  the 
United  States  through  the  cultivation  of 
Germans  who  had  become  American  citi- 
zens, and  through  the  use  of  their  influence 
in  behalf  of  German  interests.  The  policy 
inaugurated  by  Baron  von  Holleben,  the 
German  Ambassador  during  and  follow- 
ing the  war  with  Spain,  was  carried  on 
with  remarkable  ability  by  his  successor, 
Baron  von  Sternburg,  and  with  equal 
cleverness  by  Count  von  Bernstorfif.  Each 
of  these  men,  working  devotedly  for  his 
country,  lost  no  opportunity  to  secure  the 
greatest  number  of  recruits  for  the  Vater- 
land    and    to    promote    German    interests 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    45 

through  them.  Germany's  anxiety  for 
friendly  relations  was  manifested  to  the 
people  in  various  ways:  By  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Emperor's  yacht,  the  Meteor, 
in  the  United  States,  by  the  visit  of  Prince 
Henry  in  1902,  by  the  reception  of  the 
American  fleet  at  Kiel,  by  the  exchange 
of  professors  between  leading  universities 
of  the  two  nations,  by  messages  of  good 
will,  a  press  propaganda,  speeches  by  the 
Ambassadors  and  by  courtesies  extended 
to  prominent  American  public  men.  Yet, 
under  the  surface,  visible  only  to  the  offi- 
cials, ran  a  strong  current  of  purpose  to 
achieve  the  things  in  and  from  the  United 
States  which  formed  the  goal  of  German 
statecraft. 

Unquestionably,  Germany  displayed  the 
greatest  political  activity  in  the  United 
States  of  any  foreign  nation.  France 
relied  upon  the  historic  friendship 
between  the  two  countries  to  bridge  over 
any  question  that  might  arise;  and  this 
policy  was  of  easy  execution  because  of 
the  lack  of  conflicting  interests.     Austria- 


/ 


46        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Hungary  regarded  the  United  States  as 
so  remote,  just  as  the  United  States  looked 
upon  her  as  so  distant,  that  the  two  govern- 
ments jogged  along  upon  a  perfectly  polite 
basis,  without  either  taking  much  interest 
in  the  policies  of  the  other.  Italy  con- 
cerned herself  with  the  protection  and 
assertion  of  the  rights  of  her  subjects 
in  the  United  States.  Russia  was  aston- 
ished when  American  public  opinion  sup- 
ported the  cause  of  Japan  during  the  war 
between  those  empires  in  1904-5.  It  was 
a  rude  awakening  from  her  dream  of 
American  gratitude  based  upon  her  action 
in  making  a  naval  demonstration  at  New 
York  and  San  Francisco  in  a  critical 
period  of  the  Civil  War.  But  she  had 
bigger  fish  to  fry  at  home,  and  she  allowed 
her  relations  with  this  country  to  drift 
until  she  received  another  slap  in  the  face 
in  the  form  of  President  Taft's  denuncia- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  1833.  She  was 
inclined  to  make  reprisal,  but  did  nothing, 
for  again  she  considered  her  larger  inter- 
ests,  and   thev  could  not  be  promoted  by 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    47 

trouble  with  the  United  States.  Japan 
for  years  has  regarded  this  country  as  a 
probable  enemy  because  of  her  belief  in 
the  existence  of  a  conflict  of  interests  in 
the  Pacific  and  China.  Then,  too,  racial 
antipathy  has  developed  as  a  result  of  the 
treatment  of  Japanese  laborers  upon  the 
Pacific  Coast.  At  the  same  time,  Japan  has 
endeavored  sedulously  to  bring  about  a 
better  understanding,  through  the  visits  of 
distinguished  Japanese  to  this  country, 
through  the  establishment  of  news  agencies 
designed  to  lull  our  suspicions  of  her 
designs,  and  by  other  means  short  of  actual 
interference  in  our  politics. 

The  objects  for  which  these  various 
nations  were  working  have  been  furthered 
by  some  of  our  own  people.  Those  who 
shudder  at  the  possibility  of  the  United 
States  becoming  involved  in  war,  no 
matter  how  serious  the  affront  to  our 
honor  and  our  vital  interests,  who  advo- 
cate the  doctrine  of  non-resistance,  and 
who  regard  armaments  as  provocative  of 
conquest,  would  make  their  country  voice- 


48        IMPERILED  AMERICA 
• 

less  in  the  councils  of  the  world.  Thrice 
is  he  armed  who  hath  his  quarrel  just, 
but  thrice  times  thrice  is  he  armed  if  he 
have  a  pistol  at  his  hand.  Had  the 
United  States,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
possessed  an  adequate  fleet  and  an  army 
of  half  a  million  men,  there  is  no  ques- 
tion that  the  lives  of  our  citizens  would 
not  have  been  jeopardized  and  our  rights 
would  not  have  been  violated. 

A  man  who  is  not  blind  must  see  that 
Japan  can  do  what  she  wills  in  China 
because  she  realizes  the  United  States, 
the  only  great  power  not  at  war,  is 
in  no  position  to  make  good  militarily 
with  reference  to  any  protest  against 
her  conduct.  What  is  true  of  Japan  is 
true  of  other  nations;  for  to  them  the 
United  States  is  largely  a  big,  ununified 
mass,  with  valuable  outlying  possessions  in 
the  Panama  Canal,  Alaska,  Hawaii,  and 
the  Philippines,  which  it  has  not  sufficient 
actual  strength  to  defend.  It  is  only  the 
potential  possibilities  of  the  American 
people,     their    pluck    and    energy,     their 


OUR  INTERNAL  SITUATION    49 

never-die  spirit,  that  have  deterred  foreign 
governments  from  going  too  far  with  us. 
The  attempts  to  make  the  United  States 
the   tool   of   foreign   nations   in   the   great 
conflict  are  by  no  means  the  first  in   the 
history    of    our    country.     It    is    easy    to 
parallel  the  course  of  Germany  with  that 
of  France  in  the  early  days  of  our  infant 
republic.     There  were  the  same  plots,  the 
same  conspiracies.     The  French  agent  was 
reluctantly  dismissed  because  of  his  delib- 
erate   violations    of    our    neutrality,     his 
attempts  to  discredit  the  national  adminis- 
tration,  and  his  angry  outbursts  over  the 
refusal  of  the  United  States  to  go  to  the 
assistance  of  his  people.    There  were  coun- 
ter-plots by  the  enemies  of  France.    There 
were  measures  taken  to  stir  up  the  Indian 
tribes  against  the  struggling  nation,  just  as 
German  agents  gave  aid  to  the  revolution- 
ists  in   Mexico.     The   states   were   drawn 
closer  together  by  these  foreign  machina- 
tions, and  if  history  repeats  itself  that  will 
be  the  ultimate  effect  of  what  has  taken 
place  since  the  midsummer  of  1914. 


chapter  iii 
The  World  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  pronounce- 
ment by  the  United  States  which  owes  its 
existence  and  the  respect  it  has  gained 
from  foreign  powers  to  the  strength  of 
the  United  States.  It  has  been  called  into 
use  within  the  memory  of  the  present 
generation  against  Great  Britain,  Spain, 
Germany,  Italy,  France  and  Japan.  In 
its  inception  it  was  directed  against  the 
Holy  Alliance,  made  up  of  Russia, 
Prussia,  and  Austria,  which  France  joined. 
It  has  been"  applied  against  practically 
every  great  power  in  the  world  to-day, 
and  in  the  interest  specifically  of  most, 
and  generally  of  all,  of  the  republics  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  It  has  been 
invoked  by  every  administration  since  its 
declaration,  and  in  such  fashion  as  to 
keep  its  spirit  a  living  force. 

so 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     51 

The    Monroe    Doctrine    in    a    sense    is 
altruistic.     As    a    matter    of    fact,    it    is 
the     essence     of     enlightened     selfishness. 
Designed   primarily  in  the  interest  of  the 
safety  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
and  born  of  a  purpose  to  exclude  monar- 
chical institutions  from  the  new  world,  it 
has  worked  for  the  liberty  and  independ- 
ence   of    the    republics    of    Latin-America 
and  has  enabled  them  to  proceed  in  their 
development    along    the    lines    they    them- 
selves desired.    Had  there  been  no  Monroe 
Doctrine,  had  the  United  States  not  pur- 
sued determinedly  its  purpose  to  prevent 
foreign  powers  from  obtaining  or  extend- 
ing   footholds    upon    the    two    American 
continents,    this    hemisphere    would    today 
be  a  scene  of  strife,  offshoot  of  the  great 
European  war,  just  as  it  was  prior  to  the 
time  the  United  States  became  concerned 
over  the.  destiny  of  the  territory  lying  to  the 
south  of  it. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  no  place  in 
international  law,  though  one  of  its  bases 
is    sound    in    international    law  —  that    of 


52        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

self-preservation.  It  was  limited  by  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, which  was  superseded  by  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  Treaty.  On  two  occasions  it 
is  alleged  indirectly  to  have  received  inter- 
national recognition,  both  times  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  American  delegation  to  the 
Hague  Conference  which  drafted  conven- 
tions for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  interna- 
tional controversies.  Fearing  the  first  con- 
vention might  permit  European  signatories 
to  suggest  arbitration  of  disputes  arising 
under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  Ameri- 
can delegates  made  a  formal  reservation 
that  nothing  contained  in  the  instrument 
should  be  considered  to  require  any  aban- 
donment of  the  traditional  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  questions  purely 
American.  No  objection  whatever  was 
offered  to  this  reservation.  A  similar 
declaration  was  made  in  connection  with 
the  convention  adopted  by  the  second 
Hague  Conference. 

It    is    further    contended     that    Great 
Britain  assented  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     53 

in  the  British  Guiana- Venezuelan  dis- 
pute, and  that  Great  Britain,  Germany  and 
Italy  did  so  in  the  Venezuelan  controversy 
of  1901-2. 

In  view  of  the  way  in  which  solemn 
treaties  have  been  regarded  in  Europe  as 
"  scraps  of  paper,"  however,  it  is  evident 
that  mere  acquiescence  in  declarations  by 
representatives  of  the  United  States  would 
not  be  considered  for  a  moment  as  of 
binding  force  by  any  nation  deeming  it  to 
its  interest  to  violate  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  had  its  origin  in 
European  conditions  and  was  suggested 
by  George  Canning,  then  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  later  Prime 
Minister  of  Great  Britain.  It  is  one  of  the 
consequences  of  the  disturbances  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  Old  World.  Its 
importance  to  the  struggling  nation  at 
the  time  of  its  inception  in  1823,  as  well 
as  to  the  country  to-day,  is  best  shown  per- 
haps by  the  following  extract  from  a  letter 
written  by  Thomas  Jefferson  to  President 
Monroe: 


54        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

"  The  question  presented  by  the 
letters  you  have  sent  me  is  the  most 
momentous  which  has  ever  been 
ofifered  to  my  contemplation  since 
that  of  Independence.  That  made  us 
a  nation;  this  sets  our  compass  and 
points  the  course  which  we  are  to 
steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  open- 
ing on  us.  And  never  could  we 
embark  upon  it  under  circumstances 
more  auspicious.  Our  first  and  fun- 
damental maxim  should  be  never  to 
entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of 
Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer 
Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis- 
Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North  and 
South,  has  a  set  of  interests  distinct 
from  those  of  Europe,  and  peculiarly 
her  own.  She  should,  therefore,  have 
a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and 
apart  from  that  of  Europe.  While 
the  last  is  laboring  to  become  the 
domicile  of  despotism,  our  endeavor 
should  surely  be  to  make  our  hemis- 
phere that  of   freedom." 


THE  iMONROE  DOCTRINE     55 

It  is  unnecessary  to  recite  the  details  of 
the  origin  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  they 
are  known  to  the  world.  But  it  is  inter- 
esting to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
when  the  doctrine  was  proclaimed,  it  went 
far  beyond  the  suggestion  made  by  Sec- 
retary Canning.  President  Monroe,  in 
his  annual  message  of  1823,  declared  the 
United  States  would  consider  any  attempt 
to  extend  the  European  system  to  any 
portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous 
to  our  peace  and  safety.  "  With  the  exist- 
ing colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  Euro- 
pean power,"  he  said,  "  we  have  not  inter- 
fered and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared  their 
independence  and  maintained  it,  and 
whose  independence  we  have  on  great 
consideration  and  on  just  principles 
acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any 
interposition,  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing 
them,  or  controlling  their  destiny,  by  any 
European  power,  in  any  other  light  than 
as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  feel- 
ing towards  the  United  States."     Monroe 


56        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

further  served  notice  that  the  American 
continents  were  "  henceforth  not  to  be  con- 
sidered as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  European  powers." 

Canning's     position,     as     described     by 
Stapleton,  was  simply  that  Great  Britain 
would  not  permit  other  European  powers 
to    interfere   on    behalf    of    Spain    in    her 
contest  with   her  American   colonies.     So 
far   from   assenting   to   the  view   that   the 
unoccupied    parts    of    America    were    no 
longer  open  to  colonization  from  abroad, 
the    British    Prime    Minister    held    "  the 
United     States     had     no     right     to     take 
umbrage  at  the  establishment  of  new  col- 
onies  from  Europe  on  any  such  unoccu- 
pied   parts    of    the    American    continent." 
The  Monroe  declaration,  therefore,  struck 
at   England    as    well    as    at    Russia,    with 
which  the  United  States  was  involved  in 
a  dispute  concerning  the  Northwest  Ter- 
ritory,   and,    as    Calhoun    remarked,    gave 
offense  to  England  to  such  an  extent  that 
she  refused  to  cooperate  with  us  in  settling 
the  Russian  question.    The  Oregon  dispute 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     57 

with  Great  Britain,  of  easier  recollection 
by  the  famous  ''  fifty-four  forty  or  fight " 
slogan,  was  an  expression  by  the  Crown 
of  its  refusal  to  recognize  the  non-coloni- 
zation principle  of  the  Doctrine. 

To-day  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  of 
high  importance  to  Great  Britain;  and 
if  it  were  desired  by  us,  unquestionably 
she  willingly  would  accord  it  formal 
recognition.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  from 
time  to  time,  as  her  interests  dictated, 
she  sought  to  infringe  and  even  violate 
it;  but  the  firm  adherence  of  this  govern- 
ment  to  the  original  declaration  prevented 
success  attending  her  efforts.  The  culmi- 
nation occurred  in  connection  with  the 
boundary  dispute  between  British  Guiana 
and  Venezuela.  President  Cleveland  in 
1895  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  in 
which  he  used  this  language: 

"  It  may  not  be  amiss  to  suggest 
that  the  doctrine  upon  which  we 
stand  is  strong  and  sound  because  its 
enforcement  is  important  to  our  peace 
and  safety  as  a  nation,  and  is  essen- 


58        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

tial  to  the  integrity  of  our  free  insti- 
tutions and  the  tranquil  maintenance 
of  our  distinctive  form  of  government. 
It  was  intended  to  apply  to  every 
stage  of  our  national  life,  and  cannot 
become  obsolete  while  our  Republic 
endures.  If  the  balance  of  power  is 
justly  a  cause  for  jealous  anxiety 
among  the  governments  of  the  Old 
World,  and  a  subject  for  our  absolute 
non-interference,  none  the  less  is  an 
observance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
of  vital  concern  to  our  people  and 
their  government." 

When  Great  Britain  joined  with  Ger- 
many and  Italy  in  the  blockade  of  Vene- 
zuela in  1901-2,  Lord  Salisbury  declared 
his  government  had  no  intention  "  to  land 
a  British  force,  and  still  less  to  occupy 
Venezuelan  territory."  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  there  was  little  popularity  in  Eng- 
land in  connection  with  the  use  of  the 
navy  to  force  the  payment  of  a  debt  by 
an  American  state;  so  this  declaration 
met  with  entire  approval  among  the  Eng- 


THE  xMONROE  DOCTRINE     59 

lish  people,  and  was  followed  by  accept- 
ance of  President  Roosevelt's  proposal  for 
an  arbitration  of  the  claims.  Since  that 
time  there  has  never  been  the  slightest 
question  in  the  minds  of  the  American 
government  as  to  Great  Britain's  acqui- 
escence in  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  British 
statesmen  realize  its  value  to  their  own 
country.  They  have  come  to  understand 
that  the  non-colonization  principle  is  as 
much  in  their  interest  as  it  is  in  that  of 
the  United  States;  and,  above  all,  that  the 
declaration  that  the  dominions  of  one 
European  power  can  not  be  alienated  to 
another,  constitutes  in  fact  a  guarantee  by 
the  United  States  that  it  will  not  permit 
any  of  Britain's  enemies  to  take  possession 
of  British  colonies  in  the  Western  World. 
In  short,  the  United  States  is  a  power- 
ful potential  backer  of  British  control 
of  territory  in  the  Western  Hemis- 
phere. Likewise,  it  is  the  backer  of  the 
possessions  of  France  in  the  West  Indies 
and  in  French  Guiana,  and  of  those  of  the 
Netherlands.      The    Danish    West    Indian 


60        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Islands  are  about  to  pass  into  our  posses- 
sion. 

Germany  has  been  and  is  in  a  position 
totally  different  from  that  of  Great 
Britain  in  connection  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  She  regards  it  with  disfavor. 
The  records  of  the  Department  of  State 
contain  reports  of  coaling  bases,  always 
at  strategic  points,  established  ostensibly 
for  German  merchant  lines,  and  later 
in  reference  to  the  erection  of  wireless 
stations.  They  call  attention  to  German 
emigration  to  southern  Brazil  and  Ger- 
man interest  in  the  prosperity  and  de- 
velopment of  these  representatives  of 
the  Vaterland.  In  1901,  the  government 
learned  that  German  warships  were 
inspecting  the  Island  of  Santa  Margarita, 
ofif  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  with  a  view  to 
its  occupation  as  a  naval  base.  Subse- 
quently, information  was  received  that 
secret  negotiations  were  under  way  for 
German  acquisition  of  two  harbors  in 
Lower  California  for  the  Kaiser's  "  per- 
sonal  use."     Interposition  by  the  United 


THE  xMONROE  DOCTRINE     61 

States  prevented  these  various  essays  from 
meeting  with  success. 

The  real  test  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
so  far  as  Germany  was  concerned,  arose  in 
connection  with  the  blockade  of  Venezuela 
in  1901-2,  which  already  has  been  referred 
to.  Russia  and  France  had  renewed  their 
treaty  of  alliance,  leaving  Germany  iso- 
lated upon  the  continent;  and  Great 
Britain,  which  suspected  Russia's  designs 
in  the  Near  and  Far  East  and  was  on  edge 
with  France  as  a  result  of  the  latter's 
African  adventures,  was  in  a  mood  to 
listen  to  overtures.  The  result  was  an 
agreement  between  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  in  which  Italy  joined,  to  collect 
certain  claims  pending  against  Venezuela, 
which  the  latter  seemed  indisposed  to 
pay.  Lord  Lansdowne's  assurance  already 
has  been  quoted;  that  of  Germany,  as 
expressed  by  Baron  von  Holleben,  the 
Kaiser's  Ambassador  in  Washington,  was 
as   follows : 

"  We  declare  especially  that  under 

no   circumstances   do   we   consider   in 


62        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

our  proceedings  the  acquisition  or  the 
permanent  occupation  of  Venezuelan 
territory.     ...     If  this  measure  [a 
blockade]  does  not  seem  efficient,  we 
would  have  to  consider  the  temporary- 
occupation    on   our   part   of    different 
Venezuelan    harbor    places    and    the 
levying  of   duties   in   those  places." 
President     Roosevelt     had     anticipated 
German  action  by  inserting  in  his  annual 
message    (December  3,   1901),  eight  days 
before     the     formal     declaration     above 
quoted  was  made,  the  following  reference 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine: 

"  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  decla- 
ration that  there  must  be  no  territorial 
aggrandizement  by  any  non-American 
power  at  the  expense  of  any  American 
power  on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no 
wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any  nation 
in  the  Old  World.  This  doctrine  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  commercial 
relations  of  any  American  power,  save 
that  it  in  truth  allows  each  of  them 
to  form  such  as  it  desires.    .    .    .    We 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     63 

do  not  guarantee  any  state  against 
punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself, 
provided  that  punishment  does  not 
take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  any  non  -  American 
power." 

In  spite  of  the  German  declaration,  the 
Roosevelt  administration  was  seriously 
concerned  about  the  course  of  Germany. 
The  previous  activities  of  that  government 
in  this  hemisphere,  as  well  as  information 
as  to  its  purpose  which  had  come  to 
Washington,  caused  the  impression  that 
any  "  temporary  "  occupation  by  Germany 
would  be  translated  into  permanent  occu- 
pation. So  John  Hay,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  protested  against  the  ''  peaceful 
blockade,"  the  form  of  coercion  adopted, 
as  illegal  and  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
and  declared  that  its  enforcement  against 
the  rights  of  neutrals  would  not  be  toler- 
ated. Mr.  Hay  also  urged  arbitration, 
but   without   success. 

President  Roosevelt  thereupon  took 
personal   control   of   the   situation.      At   a 


64        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

moment  when  the  Venezuelan  crisis 
reached  its  point  of  greatest  tension,  he 
requested  the  German  Ambassador  to  come 
to  the  White  House.  He  explained  to  him 
the  concern  felt  by  the  government  and 
people  of  the  United  States  at  the  course 
of  Germany  and  her  allies;  that  the  United 
States  could  not  look  upon  "a  temporary 
occupation"  of  "fifty-seven  years"  as  any- 
thing other  than  a  permanent  occupation; 
that  he  and  the  American  people  desired 
the  continuance  of  the  most  friendly  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  but  that  if  within  ten 
days  he  did  not  receive  an  official  declara- 
tion from  Emperor  Wilhelm  of  his  purpose 
to  submit  the  Venezuelan  dispute  to  arbi- 
tration, he  would  instruct  Admiral  Dewey, 
in  command  of  the  North  Atlantic  Fleet, 
which  had  been  sent  to  the  Caribbean  Sea 
ostensibly  for  "  maneuvers,"  to  proceed 
to  Venezuela  and  forcibly  prevent  the 
occupation  of  territory,  temporary  or 
otherwise. 

Baron  von  Holleben  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  Emperor  had  refused  to 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     65 

arbitrate,  and  that  this  was  final.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  informed  the  Ambassador 
that  he  did  not  propose  to  argue  the 
matter,  that  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
which  he  had  set  forth,  and  that  he 
believed  the  Ambassador  might  deem  it 
wise  to  transmit  the  conversation  to  his 
government.  Baron  von  Holleben  asked 
the  President  if  he  realized  the  meaning 
of  his  words,  and  suggested  that  it  might 
precipitate  war. 

"  Now  that  you  have  said  the  w^ord, 
Mr.  Ambassador,"  substantially  replied 
the  President,  "  it  will  mean  war  unless 
your  government  acts  as  I  have  pointed 
out." 

For  a  week.  Baron  von  Holleben 
remained  avv'ay  from  the  White  House. 
Then  he  called  and  entered  upon  a  casual 
conversation.  As  he  rose  to  go,  without 
having  mentioned  the  Venezuelan  ques- 
tion, the  President  asked  him  if  he  had 
heard  from  his  government.  He  replied 
that  he  had  not  taken  the  President's 
utterances  seriously,   and  had  not  deemed 


66        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

it  necessary  to  cable  Berlin.  Thereupon 
he  was  advised  that  Admiral  Dewey 
would  be  instructed  to  proceed  to  Vene- 
zuela twenty-four  hours  earlier  than 
originally  intended.  This  produced  an 
emphatic  protest,  which  did  not  shake  the 
President's  determination.  Mr.  Roosevelt 
assured  the  Ambassador  he  had  no  inten- 
tion to  humiliate  the  Emperor  or  Ger- 
many, that  nothing  had  been  put  in  writ- 
ing, that  if  the  Emperor  would  agree  to 
arbitration,  he  would  issue  a  statement 
praising  his  action  and  would  give  the 
public  the  impression  that  the  Emperor 
had  taken  the  initiative.  Mr.  Roosevelt 
added  that  within  forty-eight  hours  he 
must  have  an  acceptance  of  his  program 
or  Admiral  Dewey  would  sail. 

On  the  morning  of  the  day  the  ulti- 
matum was  to  expire,  Baron  von  Holleben 
with  a  beaming  face  advised  the  President 
of  his  receipt  of  a  dispatch  that  the 
Emperor  would  arbitrate.  Thereupon, 
the  President  made  a  formal  announce- 
ment, giving  the  entire  credit  of  this  step 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     67 

to  the  German  Emperor.  The  greatness 
of  the  service  which  Roosevelt's  diplomacy 
rendered  to  the  United  States  has  not  been 
realized  by  the  people,  because  of  the 
necessity  of  keeping  them  in  ignorance  of 
the  lengths  to  which  he  was  forced  to  go. 

Thus  Germany  learned  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  a  living  reality.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  known  to  this  government  that 
it  was  the  influence  of  Germany  which 
defeated  in  the  Danish  parliament  a 
treaty  made  some  years  ago,  ceding  the 
Danish  West  Indies  to  the  United  States. 
A  few  weeks  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
great  European  war,  Germany  demanded 
participation  in  the  control  of  the  customs 
revenues  of  Haiti,  ostensibly  in  order  to 
protect  the  loans  of  German  subjects  to  the 
Negro  republic. 

On  September  3,  1914,  a  little  more 
than  a  month  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  Count  von  Bernstorff,  the  German 
Ambassador,  sent  a  note  to  the  State 
Department  denying  reports  that  Ger- 
many,  if  victorious,  would  seek  expansion 


68        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

in  South  America.  He  explained  that  his 
statement  did  not  cover  the  entire  hemis- 
phere, because  no  question  had  been  raised 
as  to  alleged  German  designs  upon  any 
other  part  of  the  New  World  than  that 
directly  specified.  On  October  26,  1914, 
the  Ambassador  asserted  the  right  of 
Germany  to  invade  Canada,  despite  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  since  that  Dominion 
had  participated  in  the  war  by  dispatch- 
ing troops  to  the  European  battlefields. 
Such  a  measure  undoubtedly  would  arouse 
the  American  people;  for  the  occupation 
of  Canada  would  mean  the  establishment 
of  a  great  military  power  on  our  northern 
border  and  a  grave  threat  against  the 
peace  and  integrity  of  the  Union.  If 
Germany  should  undertake  a  step  of  this 
kind  against  any  British  possession  in 
this  hemisphere,  she  would  arouse  the 
grave  concern  of  the  United  States,  and 
in  all  human  probability  would  draw  us 
into  war. 

Japan's    interest   in   the   western   world, 
while  of   recent  manifestation,  has  had  a 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     69 

significant    effect    upon    the    development 
of    the    Monroe    Doctrine.      Occupied    as 
Japanese  statesmen  were  by  the  reorganiza- 
tion   and    expansion    of    their    country    in 
the  Far  East,  it  never  was  believed  they 
would     direct     their     national     ambition 
across  the  Pacific;  and  this  particularly  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  by  an  exchange  of 
notes     with     the     United     States     during 
the    Roosevelt   administration,   Japan    had 
tacitly  accepted  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by 
declaring  that  ''  the  policy  of  both  govern- 
ments, uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive  ten- 
dencies, is  directed  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  existing  status  quo  in  the  region  above 
mentioned  (the  Pacific  Ocean)."    Yet  this 
government     was     aroused     in     1912     by 
reports    that   a  Japanese   corporation   was 
preparing     to     purchase     land     upon     the 
shores  of  Magdalena  Bay,  Mexico,  which 
furnishes    an    admirable   site   for   a    naval 
base   and   the   occupation   of   which   by   a 
foreign   power  would  menace  the   Pacific 
route  between   the  United   States   and  the 
Panama  Canal. 


70        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

The  danger  was  met  by  the  adoption 
by  the  Senate  of  a  resolution  introduced 
by  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  of  Massachu- 
setts, under  the  terms  of  which  foreign 
corporations,  subsidized  or  controlled  by 
their  governments,  are  forbidden  to 
acquire  land  in  the  Americas  which  is 
so  situated  as  to  menace  the  safety  or 
communications  of  the  United  States. 
There  is  complaint  abroad  that  the  Lodge 
declaration  is  a  forerunner  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  foreign  corporations,  and 
diplomatic  representatives  in  Washington 
expect  this  to  happen  as  the  logical  out- 
come of  President  Wilson's  Mobile  speech 
against  Latin-American  "  concessions."  It 
may  be  said  in  passing  that  when  the 
Senate  adopted  the  Lodge  resolution,  it 
for  the  first  time  made  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  a  congressional  policy;  thereto- 
fore it  had  been  exclusively  an  executive 
policy. 

The  activity  of  a  Japanese  corporation 
thus  resulted  in  a  reiteration,  a  develop- 
ment,   if    it    may    be    called    such,    of    the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     71 

Monroe  Doctrine.  But  Japan  did  not 
take  this  rebuff  to  heart.  She  sent  a 
special  envoy  to  Mexico  —  the  first  she 
or  any  other  Asiatic  state  had  ever  sent 
to  that  country  —  to  investigate  condi- 
tions there.  Shortly  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  Japanese  warships  were 
reported  to  be  establishing  a  base  on 
Lower  California.  This  report  was  dis- 
posed of  by  a  naval  investigation  which 
disclosed  that  a  Japanese  warship  had 
been  wrecked  and  that  efforts  were  being 
made  to  salvage  her.  Attention  is  called  to 
this  incident  merely  to  show  the  suspicion 
and  concern  which  exist  in  Washington  as 
to  Japanese  purposes  in  this  part  of  the 
world. 

It  is  interesting  now  to  pass  to  the  Latin- 
American  view  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
With  the  principles  of  that  Doctrine  the  ' 
people  of  Central  and  South  America  are 
in  hearty  accord.  But  they  object  to  the 
appearance  of  overlordship  which  the  sup- 
port of  the  Doctrine  seems  to  give.  Their 
pride   is   touched   by  such   declarations   as 


11        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

that  of  Secretary  of  State  Olney:  "The 
United  States  is  practical  sovereign  on  this 
continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the 
subject  to  which  it  confines  its  interposi- 
tion." Moreover,  there  are  Latin-Ameri- 
cans who  point  out  that  the  Doctrine, 
while  forbidding  European  and  Asiatic 
conquest  of  the  territory  of  their  countries, 
contains  no  such  prohibition  against  the 
author  of  the  Doctrine;  and  proof  of  the 
predatory  instinct  of  the  United  States  is 
found  in  our  acquisition  of  territory  from 
Mexico,  our  alleged  protectorate  over 
Cuba,  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo,  our  inter- 
vention in  Nicaragua,  and  our  participa- 
tion in  the  separation  of  Panama  from  the 
Republic  of  Colombia.  Therefore,  South 
Americans  urge  the  United  States  to  adopt 
as  a  corollary  to  the  Doctrine  the  same  in- 
terdict upon  its  conquest  of  American  terri- 
tory as  it  has  imposed  upon  cis-Atlantic, 
and  cis-Pacific  states.  The  state  of  this 
feeling  was  set  forth  in  an  article  printed 
by  the  North  American  Review  of  Sep- 
tember,    1915,    from    the    pen    of    John 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     73 

Barrett,  Director  General  of  the  Pan 
American    Union. 

"  There  is  also  the  suggestion  that  all 
Latin-America  is  opposed  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,"  said  Mr.  Barrett.  "  But  what 
is  interpreted  as  opposition  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  not  a  feeling  against  the  orig- 
inal Doctrine  and  the  conditions  under 
which  it  was  declared,  but  against  a  kind 
of  casual  interpretation  of  it  in  the  United 
States  which  carries  the  obnoxious  inti- 
mation that  the  United  States  has  a  '  holier 
than  thou,'  a  supreme,  position  among  the 
nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Latin- 
America,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  believes  in  a 
just  and  unselfish  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  —  an  interpretation 
which  would  make  it  a  Pan-American 
principle  or  policy,  by  which  all  the 
countries  of  North  and  South  America 
would  stand  for  the  sovereignty  and 
integrity  of  each." 

The  suspicion  as  to  our  purposes  under 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  led  to  reports 
of  the  formation  of  an  alliance  by  Argen- 


74        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

tina,  Brazil  and  Chile,  of  negotiations  for 
a  secret  treaty  between  Chile  and  Colom- 
bia, in  connection  with  the  Panama  Canal 
episode,  and  in  various  other  ways.  It 
was  intensified  by  President  Wilson's 
declaration  that  the  United  States  was 
the  champion  of  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  the  American  hemisphere,  and  by 
his  announcement  that  he  would  not  recog- 
nize a  government  which  attained  power 
through  force  instead  of  by  the  will  of 
the  people  —  a  position  which  was  wholly 
at  variance  with  precedent  and  which  he 
was  compelled  to  abandon  within  a  little 
more  than  a  year  of  its  declaration,  in 
four  specific  cases:  China,  Peru,  Haiti, 
and  finally  Mexico.  In  other  words,  Mr. 
Wilson  was  forced  to  return  to  the 
wiser  policy  pursued  by  his  predecessors 
and  first  sounded  by  President  Monroe 
in  his  last  annual  message  to  Congress 
in   1824. 

"  These  new  states,"  said  the  astute 
Monroe,  "  are  settling  down  under  gov- 
ernments   elective    and    representative    in 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     75 

every  branch,  similar  to  our  own.  In 
this  course,  we  ardently  wish  them  to 
persevere,  under  a  firm  conviction  that  it 
will  promote  their  happiness.  In  this, 
their  career,  however,  we  have  not  inter- 
fered, believing  that  every  people  have  a 
right  to  institute  for  themselves  the  gov- 
ernment which,  in  their  judgment,  may 
suit  them  best.  Our  example  is  before 
them,  of  the  good  effect  of  which,  being 
our  neighbors,  they  are  competent  to 
judge,  and  to  their  judgment  we  leave  it, 
in  the  expectation  that  other  powers  will 
pursue  the  same  policy.  The  deep  interest 
which  we  take  in  their  independence, 
which  we  have  acknowledged,  and  in 
their  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights  incident 
thereto,  especially  in  the  very  important 
ones  of  instituting  their  own  governments, 
has  been  declared  and  is  known  to  the 
world." 

It  is  evident  that  sovereignty  implies 
obligation.  So  long  as  certain  of  the 
Latin-American  republics  which  were  in 
a    chronic    state    of    revolution,    did    not 


76        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

menace  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United 
States,  so  long  were  they  left  alone.  But 
when  by  their  acts  and  by  their  refusal 
to  pay  the  debts  they  had  incurred,  they 
paved  the  way  for  foreign  intervention, 
this  government  was  forced  to  intervene. 
When  Cuba  was  liberated  by  American 
arms  from  the  yoke  of  Spain,  the  United 
States  aided  it  in  the  establishment  of  a 
stable  government.  When  Santo  Domingo 
was  threatened  by  foreign  powers.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  upon  the  request  of  that 
government,  established  what  may  be  called 
a  financial  protectorate  over  the  island, 
which  made  for  its  financial  rehabilitation 
and  the  development  of  order  and  tran- 
quility. By  this  action  President  Roosevelt 
asserted  the  same  right  of  self-protection 
against  other  American  states  as  against 
Europe.  The  Taft  administration  sought 
to  make  arrangements  for  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras  similar  in  many  respects  to  that 
adopted  in  the  case  of  Santo  Domingo. 
The  Wilson  administration  took  little 
action     with     reference     to     Haiti.     The 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     11 

treaties    with    Haiti    and    the    one    with 
Nicaragua  finally  were  ratified. 

What  was  aimed  at  in  these  several 
conventions  was  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  peace.  With  the  kind  of 
government  in  power  the  United  States 
had  no  concern.  The  like  motive  caused 
the  Taft  administration  to  take  the  wholly 
unprecedented  step  of  excluding  General 
Castro  from  Venezuela,  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  a  stormy  petrel,  and  General 
Zelaya  from  Nicaragua  because  of  his  dic- 
tatorial conduct.  President  Wilson  went 
even  further  than  Taft  when,  in  his.  annual 
message  of  December,  1913,  he  made  this 

statement: 

"  There  can  be  no  certain  prospects 
of  peace  in  America  until  General 
Huerta  has  surrendered  his  usurped 
authority  in  Mexico;  until  it  is  under- 
stood on  all  hands,  indeed,  that  such 
pretended  governments  will  not  be 
countenanced  or  dealt  with  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  Stated. 
We   are   the   friends   of  constitutional 


78        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

government  in  America;  we  are  more 
than  its  friends,  we  are  its  champions." 
If  we  can  force  a  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  Mexico,  why  may  we  not  do  like- 
wise elsewhere?  ask  those  in  authority  in 
South  America.  If  we  can  go  that  far, 
when  the  people  of  certain  states  are  not 
ready  for  such  liberty,  may  we  not  go 
even  further  and  say  they  must  accept  our 
officials  to  show  them  how  to  run  their 
countries?  And  if  this  step  should  be 
taken,  is  not  the  next  inevitable  step 
annexation   to  the  United   States? 

President  Wilson  sought  to  dissipate 
the  cloud  of  suspicion  through  which 
Latin-America  views  the  United  States, 
by  inviting  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile, 
and  subsequently  other  Latin-American 
powers,  to  aid  him  in  settling  the 
Mexican  question;  by  disclaiming,  in 
his  annual  message  of  December,  1915, 
any  idea  of  guardianship  or  thought  of 
wards,  in  connection  with  the  southern 
republics,  and  by  proclaiming  "  a  full 
and   honorable   association   as   of   partners 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     79 

between  ourselves  and  our  neighbors  in 
the  interest  of  all  America,  North  and 
South."  This  thought  received  expression 
in  proposals  by  Secretary  Bryan  for 
treaties  with  the  Latin-American  republics, 
containing  a  mutual  guarantee  of  each 
other's  independence  and  integrity,  and  the 
maintenance  of  a  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment by  each. 

Such  treaties  would  strike  at  the  vital 
interests  of  the  United  States  as  well  as 
those  of  the  southern  states.  There  ought 
to  be,  of  course,  no  thought  of  alliances 
with  the  southern  republics,  though  a 
natural  desire  prevails  for  a  solidarity  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  based  upon  its 
geographical  separation  from  European 
and  Asiatic  concerns,  the  peculiar  social 
conditions  which  it  possesses,  the  character 
of  its  peoples,  the  vastness  of  its  area  and 
the  richness  of  its  soil,  and  finally  the 
development  of  a  public  law  which  these 
distinctions  have  assured.  It  is  evident, 
however,  that  since  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is   a  declaration   based   upon   this  govern- 


80        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

ment's  right  to  protect  itself,  it  cannot,  to 
quote  the  words  of  Elihu  Root,  "  be  trans- 
muted into  a  joint  or  common  declaration 
by  American  states  or  any  number  of 
them.  If  Chile  or  Argentina  or  Brazil 
were  to  contribute  the  weight  of  her 
influence  toward  a  similar  end,  the  right 
upon  which  that  nation  would  rest  its 
declaration  would  be  its  own  safety,  not 
the  safety  of  the  United  States. 
Each  nation  would  act  for  itself  and  in 
its  own  right,  and  it  would  be  impossible 
to  go  beyond  that  except  by  more  or 
less  offensive  and  defensive  alliances. 
Of  course,  such  alliances  are  not  to  be 
considered." 

The  real  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  exists 
to-day  as  in  the  time  of  Monroe,  has  not 
changed.  Its  fundamental  base  is  that 
American  territory  shall  remain  American. 
The  reason  for  its  present  enforcement  is 
even  more  lively  than  it  was  when  pro- 
claimed. The  Caribbean  Sea  and  Central 
America  are  our  back  yard.  South 
America   is   nearer   than    it  was   in    1823. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE     81 

The  growth  of  Argentina,  Brazil  and 
Chile  reduces  the  chance  of  their  terri- 
tory being  used  for  European  or  Asiatic 
colonization  purposes.  But  the  peace  and 
safety  of  the  United  States,  the  impelling 
motives  for  the  proclamation  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  Doctrine,  must  be  guarded; 
and  this  can  be  accomplished  only  through 
the  determination  and  ability  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  enforce  universal  respect  for 
their  traditional  policy. 


chapter  iv 

The  Caribbean  Sea  Problem 

The  progress  of  events  has  forced 
another  policy  upon  the  United  States,  a 
policy  included  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and,  like  the  Doctrine  as  a  whole,  based 
upon  the  recognized  right  of  self-preserva- 
tion. It  relates  to  the  Panama  Canal,  to 
the  territory  lying  between  the  Rio  Grande 
and  the  southernmost  boundary  of  the 
canal  zone,  to  the  countries  washed  by  the 
Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Canal,  and  to  the 
islands  which  dot  those  reaches  of  water. 
More  than  ever,  the  United  States  cannot 
permit  any  European  or  Asiatic  power 
to  gain  possession  of  footholds  in  that 
important  region.  More  than  ever,  it 
must  keep  within  its  control  the  com- 
munications between  its  continental  limits 
and-  the  Canal.     Indeed,  the  policy  of  the 

82 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM     83 

United  States  must  be  to  consolidate  its 
position  in  Mexico  and  Central  America, 
in  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  in  those  countries 
whose  geographical  situation  lends  them 
strategic  value  in  connection  with  the 
waterway. 

The   importance  of   the   Caribbean   Sea 
to  the  American   people  was   realized   by 
the  founders  of  the  Republic.     They  saw 
in   its   islands   natural   appendages    to    the 
North   American   continent,   with   one   of 
them,  Cuba,  almost  in  sight  of  our  shores.^ 
The  commanding  position  of  that  island, 
with    reference    to    the    Gulf    of    Mexico 
and    the   West    Indian    seas;    its   situation 
midway   between   pur  southern   coast   and 
the  important  island  of   Santo   Domingo; 
its  safe  and  capacious  harbor  of  Havana, 
fronting  a  long  line  of  our  shores,  destitute 
of  the  same  advantage;  the  nature  of  its 
productions     and     wants,     furnishing     the 
supplies  and  needing  the  returns  of  a  com- 
merce immensely  profitable  and  mutually 
beneficial,    lent    it    an    importance    in    the 
sum  of  our  national  interests,  in  the  view 


\i 


84        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  Secretary  of  State  John  Quincy  Adams, 
with  which  that  of  no  other  foreign  terri- 
tory could  be  compared,  and  little  inferior 
to  that  which  bound  the  different  mem- 
bers of  the  Union  together.  It  was  appre- 
ciated by  Adams,  as  it  had  been  appreci- 
ated by  his  predecessors  in  office,  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  could  not 
look  with  indifference  upon  any  attempt  to 
transfer  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  or,  indeed, 
any  of  the  West  Indian  Islands,  from  their 
owners  to  other  powers.  What  was  true 
of  the  islands  was  true  likewise  of  Mexico 
and  Central  America,  in  fact,  of  all  the 
nations  on  the  Caribbean  littoral.  So  we 
find  the  American  people  manifesting  a 
supreme  interest  in  the  maneuvers  of  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Spain  and  subse- 
quently of  Germany,  in  connection  with  all 
the  territory  lying  directly  to  the  south  of 
the  Rio  Grande. 

Thus  there  always  has  been  a  Caribbean 
Sea  question,  and  a  Central  American 
question.  The  pivot  of  the  question  has 
shifted.     To-day  it  is  the  Panama  Canal. 


,1' 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM    85 

The  southernmost  boundary  of  the  zone 
through  which  the  waterway  has  been 
constructed  has  become  in  fact  what  Presi- 
dent Hayes  predicted  —  a  new  coast  line 
for  the  United  States.  It  must  be  defended 
as  we  must  defend  our  continental  coast 
lines.  Our  sole  dependence  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Canal  in  American  owner- 
ship and  under  American  control  lies  in 
our  fleet.  The  time  may  come  when  we 
will  deem  it  necessary  to  have  another 
line  of  approach  to  the  Canal  in  order  to 
provide  for  its  defense;  and  that  line  can 
be  secured  only  through  control,  most 
probably  possession,  of  the  territory  lying 
between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  Republic 
of  Colombia. 

The  interest  of  the  United  States  in  this 
part  of  the  world  is  an  interest  so  vast  that 
it  may  be  regarded  as  comparable  to  that 
of  ancient  Rome  in  connection  with  the  y/ 
Mediterranean  Sea.  Any  attack  on  this 
nation  by  a  European  power  undoubtedly 
would  be  launched  from  an  island  in  the 
West   Indies.     Any  attack   by   an   Asiatic 


86        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

power  upon  this  nation  unquestionably 
would  be  directed  from  Mexico.  Two 
distinct  ends  would  be  gained  by  such  a 
maneuver:  first,  the  severance  of  commun- 
ications with  the  Canal,  and,  second,  the 
establishment  of  a  base  for  operations 
against  the  Union.  He  who  seizes  the 
Canal  annuls  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
dominates  Central  and  South  America;  he 
deprives  the  United  States  of  a  mighty 
defensive  and  offensive  weapon,  and  he 
enjoys  possession  of  a  second  world  high- 
way of  the  greatest  political  and  economic 
value. 

The  statesmen  of  Europe,  as  those  of 
America,  have  realized  the  importance 
of  the  Canal;  and  this  is  responsible  for 
the  efiforts  they  have  made  in  the  past  to 
gain  control  of  the  Panama  and  Nica- 
raguan  routes,  as  well  as  the  Tehuantepec 
route  through  Mexico.  It  is  responsible 
also  for  their  efforts  to  acquire  islands 
which  command  the  Canal  routes,  and  it 
has  inspired,  blindly,  to  be  sure,  a  similar 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  United   States. 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEJNI     87 

Sentiment  is  strengthened  immeasurably 
by  economic  need,  and  above  all  by  the 
necessity  of  self-preservation;  and  doubt- 
less that  was  in  the  mind  of  Elihu  Root 
when  he  said : 

*'  It  is  plain  that  the  building  of  the 
Panama  Canal  greatly  accentuates  the 
practical  necessity  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  it  applies  to  all  the  terri- 
tory surrounding  the  Caribbean  or 
near  the  Bay  of  Panama.  The  plain- 
est lessons  of  history  and  the  universal 
judgment  of  all  responsible  students 
of  the  subject,  concur  in  teaching  that 
the  potential  command  of  the  route  to 
and  from  the  canal  must  rest  with  the 
United  States  and  that  the  vital  inter- 
ests of  the  nation  forbid  that  such 
command  shall  pass  into  other  hands. 
Certainly  no  nation  which  has  acqui- 
esced in  the  British  occupation  of 
Egypt  will  dispute  this  proposition." 
It  is  obvious  that  the  peace  and  safety 
of  the  United  States  forbid  particularly 
the    transfer   by    one    over-seas    power    to 


88        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

another  of  any  territory  in  this  region.  It 
is  obvious,  furthermore,  that  the  value  to 
each  of  the  republics  of  a  stable  and 
orderly  government  is  no  less  important 
to  them  than  it  is  to  the  United  States. 
It  follows  as  a  necessary  corollary  that 
there  must  exist  closer  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  those  republics,  if 
possible  without  jeopardizing  their  inde- 
pendence. Chronic  revolutions,  refusal  to 
pay  debts,  insults  and  injury  to  foreigners, 
invite  retaliation,  and  retaliation  awakens 
the  keen  apprehension  of  the  American 
people.  Orderly  and  stable  government 
assuring  discharge  of  the  obligation  to 
protect  life,  liberty  and  property,  ought 
not  to  be  too  great  a  price  to  pay  for 
independence. 

It  was  this  sound  view  which  was 
responsible  for  the  adoption  of  the  Piatt 
amendment  in  connection  with  Cuba,  the 
application  of  the  Roosevelt  financial  pro- 
tectorate to  Santo  Domingo,  and  the  nego- 
tiation of  similar  protectorates  over  Hayti, 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras.     It  is  the  base 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEiM     89 

for  our  guarantee  of  the  independence  of 
Panama  and  our  diplomatic  intervention  in 
Venezuela  and  Mexico.  And  by  virtue  of 
the  fact  that  our  policy  of  "  hands  off  "  nec- 
essarily imposes  obligations  on  us  to  those 
shut  out,  more  and  more  the  over-seas 
states  are  urging  American  redress  of 
wrongs  perpetrated  upon  them  and  their 
subjects.  Their  attitude  in  this  respect 
has  been  manifested  especially  in  Mexico, 
where  revolutions  have  destroyed  foreign 
life  and  foreign  property.  It  is  no  secret 
that  had  not  the  European  situation  prom- 
ised war  there  would  have  been  inter- 
vention as  against  the  United  States  in  the 
neighboring  republic  prior  to   1914. 

That  we  have  not  met  our  responsibility 
in  the  case  of  Mexico  is  apparent  to  those 
who  have  followed  the  course  of  deplor- 
able events  there.  It  is  the  international 
point  of  view  more  than  the  internal 
struggles  in  that  republic  which  arouses 
the  concern  of  those  who  have  their  coun- 
try's interest  at  heart.  European  nations 
have  looked  with  amazement  upon  a  pol- 


90        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

icy  of  "  watchful  waiting,"  which  has  per- 
mitted the  assassination  and  murder  of 
American  citizens,  as  well  as  of  their  own 
nationals,  the  destruction  of  hundreds  of 
millions  of  foreign  property,  and  the  crea- 
tion of  a  condition  that  common  humanity, 
which  has  been  a  mainspring  of  action  by 
the  United  States  in  the  past,  demanded 
should  be  terminated.  They  have  seen 
revolutionary  and  bandit  chiefs  insult  and 
flaunt  the  United  States;  they  have  seen 
the  American  flag  dragged  in  the  dust, 
American  soldiers  and  marines  killed  and 
wounded,  and  no  reprisals,  save  a  tem- 
porary occupation  of  Vera  Cruz,  enforced. 
They  have  witnessed  the  observance  of 
two  distinct  and  antipathetic  policies:  one 
a  refusal  to  recognize  a  dictator,  the  other 
the  recognition  of  a  dictator. 

There  developed  abroad  the  conviction 
that  the  United  States  did  not  mean  what 
it  said,  that  American  life  and  American 
rights  could  be  violated  with  impunity, 
that  American  representations  could  be 
disregarded  and  American  demands  treated 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM     91 

contemptuously.  President  Wilson's  course 
in  Mexico  reduced  American  prestige 
to  a  stage  so  low  that  it  is  difficult 
to  find  a  parallel  in  our  entire  history. 
This  had  a  bearing  on  our  international 
situation  which  the  people  little  appre- 
ciated, for  it  left  us  without  a  friend  in  the 
world;  and  the  President  was  compelled, 
in  order  to  prevent  our  isolation,  to  regain 
the  friendship  of  a  foreign  power  by 
complying  with  the  British  demand  for 
equal  tolls  on  all  ships  passing  through 
the  Panama  Canal. 

There  are  some  who  think  that  Mexico 
is  a  far  cry  to  the  Panama  Canal.  Yet 
Mexico  has  a  direct  relation  to  that  water- 
way, not  only  from  a  strategic  but  from 
a  commercial  point  of  view.  The  genius 
of  Diesel  has  dethroned  King  Coal,  and 
the  future  will  see  greater  and  greater  use 
of  petroleum  in  place  of  the  fuel  to  which 
the  world  has  become  accustomed.  The 
employment  of  petroleum  will  revolu- 
tionize the  entire  realm  of  naval  strategy 
and  deep  sea  trade.    Thus  this  mineral  oil 


92        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

becomes  of  vital  moment  in  the  sphere  of 
military  and  political  interests.  It  follows 
that  every  maritime  nation,  including  the 
United  States,  must  consider  the  oil 
production   of   the  world. 

Great  Britain,  with  that  far-sightedness 
which  has  played  such  an  important  part 
in  her  development,  realized  long  before 
other  states  the  value  of  petroleum,  and 
quietly  began  to  acquire  properties  where 
they  would  be  of  strategic  use.  The  Eng- 
lish Pearson  interests,  the  head  of  which, 
Lord  Cowdray,  has  close  relations  with 
the  British  Admiralty,  have  acquired  oil 
fields  in  the  State  of  Vera  Cruz  and  on 
the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  as  well  as 
in  other  parts  of  Mexico.  The  wells  in 
operation  have  an  estimated  annual  output 
of  one  hundred  million  barrels;  that  is  to 
say,  nearly  half  the  annual  production  of 
the  United  States.  In  a  few  years,  Mexico 
may  become  the  first  petroleum  producing 
country  in  the  world,  surpassing  the 
United  States  in  the  output  of  this  prod- 
uct.    By  reason  of  Its  closer  proximity  to 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM    93 

the  Canal,  which  it  can  supply  by  pipe 
lines,  yet  to  be  built,  Mexico  thus  has  an 
enhanced  importance  with  respect  to  the 
waterway.  Besides  the  oil  wells  in  Mex- 
ico, foreign  interests  have  acquired  mines 
in  Colombia  and  Ecuador.  It  is  appar- 
ent, therefore,  that  petroleum,  "  which 
seemed  to  be  a  gift  of  the  gods  to  the 
economically  weak  Latin  republics  of 
Central  America  and  of  the  neighboring 
countries  of  South  America,  has,  on 
account  of  the  Panama  Canal,  become  the 
bone  of  contention  of  the  great  powers, 
which  circumstance  alone  would  justify 
us  in  speaking  of  a  Central  American 
question  —  "  this  from  Germanicus  in  The 
American  Journal  of  International  Law, 
April,    1914. 

The  United  States  is  both  feared  and 
hated  in  the  states  over  which  it  has 
established  a  suzerainty.  In  Mexico,  our 
armed  intervention  and  withdrawal  and 
our  diplomatic  intervention  have  created 
a  feeling  bordering  on  contempt.  A 
way   for    a   brigand    chief    to    gain    popu- 


94        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

lar  favor  was  and  is  to  attack  the 
United  States.  Huerta  did  so,  Villa  did 
so,  and  Carranza  has  found  it  desirable 
to  do  likewise.  The  Central  Americans 
have  been  greatly  exercised  over  the  inva- 
sion of  Nicaragua  by  American  marines 
and  their  continued  occupation  of  Man- 
agua, the  capital  of  the  country  —  an 
occupation  which  has  lasted  three  years. 
The  expulsion  of  President  Zelaya  by  the 
Taft  Administration  aroused  the  appre- 
hension of  the  dictators  of  Guatamala 
and  Honduras.  Costa  Rica  is  com- 
paratively friendly  in  sentiment.  As  to 
Panama,  her  existence  rests  upon  the  good 
will  of  the  United  States.  It  would  seem 
there  ought  to  be  gratitude  there;  but  the 
feeling  against  our  country  has  found 
expression  in  attacks  upon  our  soldiers 
who  go  from  the  Zone  to  the  city  of 
Panama.  Colombia  has  never  forgiven 
what  she  regards  as  President  Roosevelt's 
"  rape "  of  Panama,  but  is  prepared  to 
accept  the  tidy  little  sum  of  $25,000,000 
to   salve   her   honor.     The   United    States 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM     95 

having  kept  Castro  out  of  Venezuela,  the 
people  of  that  country  fear  it  may  intervene 
again  to  expel  some  other  ruler  to  whom  it 
has  taken  a  dislike.  Of  the  West  Indian 
republics,  Cuba,  in  spite  of  our  interven- 
tion which  produced  her  freedom,  in  spite 
of  our  magnanimous  action  in  leaving  her 
to  pursue  her  own  destiny,  and  in  spite 
of  our  support  of  an  orderly  government, 
entertains  no  feelings  of  gratitude  for  us. 
The  same  is  true  of  Santo  Domingo,  which 
we  are  helping  to  peace  and  tranquility. 
Our  marines,  only  recently,  have  been 
engaged  in  ^'  pacifying "  Haiti,  much  to 
the  dissatisfaction  of  native  trouble- 
breeders  who  hold  to  the  "  inalienable 
right  of  revolt "  whenever  it  is  to  their 
interest  to  exercise  it. 

Bankers  of  foreign  governments  have 
lent  money  to  practically  all  these  countries, 
and  at  different  times  most  of  them  have 
defaulted  on  their  debts.  Secure  in  our 
protection,  they  have  gone  on  in  their 
reckless  course  with  full  knowledge  that 
none  of  the  European  nations  can  chastise 


96        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

them  for  their  aggressions  and  bring 
order  out  of  chaos  without  antagoniz- 
ing the  United  States.  Sooner  or  later 
some  power  will  feel  itself  compelled, 
in  vindication  of  its  own  honor  and 
the  protection  of  its  citizens  and  their 
rights,  to  adopt  forcible  measures.  In  the 
last  twenty  years  this  has  been  done  by 
the  British  against  Nicaragua,  and  by  the 
British,  Germans  and  Italians  against 
Venezuela.  One  happy  development  of 
the  situation,  so  far  as  the  safety  of  the 
United  States  is  concerned,  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  Central  American  and  West 
Indian  states  are  now  borrowing  money 
from  American  bankers.  We  have  financed 
Cuba  and  Santo  Domingo,  neither  of 
which  can  obtain  loans  without  our 
approval;  we  are  paying  a  subsidy  to 
Panama;  and  we  are  arranging  to  finance 
Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Honduras  and  Haiti. 
Since  the  war  began,  other  loans  have 
been  made  to  Latin-American  states.  The 
time  will  come  when  this  grave  question 
of  finance  will  be  settled  through  the  hold- 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM     97 

ing  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  loans  in 
the  United  States. 

The  powers  in  the  West  Indies,  besides 
the  independent  states  mentioned,  are  the 
United  States,  whose  flag  flies  over  Porto 
Rico  and  Culebra;  Great  Britain,  which, 
in  addition  to  British  Honduras  in  Cen- 
tral America,  and  British  Guiana,  South 
America,  owns  the  Bahamas,  Barbados, 
Jamaica,  Turks,  Trinidad,  Tobago  and 
the  Leeward  and  Windward  Islands; 
France,  which  controls  Martinique,  St. 
Pierre  and  Miquelon,  besides  French 
Guiana  in  South  America;  Denmark, 
which  has  a  burden  in  St.  Croix,  St. 
Thomas  and  St.  John;  and  the  Nether- 
lands, which  owns  Curacao,  six  hundred 
miles  from  Panama,  and  Dutch  Guiana 
in  South  America. 

American  acquisition  of  the  Danish 
West  Indies  will  remove  a  constant  source 
of  worry  to  our  statesmen.  It  is  evident 
that  if  Germany  should  acquire  con- 
trol of  Denmark  or  Holland,  she  would 
claim  their  colonies;  and  the  United  States 


98        IMPERILED  AMERICA 

would  be  forced  to  apply  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  against  her  annexation  of  the 
West  Indian  possessions  of  the  nation  con- 
quered or  annexed.  Through  the  perspi- 
cacity of  Senators  Root  and  Lodge,  a 
grave  danger  was  averted  for  the  United 
States  during  the  time  William  J.  Bryan 
occupied  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State. 
Mr.  Bryan  negotiated  with  Denmark  and 
the  Netherlands  his  ill-considered  peace 
treaties,  the  effect  of  which,  had  the 
Senate  ratified  them,  would  have  been  to 
compel  the  United  States  to  submit  to 
arbitration  the  question  of  its  right  to 
forbid  the  acquisition  of  the  Danish  or 
Dutch  West  Indies  by  another  European 
power.  A  similar  instrument,  negotiated 
with  Ecuador,  would  have  had  a  like 
effect  with  reference  to  the  Galapagos 
Islands,  off  the  coast  of  Ecuador,  which 
furnish  an  admirable  base  for  operations 
against  the  Panama  Canal. 

In  our  contemplation  of  the  commercial 
value  of  the  Canal,  we  have,  in  a  great 
measure,    lost  sight  of   an   equally  prime 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM     99 

reason  for  its  construction  —  the  tremen- 
dous increase  in  military  strength  which 
it  affords  us.  The  Suez  Canal  is  a  great 
convenience  to  Europe;  the  Panama  Canal 
is  a  necessity  for  the  United  States.  The 
easy  and  quick  transportation  it  permits 
for  our  fleet  from  one  great  ocean  to  the 
other  is  worth  the  money  and  time  and 
brains  we  have  expended  in  its  building. 
For  this  advantage  and  for  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  it  was  necessary  for  President 
Roosevelt  to  insist  upon  an  American 
guarantee  of  the  Canal  in  contradistinction 
to  the  European  guarantee  of  the  Suez 
Canal.  The  international  status  of  the 
two  canals  is  practically  the  same,  unless 
the  United  States  itself  be  engaged  in 
war.  To  preserve  the  international  status 
of  the  Canal  this  country  is  obligated: 

1.  To  keep  the  Canal  free  (for  pas- 
sage but  not  equal  in  respect  of  tolls, 
despite  the  Wilson  interpretation)  and 
open  to  all  private  vessels  of  nations 
observing  the  rules  prescribed  in  the 
Hay-Pauncefote   Treaty. 


JOO      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

2.  To  keep  the  Canal  free  and  open 
to  men-of-war,  even  to  those  of  bellig- 
erents when  the  United  States  is  not  a 
party  to  the  war.  If  the  United  States 
be  at  war,  its  enemy  will  not  be  permitted 
to  use  the  Canal. 

3.  To  preserve  the  neutrality  of  the 
Canal  and  protect  the  property  there  in 
the  same  fashion  as  it  does  the  neutrality 
of  its  own  ports. 

4.  Alone  to  guarantee  that  the  Canal 
shall  be  kept  free  and  open  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty. 

5.  To  protect  the  Canal  by  permanent 
fortifications  and  a  military  garrison,  this 
under  a  right  granted  by  a  treaty  with 
Panama. 

In  other  words,  the  Canal  is  an  Amer- 
ican waterway,  of  great  political  and  mili- 
tary, as  well  as  commercial,  importance 
to  the  United  States,  and  absolutely  under 
the  sovereignty,  control  and  protection  of 
the  United  States.  It  must  be  regarded, 
to  quote  the  report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 


THE  CARIBBEAN  PROBLEM  101 

Commission,  as  but  "  one  link  in  a  chain 
of  communications  of  which  adjacent  links 
are  the  Caribbean  Sea  on  the  east  and  the 
waters  of  the  Pacific,  near  the  Canal 
entrance,  on  the  west,"  and  it  is  evident 
that,  again  to  quote  the  report,  "  unless 
the  integrity  of  all  the  links  can  be  main- 
tained the  chain  will  be  broken."  Neces- 
sity, vital  necessity,  therefore,  forces  the 
United  States  to  play  a  dominant  role  in 
the  region  described,  to  guard  jealously 
against  foreign  encroachment,  and  to  main- 
tain a  strength  which  will  prevent  its 
hegemony  from  ever  being  successfully 
assailed. 


chapter  v 

The  United  States  in  the  Pacific 

Fateful  is  the  problem  of  the  Pacific 
for  the  American  people.  That  ocean, 
so  vast  that  all  the  nations  of  the  earth 
might  well  live  in  peace  upon  it,  has 
become  a  scene  of  turbulent  struggle 
which  is  certain  to  develop  into  deadly 
conflict.  Fifty  years  ago  William  H. 
Seward,  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  State, 
pointed  out  that  this  ocean,  its  shores,  its 
islands  and  the  vast  region  beyond,  would 
develop  into  ''  the  chief  theater  of  events 
in  the  world's  great  hereafter."  Equally 
prescient,  Former  President  Roosevelt, 
declared  "  the  Pacific  era,  designed  to  be 
the  greatest  of  all  and  to  bring  the  whole 
human  race  at  last  into  one  comity  of 
nations,  is  just  at  the  dawn."  The  Pan- 
ama Canal  has  been  constructed  since 
these    two    statesmen    made    their    predic- 

102 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  103 

tions;  and  this  link  of  the  west  and  the 
east  already  is  having  an  influence  upon, 
and  will  play  an  increasingly  important 
role  in  connection  with,  the  destiny  of  the 
human    race. 

The  problem  of  the  Pacific  comprises 
many  questions,  each  of  which  is  of  vital 
moment  to  the  United  States.  These  ques- 
tions primarily  are  Racial,  Industrial, 
Commercial,  Territorial  and  Strategical. 
On  this  great  ocean,  the  Occident  and 
Orient  meet,  not  on  common  but  on  alien 
ground.  Here  two  powerful  races  face 
each  other — the  yellow  and  the  white. 
Here  there  is  a  struggle  between  the  cheap 
though  relatively  inefficient  labor  of  the 
former  with  the  expensive  and  more 
highly  specialized  labor  of  the  latter. 
Here  there  is  a  determined,  tenacious 
rivalrv  for  markets.  And  as  the  natural 
consequences  of  these  conflicts  of  peace 
there  is  a  reaching  out  by  the  aggressive 
nations  for  territory  and  the  adoption  of 
means  less  for  their  own  defense  than  as 
an    assistance    to    the    aspirations    which 


/ 


104       IMPEPJLED  AMERICA 

consciously    or    subconsciously    their    need 
creates. 

What  is  the  need  of  the  United   States 
in  the  Pacific  and  what  are  the  aspirations 
it  has  created?    Do  we  require  an  outlet  for 
surplus  population?     Not  at  all.     Do  our 
conditions    impel    us    to    acquire    territory 
for   colonization    purposes?     We    have    a 
superfluity     of     land.       Our     underlying 
desire,    our   underlying    aim,    is    to    make 
money,  to  do  so  by  expanding  our  trade, 
by   the    development   of    markets,    by    the 
investment    of    our    surplus    capital.      In 
pursuance    of    this    purpose   we   gave    the 
world  a  new  nation  in  the  form  of  modern 
Japan;  we  have  figured  largely  in  recent 
years    in    the    international    maneuvers    to 
preserve  the  integrity  of  China  and  equal- 
ity of  opportunity  therein,   and   we   have 
acquired  islands  which  we  are  turning  into 
fortified    bases    both    for    our    continental 
defenses  and  for  pushing  the  commercial 
dreams   which    subconsciously   inspire    us. 
Our  so-called  higher  motives,  too,  play  a 
part  in  our  Pacific  development.    We  like 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  105 

to   think   of   ourselves   as   the    regenerator 
of  the  Philippines,  the  "  first  friend  "  of 
Japan,    the    preserver    of    China    for    the 
Chinese,    of    the    Latin-Americas    for    the 
Latin-Americans,    and    above    all    as    the 
champion  of   Christianity  and  the  bearer 
of  the  Message  of  Hope  to  the  heathen. 
The    development    of    means    of    trans- 
portation,   the    increase    of   our    manufac- 
tures, and  the  activity  of  our  missionaries 
and     traders    have    brought    the     United 
States    into    direct    contact    with    at    least 
six  hundred  millions  of  people,  more  than 
one-third  of  the  human  race,  who  inhabit 
lands  bordering  on  or  lying  in  the  Pacific. 
Of  these,  four  hundred  million  are  inhab- 
itants  of  weak,   helpless   China,   the   prey 
of  stronger  powers,  and  sixty  million  are 
the  sturdy  sons  of  Japan,  w^hich  is  highly 
organized    and    ambitious    to    become    the 
Great  Britain  of  the  Pacific  and  Far  East. 
The    balance    populates    Canada    and    the 
countries  of  Central  and   South  America, 
having    access    to    the    Pacific     and     the 
Pacific    Islands.      The    myriad    wants    of 


106       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

these  people  we  partially  supplied,  at  a 
cost  to  them,  for  the  year  prior  to  the 
Great  War,  of  $250,000,000;  and  in  return 
they  sold  us  products,  during  the  same 
period,  valued  in  the  neighborhood  of 
$350,000,000.  Our  own  trade  with  our 
Pacific  dependencies  has  attained  the 
respectable  figure  of  $160,000,000  annu- 
ally. As  time  goes  on  this  commerce  will 
swell  to  enormous  proportions,  provided 
of  course  it  is  safeguarded  and  assisted  by 
the  government  of  the  United  States. 

There  is  no  clearer  truth  in  history 
than  that  nations  and  races  may  be  devel- 
oped or  destroyed  through  their  industries, 
and  that  national  greatness  is  dependent 
upon  the  competition  between  the  work- 
shops of  the  world.  The  records  of  our 
State  Department  reveal  the  careful  man- 
ner in  which  the  government  always  has 
fostered  our  foreign  trade.  It  has  been 
done,  however,  in  haphazard  fashion, 
rather  with  the  thought  of  the  day  than 
of  the  morrow.  There  has  been  no  settled 
policy,  no  definite  goal.    We  seem  to  have 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  107 

been  driven  on  in  spite  of  ourselves,  to 
be  the  creatures  of  Manifest  Destiny.  And 
this  forward  movement,  caused  by  our 
virility  and  aggressiveness,  has  made  us  a 
power  to  be  considered  by  the  nations  we 
face,  as  it  compels  us  to  consider  the 
effect  of  their  attitude  toward  and  policies 
upon  us. 

The  United  States  is  in  control  of  the 
western  flank  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  In 
fact,  its  coast  line  extends  from  the  Arctic 
to  the  Antarctic  Circle.  Besides  its  own 
continental  territory,  which  comprises 
Alaska  as  well  as  the  Pacific  Coast  states 
and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  it  must  pro- 
tect Canada  and  all  the  Latin-American 
republics  from  foreign  occupation.  In 
the  Pacific  itself  it  has  various  islands: 
those  lying  off  the  coast  of  Alaska; 
Hawaii;  Guam,  in  the  Ladrone  group; 
the  Philippines ;  and  Tutuila  and  Rose, 
in  Samoa.  Through  the  possession  of 
Hawaii  it  has  an  advanced  naval  base 
for  its  own  defense  which  commands  all 
the  trade  routes  across  the  North  Pacific. 


108       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

In  the  possession  of  Guam  it  has  a  site 
for  a  naval  base  which  commands  prac- 
tically every  trade  route  in  the  Far  East. 
In  the  possession  of  Tutuila  it  has  a  site 
for  a  naval  base  which  commands  every 
trade  route  in  the  South  Seas.  The  Phil- 
ippines, also,  furnish  a  base  of  value  for 
operations  across  the  China  Seas.  But  the 
real  fortresses  of  our  control  lie  in  Hawaii, 
Guam  and  Tutuila,  and  no  Oriental  enemy 
will  pass  over  the  sea  to  attack  us  until 
those  fortresses,  when  they  shall  have  been 
completed,  are  destroyed  or  contained. 

Thus  the  American  nation  is  in  a  mag- 
nificent strategic  position  for  the  further- 
ance of  its  more  or  less  unformulated 
aims,  and,  above  all,  for  the  assertion  of 
its  political  and  military  purposes.  It  is 
in  a  strategic  position  where  it  can  meet 
the  shock  of  conflict  with  the  Asiatic  races, 
provided,  of  course,  that  it  has  the  requi- 
site military  strength.  That  conflict  is  no 
bogie  of  the  future;  it  has  begun.  In  the 
Pacific,  the  United  States  has  been  forced 
V    to   adopt   two   totally  variant   policies.     It 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  109 

has  excluded  the  Far  East  from  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  and,  until  the  Wilson 
Administration  came  into  power,  it  insisted 
upon  entrance  into  China  upon  identically 
the  same  terms  as  those  enjoyed  by  other 
nations.  It  wants  no  bar  upon  American 
activities  in  the  Far  East,  but  it  has 
excluded  Chinese  and  Japanese  not  only 
from  its  continental  limits  but  from  its 
islands.  China  has  acquiesced  in  the  pol- 
icy of  the  American  government;  Japan 
has  done  so  officially,  but  proud  as  she  is, 
it  is  natural  that  she  resents  the  stigma 
of  racial  inferiority  our  action  has  stamped 
upon  her. 

A  mere  superficial  glance  at  conditions 
in  the  Pacific  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the 
great  present-day  powers  in  that  ocean  are 
the  United  States,  Japan,  Great  Britain 
and  Russia.  Spain  has  been  eliminated. 
Portugal  has  only  the  settlement  in  China 
known  as  Macao.  The  Netherlands,  pur- 
suing a  policy  of  passive  resistance,  and 
without  the  military  strength  to  oppose 
aggression,  is  drifting  along  until  the  time 


no       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

in  the  future  when  it  shall  be  deprived 
of  its  Far  Eastern  possessions.  Indeed, 
the  government  at  The  Hague  is  desper- 
ately afraid  of  becoming  involved  in  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Central  European 
Powers;  for  it  realizes  that  such  a  step 
would  mean  an  end  to  its  colonial  empire. 
Therefore,  it  guards  its  neutrality  with 
zealous  care.  France,  which  has  Tonquin 
and  Indo-China  wrested  from  China,  also 
has  possessions  in  the  South  Pacific;  but 
France  is  not  a  colonizing  nation,  nor  is 
she  successful  commercially.  Rather  does 
her  ambition  lead  to  influence,  power, 
military  glory.  Italy  sought  a  foothold  in 
China  when  the  great  scramble  for  terri- 
tory was  on  in  the  closing  years  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  but  was  thwarted  by 
the  United  States.  Russia  endeavored  to 
release  herself  from  the  grip  of  the  Arctic 
North  by  acquiring  Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny,  on  the  Yellow  Sea,  but  was  driven 
therefrom  by  Japan.  The  Treaty  of 
Portsmouth,  which  terminated  the  Russo- 
Japanese   war   in    1905,   not   only   pushed 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  111 

back  Russia  into  Northern  Manchuria, 
but,  by  according  Japan  sovereignty  over 
the  southern  half  of  Sakhalin  Island, 
placed  the  Tokyo  government  in  a  posi- 
tion to  command  every  route  to  and  from 
China  down  to  the  Philippines.  The  tre- 
mendous strategic  importance  of  this  situ- 
ation has  impressed  students  of  world 
conditions;  for  the  especial  struggle  of 
the  Pacific  is  for  the  control  of  the  trade 
and  rich  resources  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 
and  the  nation  which  dominates  the  routes 
of  traffic  is  certain  to  enjoy  an  advantage 
of  untold  value  over  its  rivals.  By  hold- 
ing the  Philippines  the  United  States  would 
serve  its  own  interests  as  well  as  those 
of  the  White  Race.  The  continued  posses- 
sion of  this  archipelago,  which  the  naval 
genius  of  Dewey  gave  to  us,  would  entitle 
the  American  people  to  a  voice  in  Far 
Eastern  affairs,  supply  them  with  a  com- 
mercial as  well  as  a  military  base,  and  as- 
sure them  a  splendid  opportunity  to  further 
their  trade  activities  on  the  Asiatic  conti- 
nent.     It    is    a    crime    against    America's 


112       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

future  for  the  Democratic  Party  to  seek 
to  cast  these  valuable  islands  adrift. 

While  Russia  has  no  colonies  in  the 
Pacific,  she  has  an  immense  coast  line  in 
the  frozen  North;  and  her  ambition  to 
acquire  Chinese  territory  makes  her  a 
factor  to  be  considered  in  the  problem 
opening  before  the  American  people. 
Prior  to  the  Taft  Administration,  the 
United  States,  without  much  thought  about 
it,  believed  it  desirable  for  Russia  and 
Japan  to  be  kept  apart  in  the  extreme 
Orient.  This  unformed,  or  rather  unex- 
pressed, policy  received  a  deathblow  at 
the  hands  of  Philander  C.  Knox,  when 
Secretary  of  State.  Mr.  Knox,  w^ith  no 
conception  of  the  immense  interests 
involved,  indeed,  believing  he  was  carrying 
out  the  Hay  Doctrine  of  the  Integrity  of 
China,  proposed  the  neutralization  of  the 
Trans-Manchurian  Railroad  —  the  artery 
connecting  Siberia  with  Port  Arthur,  con- 
trol of  which  had  been  divided  by  Japan 
and  Russia  in  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 

The    moment   knowledge   of    the    Knox 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  113 

plan   reached   the  chancellories  of   Petro- 
grad,  then  known  as  St.   Petersburg,   and 
Tokyo,  that  moment  the  two  governments, 
realizing  the  menace  to  their  interests,  came 
together.     The  present  alliance,  by  which 
Japan  is  giving  loyal  aid  to  Russia  in  the 
great  European  struggle,  had  its  roots  m 
the  understanding  reached  after  the  Knox 
proposal  was  made.    Whether  that  alliance 
deals  with  China  and  the  Pacific,   as  has 
been  reported,  is  not  of  certain  knowledge. 
Even  a  blind  man  can  see,  however,  that 
there  does  exist  a  far-reaching  understand- 
ing which  undoubtedly  has  a  direct  bearing 
upon  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

Japan's  position  in  the  Far  East  and  - 
the  Pacific  was  established  by  the  war 
with  Russia.  It  was  recognized  by  Great 
Britain  immediately  prior  thereto,  which 
entered  into  an  offensive  and  defensive 
treaty  with  the  Tokyo  government.  Great 
Britain  was  moved  to  take  this  step  by 
the  rapid  rise  of  Germany  as  a  commer- 
cial competitor,  and  by  the  latter's  naval 
development,  which  unbalanced  the  Euro- 


114       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

pean  situation.  It  was  necessary  for  her 
to  concentrate  her  fleet  at  home,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  protect  her  interests  in 
the  Far  East;  and  the  Japanese  navy- 
assured  this  over-seas  protection.  The  first 
treaty  of  alliance  between  the  two  powers 
stated  as  its  purpose  "  a  desire  to  maintain 
the  status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the 
extreme  East,"  "  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of 
China  and  the  Empire  of  Korea,"  and 
"  equal  opportunities  in  those  countries  for 
the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations." 
The  results  of  the  war  enabled  Japan 
to  absorb  Korea,  in  spite  of  the  self- 
denying  pledges  she  had  made;  and  this 
necessitated  a  revision  of  the  treaty, 
which  was  made  in  1905.  The  new 
treaty  contained  no  reference  to  the 
prior  guarantee  of  Korean  independence, 
and,  in  fact,  contained  a  clause  under 
which  Japan's  right  to  do  as  she  pleased 
in  the  "  Hermit  Kingdom "  was  recog- 
nized. Korea  as  an  independent  country 
was  promptly  obliterated.    While  reiterat- 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  115 

ing  the  agreement  to  insure  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  China  and  the  Open 
Door  in  that  Empire,  the  convention  broad- 
ened the  original  purpose  by  extending 
mutuality  of  action  to  the  defense  of  the 
territorial  rights  and  special  interests  of 
the  contracting  powers  "  in  the  regions  of 
Eastern  Asia  and  of  India." 

That  the  treaty  could  be  applied  against 
the  United  States  was  evident;  but  six 
years  later  Great  Britain  made  such  appli- 
cation impossible  by  declaring  the  instru- 
ment could  not  be  invoked  against  any 
nation  with  which  she  had  a  treaty  of 
general  arbitration;  and  she  has  such  a 
treaty  with  us.  But  she  did  not  have  a 
treaty  of  the  kind  with  Germany,  and 
Japan,  therefore,  entered  into  the  war 
against  the  Central  European  Powers. 
The  Japanese  did  so  gladly.  The  Euro- 
pean struggle  furnished  them  the  oppor- 
tunity they  desired  to  humiliate  Germany 
and  eliminate  that  country  from  the  Far 
East.  The  Nipponese  people  had  never 
forgiven    the    Kaiser    for    joining    Russia 


116       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

and  France  to  oust  them  from  the  Liao 
Tung  Peninsula,  upon  which  Port  Arthur 
is  situated,  which  their  arms  had  acquired 
during  the  war  with  China  in  1894-95. 
So,  after  the  war  of  1914  had  begun, 
Tokyo  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Berlin. 
It  was  couched  in  identically  the  same 
language  as  that  used  by  Germany  twenty 
years  before.  Demands  were  made  for 
the  retirement  of  Germany  from  Kiao 
Chou,  the  advanced  base  which  the 
Kaiser's  government  had  grabbed,  and  the 
abandonment  of  the  sphere  of  influence 
which  the  Province  of  Shantung  comprised. 
Germany  refused;  and  Japan,  without 
regard  to  the  neutrality  of  China,  which 
she  violated  as  the  territory  of  weak  states 
always  will  be  violated  under  the  plea  of 
military  necessity,  inaugurated  military 
measures  in  cooperation  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, that  for  the  moment  at  least  have  put 
an  end  to  Germany's  aspirations  in  the 
extreme  Orient.  Great  Britain,  requiring 
all  her  available  ships  for  operations  in 
different    parts    of    the    world,    requested 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  117 

Japan  to  aid  her  in  dispossessing  Germany 
from  the  Pacific  Islands.  That  aid  was 
forthcoming,  with  the  result  that  we  find 
Japanese  forces  occupying  the  Ladrone 
Islands,  other  than  Guam;  the  Pelew  and 
Caroline  Islands,  to  the  westward  of  the 
Philippines,  and  the  Marshall  Group. 
These  islands  furnish  valuable  outlying 
sites  for  bases,  and  could  be  utilized  against 
the  Pacific  bases  of  the  United  States. 

Will  Japan  withdraw  from  the  islands  ' 
she  has  occupied  when  the  war  ends?  It 
is  to  the  interest  of  the  United  States  that 
she  shall  surrender  them.  For  her  to 
remain  in  possession  would  be  to  violate  a 
specific  agreement  with  this  government. 
Following  the  dispatch  of  the  American 
fleet  to  the  Pacific  in  1908,  Elihu  Root, 
Secretary  of  State,  and  K.  Takahira,  the 
Japanese  Ambassador,  signed  an  agree- 
ment declaring,  among  other  things,  that 
it  was  "  the  wish  of  the  two  governments 
to  encourage  the  free  and  peaceful  devel- 
opment of  their  commerce  in  the  Pacific 
Ocean,"  and  they  asserted  that  the  policy 


118       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  both,  uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive 
tendencies,  "  is  directed  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  existing  status  quo  "  in  that  region. 
The  agreement  further  noted  an  identic 
policy  for  "  the  defense  of  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and 
industry  in  China  "  and  for  the  support  of 
"  the  independence  and  integrity  "  of  that 
country.  As  one  of  those  used  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
above  agreement,  the  author  can  say 
that  what  the  United  States  desired  and 
obtained  in  making  the  agreement,  was  a 
public  disavowal  by  Japan  of  an  aggres- 
sive design  upon  any  of  the  Pacific  Islands, 
particularly  the  Philippines,  belonging  to 
the  United  States;  but  it  was  realized  that 
it  was  to  the  interest  of  this  nation  that 
there  should  be  no  further  change  in  the 
status  of  the  territories  in  the  Pacific, 
and  it  was  for  that  reason  the  instrument 
was  couched  in  such  broad  terms. 

From  a  strategical  point  of  view,  the 
British  Empire  has  a  distinct  superiority 
over  every  other  nation  in  the  Pacific.     It 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  119 

is  established  on  both  flanks  of  the  ocean, 
with  fine,  safe  harbors  for  its  fleets,  and 
is  in  possession  of  Australia,  and  other 
islands  in  the  South  Seas.  With  its  genius 
for  colonization,  it  has  brought  peace  and 
prosperity  to  the  territories  it  has  occu- 
pied. It  has  made  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  a  white  man's  land.  It  has  an 
impregnable  base  in  Hong  Kong  and  the 
hinterland,  and  it  has  a  sphere  of  influence 
in  the  rich,  fertile  valley  of  the  Yangtse- 
Kiang,  China.  In  Canada  it  has  a  domin- 
ion of  unlimited  possibilities,  a  dominion 
which  is  certain  to  have  an  important  rela- 
tion to  and  influence  upon  the  Pacific 
problem.  Both  Canada  and  Australia 
have  the  resources  for  manufactures,  and 
as  they  increase  in  population  they  will 
become  sharp  competitors  of  the  United 
States  and  Japan  in  the  markets  of  Asia. 
In  the  unforeseen  case  of  war  with  Great 
Britain,  the  United  States,  so  far  as  the 
Pacific  is  concerned,  would  be  menaced 
from  the  naval  base  of  Esquimault,  British 
Columbia,   and   from  Australia  and  New 


120       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Zealand.  That  these  British  Colonies 
would  be  no  mean  antagonists  has  been 
demonstrated  by  the  heroic  conduct  of  the 
Canadians  in  Northern  France  and  the 
unfaltering  courage  of  the  Australians  and 
New  Zealanders  in  the  ill-fated  adventure 
against  the  Turkish  Dardanelles. 

It  must  be  a  matter  of  deep  regret  to 
all  Americans  that  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  and  the  British  Dominions 
in  this  hemisphere  and  across  the  Pacific 
have  been  injuriously  affected  by  events 
of  the  present  war.  The  action  of  a 
"  yellow  journal  "  on  the  Pacific  Slope  in 
supplying  information  to  the  German 
cruisers  operating  in  the  Pacific  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  struggle,  has 
aroused  bitter  feeling  in  Australia.  Can- 
ada cannot  understand  the  failure  of  the 
United  States  to  aid  her  and  the  British 
cause  in  the  fight  for  ideals  and  principles, 
which,  if  lost,  will  directly  afifect  the 
future  of  this  nation.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
there  is  a  great  similarity  between  the 
ideals  and  institutions  of  Canada  and  Aus- 


IN  THE  PACIFIC  121 

tralia  and  the  United  States.  There  exist 
also  between  the  United  States  and  these 
British  Dominions,  indeed  with  the  entire 
British  Empire,  common  interests  based 
upon  the  same  vital  needs.  Both  must 
stand  for  the  Open  Door  in  China  and 
the  exclusion  of  Asiatics.  For  them,  there- 
fore, to  have  any  other  than  a  convergent 
policy  contemplating  in  the  end  effective 
cooperation  would  be  to  strike  a  blow  at 
the  supremacy  of  the  White  Race  in  the 
great  Ocean  of  the  Future. 

The  Panama  Canal  has  made  the  United 
States  the  greatest  industrial  power  in  the 
Pacific.  That  waterway  has  brought  our 
eastern  factories  nearer  to  the  western 
coast  of  Central  and  South  America,  the 
British  possessions  in  the  South  Pacific, 
and  the  Extreme  Orient.  We  have  a 
marvelous  organization  of  industrial 
machinery,  which  must  be  supplemented 
by  adequate  financial,  shipping  and  com- 
mercial machinery  in  the  Pacific  regions. 
Our  merchant  marine  flag,  which  waved 
over  a  few  ships  on  this  ocean  after  the 


122       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Civil  War,  has  disappeared,  as  a  result  of 
ill-advised  legislation,  and  our  freights  are 
being  carried  more  and  more  by  Japanese 
vessels.  Foreign  banks  have  attended  to 
most  of  our  financial  transactions.  Our 
agents  are  in  many  instances  natives,  or 
non-Americans.  But  in  spite  of  these 
handicaps,  handicaps  w^hich  must  be 
removed,  we  have  made  a  long  start 
toward  securing  that  supremacy  which  our 
geographical  location,  our  resources,  and 
our  tremendous  industrial  and  commercial 
activity  justify  us  in  striving  to  obtain.  In 
the  pursuit  of  our  necessitous  ambition,  we 
must  expect  friction.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  it  will  be  peacefully  resolved;  but  we 
should  not  forget  the  years-ago  prediction 
of  the  far-sighted  Prince  Ito,  the  Bismarck 
of  the  Japanese  Empire: 

"The  next  great  war  will  take  place 
in  Europe.  It  will  be  followed  by  a 
second  conflict  —  the  struggle  for  the 
mastery  of  the  Pacific." 


chapter  vi 
Shutting  the  Open  Door 

Momentous  events  have  occurred  in 
China  since  the  European  war  began, 
events  which  may  be  said  to  mark  the 
beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  history  of 
that  weak  and,  therefore,  long  sufifering 
country.  It  is  an  era  pregnant  with  the 
promise  of  Japan's  assumption  of  control 
in  the  Far  East,  of  the  termination  of  ter- 
ritorial aggrandizement  there  by  the  White 
Powers,  and  of  a  long  step  toward  realiza- 
tion of  the  dream  of  the  wonderful  Island 
People — Asia  for  the  Asiatics. 

It  is  not  at  all  astonishing  that  Japan 
seized  the  opportunity  which  the  break- 
ing out  of  the  European  war  provided. 
Rather  would  it  have  been  astonishing  had 
she  not  done  so.  Japan  could  no  more 
afiFord  to  have  the  great  military  powers 
of    the   West   sitting    upon    her    threshold 

123 


124      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

than  the  United  States  could  afford  hav- 
ing them  in  Latin-America.  Her  vital 
interests  were  threatened  when  Russia  v 
sought  to  acquire  the  great  Chinese  region 
of  Manchuria  and  the  Kingdom  of  Korea. 
Had  Russia  succeeded,  Japan  would  have 
felt  the  menace  of  an  arrow  pointed 
directly  at  her  heart.  The  success  of 
Japanese  arms  in  the  war  of  1904-5 
destroyed  this  menace  and  made  possible 
the  annexation  of  Korea  and  the  assertion 
of  Japanese  dominance  over  Southern 
Manchuria. 

There  remained,  within  close  proximity 
to  Japan,  the  military  force  of  Germany, 
entrenched  at  Kiao  Chou.  This  port  had 
been  seized  by  the  Kaiser  in  1897  as  com- 
pensation for  the  murder  of  two  mission- 
aries, and  thus  constituted  an  assertion  in 
the  Far  East  of  the  policy  of  the  "  mailed 
fist."  Several  motives  inspired  Japan  to 
attack  this  stronghold  —  the  ridding  of 
China  of  another  European  power,  the 
extension  of  Japanese  interests  and  influ- 
ence,   and     revenge.    When     Kiao    Chou 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  125 

was  conquered,   the  Japanese  government 
turned  its  attention  to  the  larger  questions 
which   concerned   it  —  the   increase  of   its 
power  in  China.     It  made  demands  upon 
the  Pekin  government  which  were  granted 
in     May,     1915,     under     threat    of     war, 
demands    which    conclusively    established 
Japanese  control  over  Southern  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia;  which  made 
the  Province  of  Shantung  a  Japanese  in- 
stead  of   a   German   sphere   of   influence; 
which  strengthened  Japan's  position  in  the 
Province  of  Fukien,  gave  her  a  voice  in  the 
rich    Yangtse-Kiang    valley,    up    to    that 
time    claimed     as     a     British    sphere    of 
influence,   and    forced    China    to    declare 
that  it  would  not  cede  or  lease  any  terri- 
tory or  island  along  the  coast  of  Shantung 
to  any  foreign  power.     In  short,  Japan's 
paramountcy   received   treaty   recognition; 
and  had  it  not  been  for  foreign  pressure, 
the  Tokyo  government  would   have  com- 
pelled   compliance    with    other    demands 
which  would  have  placed  political,  finan- 
cial   and    military    control    of    the    entire 


126      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Chinese  nation  formally  in  Japanese  hands. 
How  was   this    accomplished?     Princi- 
pally as  a  consequence  of  the  preoccupation 
of   Europe   and   the   unwillingness   of   the 
United    States    to    do    more    than    make 
paper    protests.      Great    Britain,    thinking 
more  of  Europe  and  her  over-seas  posses- 
sions than  of  China,  looking  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  larger  rather  than  the  smaller 
interest,  deemed  it  wisdom  to  acquiesce  in 
Japan's     demands.     The     possibility     that 
Japanese   troops   might  be   needed   in   the 
Indian  Empire  to  oppose  invasion  or  sup- 
press revolt,  doubtless  also  influenced  Brit- 
ain's attitude.     Russia,  in  agreement  with 
Japan,    expected    territorial    compensation 
in  Outer  Mongolia;  besides,  she  could  not 
oppose  force  to  Japan,  even  had  she  been 
inclined     to     do     so.     Moreover,     Great 
Britain    was    willing    that    Japan    should 
acquire  control  of  coal  and  iron  mines  in 
the    Yangtse    region    in    order    that    that 
country    might   obtain    the    raw    materials 
needed   in   the   manufacture   of   munitions 
for  Russia.     France,  in  Southern  Asia  and 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  127 

with  a  sphere  of  influence  in  the  neighbor- 
ing southern  provinces  of  China,  was 
manacled  by  the  necessity  of  concentrating 
every  ounce  of  her  strength  against  Ger- 
many. The  single  nation  Japan  had  to 
reckon  with  was  the  United  States. 

Would  the  American  people  remotely 
consider  the  idea  of  going  to  war  in  behalf 
of  China?  It  does  not  take  an  instant's 
reflection  to  answer  emphatically  in  the 
negative.  Our  interests  in  China  are 
rather  of  the  future,  important  as  are 
those  of  the  present  in  religion  and  trade 
and  education.  It  was  with  a  view  to  safe- 
guarding them,  to  promoting  them  by  the 
attainment  of  influences  and  prestige,  that 
the  United  States  early  concerned  itself 
with  the  destiny  of  China.  We  aided 
materially  in  breaking  down  the  policy  of 
exclusion,  which  the  Chinese  government 
was  enabled  to  pursue  until  the  time  of 
the  Chino-Japanese  war  in  1894-5.  Fol- 
lowing that  war,  an  era  of  encroachment 
by  the  foreign  powers  was  inaugurated 
upon    the    Empire.      Moved    by    political 


128       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

as  well  as  commercial  reasons,  they 
endeavored  to  partition  the  country  among 
themselves  through  the  creation  of  spheres 
of  influence,  the  acquisition  of  sites  for 
strategical  bases,  the  construction  and  oper- 
ation of  lines  of  railway  and  the  securing 
of  vast  and  loosely  defined  concessions 
covering  the  entire  land. 

John  Hay  was  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  at  the  time;  and  his  Far 
Eastern  adviser  was  William  Woodville 
Rockhill,  a  man  who  combined  knowledge 
born  of  long  experience  in  China  and 
statecraft  to  an  unusual  degree.  In  a 
memorandum,  which  some  day  will  be 
published,  Mr.  Rockhill  called  the  atten- 
tion of  Mr.  Hay  to  the  prospect  that  if 
the  United  States  stood  aloof  from  the 
Chinese  situation,  its  trade  would  be 
destroyed,  its  religious  and  educational 
interests  restricted,  and  its  influence  and 
prestige  reduced  to  a  cipher.  With  Mr. 
Hay,  to  be  convinced  was  to  act.  He 
issued,  in  the  summer  of  1899,  his  famous 
circular   to    the    powers,    advocating    as    a 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  129 

world  policy  the  establishment  of  the  Open 
Door  in,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  in- 
tegrity of,  the  Chinese  Empire.  Politic- 
ally the  step  was  important,  for  it 
contemplated  general  international  agree- 
ment in  behalf  of  Chinese  integrity  and 
Chinese  independence,  and  commercially 
it  was  important,  particularly  for  the 
United  States,  since  it  gave  promise  that 
our  trade  would  be  unrestricted  through- 
out the  length  and  breadth  of  China.  The 
prestige  which  the  war  with  Spain  gave 
us,  the  support  of  Great  Britain,  and  the 
situation  of  the  powers  at  the  time,  enabled 
Mr.  Hay  to  wring  reluctant  assents  to  his 
declaration.  For  five  years  he  struggled  to 
clamp  his  purpose,  and  when  death  took 
him  from  the  State  Department  it  was  with 
the  comforting  knowledge  that  a  new 
American  policy  had  been  written  upon 
the  book  of  international  relations. 

The  policy  was  incorporated  in  the 
treaties  of  alliance  between  Great  Britain 
and  Japan;  it  was  observed  in  the  Treaty 
of  Portsmouth,  which  terminated  the  war 


130      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

between  Russia  and  Japan;  it  was  the  base 
of  an  agreement  between  Japan  and 
France  in  1907,  and  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan  in  1908.  The  agreement 
with  the  United  States  specifically  pro- 
vided that  for  the  defense  of  the  Open 
Door,  Japan,  after  consultation  on  the 
measures  to  be  taken,  would  join  with  the 
United  States,  whenever  occasion  might 
arise,  to  support  "  by  all  pacific  means  at 
their  disposal  the  independence  and  integ- 
rity of  China  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity  for  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  all  nations  in  the  Empire." 

These  several  treaties  and  agreements 
made  Japan  politically  what  her  geo- 
graphical proximity  to  China  and  her 
military  strength  justified  her  in  asserting 
• — the  guardian  of  the  Open  Door,  and 
indeed  its  chief  exponent.  What  she  has 
done  to  take  advantage  of  her  position  is 
a  matter  of  history.  British  and  American 
trade  steadily  declined  in  Southern  Man- 
churia because  it  could  not  compete  with 
Japanese    trade,    supported    as    the    latter 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  131 

was  by  geographical  proximity,  preferen- 
tial customs  and  railway  rates  and  shipping 
bounties,  and  by  the  refusal  of  Japanese 
traders  to  pay  China's  internal  taxes. 

For  some  years  prior  to  tlie  war  the 
attention  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
became  centered  more  and  more  upon 
other  parts  of  the  world.  They  were  forced 
by  events  to  sacrifice  their  commercial 
interests  in  China  and  to  give  Japan  greater 
freedom  in  economic  matters.  The  United 
States,  with  strange  indifiference  to  the 
important  interests  slipping  from  its  grasp, 
permitted  the  duty  and  responsibility 
which  the  Hay  policy  enjoined  on  it, 
to  pass  to  Japan.  The  act  that  practically 
terminated  America's  influence  on  the 
fate  of  China  w^as  President  Wilson's  with- 
drawal from  the  so-called  Six-Power 
Loan,  which  had  been  a  subject  of  nego- 
tiation between  the  powers  and  the  United 
States  during  the  entire  Taft  Administra- 
tion. While  the  President  declared  that 
"  our  interests  are  those  of  the  Open 
Door,    a    door   of    friendship    and    mutual 


132       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

advantage  "  and  that  "  this  is  the  only  door 
we  care  to  enter,"  he  served  notice  of  his 
declination  to  take  any  step  to  preserve  the 
principle  which  the  American  people  had 
so  heartily  approved  and  which  had 
received  at  least  lip-service  from  the  rest 
of  the  world.  It  was  realized  by  China 
and  the  powers  interested  in  her  situation 
that  so  far  as  the  United  States  was  con- 
cerned it  would  no  longer  concern  itself 
over  the  integrity  of  the  Far  Eastern 
country.  More  than  ever  the  responsibil- 
ity for  China's  preservation  devolved  upon 
Japan,  particularly  in  view  of  the  strained 
condition  of  affairs  leading  up  to  the 
Great  War  developing  in  Europe.  Had 
not  the  war  broken  out,  it  is  likely  there 
would  have  been  events  in  China  quite  as 
important  as  those  which  have  occurred 
since  the  struggle  began.  Japan  for  years 
had  been  paving  the  way  for  the  enuncia- 
tion of  her  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  time 
was  about  ripe  for  her  to  act. 

Whether   the   kind   of   a   Monroe   Doc- 
trine that  will  be  favored  by  Japan  will 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  133 

be  similar  to  the  American  policy,  remains 
to  be  seen.     Our   Doctrine   has   not  kept 
this   country   from    acquiring   territory   at 
the     expense    of     the     neighbors     it    was 
designed  to  protect,  nor  is  it  likely  Japan 
will  hesitate  to  extend  her  holdings  at  the 
expense  of  China,  if  it  is  to  her  advantage 
to  do  so.    The  fact  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  China  is  densely  populated,  and  that 
Japanese   immigrants   will   labor   in    keen 
competition    with    the    natives.     Statistics 
show  there  has  been  a  very  small  emigra- 
tion to  Manchuria,  and  a  large  proportion 
of  those  w^ho  hastened  to  that  region  after 
the    Russo-Japanese    war    have    returned 
home.     The  Japanese  can  not  work  suc- 
cessfully   alongside    the    Chinese    even    in 
their    own    island    territory    of    Formosa. 
This     economic     fact     undoubtedly     will 
figure    heavily    in    Japanese    calculations, 
and  the  chances  are  that  the  Tokyo  gov- 
ernment will  be  inclined  to  pursue  a  policy 
of  exploitation  rather  than  of  annexation 
—  for  a  time  at  least. 

Japan  is  in  a  position  to  adopt  the  policy 


134      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

which  is  best  suited  in  her  judgment  for 
her  own  interests.  Manchuria  is  as  good 
as  Japanese  to-day,  and  although  Japan 
has  agreed  formally  to  return  Kiao  Chou 
in  Shantung  to  China  when  the  European 
war  shall  end,  she  has  provided  for  the 
creation  of  an  exclusive  Japanese  conces- 
sion, besides  an  international  concession, 
at  that  port.  The  commercial,  industrial 
and  railroad  rights  which  Germany 
enjoyed  in  the  province  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  and  will  remain  in  the  hands  of 
Japan.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that 
Shantung's  destiny  ultimately  will  be  that 
of  Manchuria.  Being  in  control  of  Man- 
churia and  Shantung,  Japan  has  her  grip 
around  the  intervening  Province  of  Pe 
Chili  in  which  Pekin,  the  capital  of  the 
nation,  is  situated.  Again,  Japan  forced 
China  to  engage  not  to  grant  to  any  other 
power  the  right  to  build  a  shipyard,  coal- 
ing or  naval  station  or  other  military 
establishment  on  the  coast  of  the  Province 
of  Fukien,  which  lies  south  of  the  Province 
of    Che-Kiang,    which    borders    on    Shan- 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  135 

tung.  This  engagement  was  required  by 
Japan  because  an  American  firm  liad  a 
concession  for  constructing  a  dockyard  at 
a  Fukien  port,  and  because  China,  to 
curb  Japan,  desired  the  United  States  in 
that  province.  Looking  at  the  map  of 
China,  it  will  appear,  therefore,  that 
strategically,  Japan  controls  the  entire 
coast  of  the  country,  a  control  which  is 
strengthened  by  her  ownership  of  the 
islands  lying  in  proximity  to  the  coast. 

The  Wilson  Administration  followed 
closely  the  course  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
negotiations.  The  representations  it  made 
undoubtedly  influenced  the  Japanese  gov- 
ernment to  agree  to  the  postponement 
of  the  demands  included  in  what  is  known 
as  Group  V,  which,  more  directly  than 
those  accepted,  struck  at  the  very  heart 
of  China's  sovereignty.  The  postponed 
demands  will  be  pressed  at  a  more  oppor- 
tune moment.  Of  that  there  is  no  doubt. 
In  the  meantime,  the  United  States  has 
contented  itself  with  notifying  China  and 
Japan    that    it    "  can    not    recognize    any 


136      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

agreement  or  undertaking  which  has  been 
entered  into  or  which  may  be  entered  into 
between  the  governments  of  China  and 
Japan  impairing  the  treaty  rights  of  the 
United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China, 
the  political  or  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Republic  of  China,  or  the  international 
policy  commonly  known  as  the  Open  Door 
Policy."  When  the  American  Charge 
d'Afifaires  presented  the  communication  in 
Tokyo,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
asked  what  he  was  to  do  with  it.  "  I 
presume  it  is  intended  for  record,"  he  is 
said  to  have  responded.  ''  It  will  be  filed," 
gravely  replied  the  Minister. 

With  China's  plight,  the  American  peo- 
ple undoubtedly  have  sympathy.  Yuan 
Shih  Kai  endeavored  to  keep  his  country 
out  of  the  war  by  every  means  in  his 
power.  He  was  not  successful,  and  the 
nation  over  which  he  ruled  already  has 
paid  the  price  of  enforced  participation 
in  the  conflict,  just  as  Belgium  has  paid 
the  price.  Heroic  Belgium  deliberately 
chose   to   sacrifice   herself   upon    the   altar    ' 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  137 

of  right;  China  pursued  the  easier  alter- 
native, just  as  she  did  during  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  when  she  permitted  the 
belligerents  to  fight  in  Manchuria.  In 
spite  of  the  conclusion  of  hostilities,  how- 
ever, the  war  is  not  yet  over  for  China. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  capable 
German  agents  in  China  have  fostered 
and  are  fostering  dislike  of  the  Japanese 
among  the  natives.  There  is  little  doubt 
they  fanned  the  ambition  of  Yuan  Shih 
Kai  to  restore  the  empire  with  himself  as 
emperor.  They  figured  his  ambitious 
action  would  provoke  a  revolution  in  the 
southern  provinces,  that  this  would  precip- 
itate Japanese  intervention,  and  that  the 
necessity  of  providing  for  her  own  troops 
would  cause  Japan  to  diminish  the  supply 
of  munitions  she  has  been  furnishing  to 
the  Russian  government.  When  Yuan 
Shih  Kai  ascends  the  throne.  President 
Wilson  undoubtedly  will  accord  him  for- 
mal recognition  in  the  imperial  dignity, 
just  as  he  accorded  him  recognition  as 
president  of  the  republic,  this  in  spite  of 


138       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Mr.  Wilson's  declaration,  issued  seven  days 
after  the  Administration  began,  that  he 
would  not  recognize  a  man  who  achieved 
rulership  through  force. 

With  Japan  exploiting  the  resources  of 
China,  it  is  apparent  Nipponese  power 
will  be  tremendously  increased.  Her 
Manchurian  railroad  leases  having  been 
extended,  she  will  be  able  to  borrow 
money  upon  these  lines.  Her  more  solidly 
established  interests  in  Manchuria,  the 
rights  she  has  acquired  in  Shantung  and 
her  title  to  the  Hanyang  Iron  Worlds,  will 
improve  her  credit.  Altogether,  the  war 
has  proved  a  profitable  venture  for  Japan, 
and  a  correspondingly  unfortunate  occur- 
rence for  China.  It  is  to  be  regarded  as 
certain  that  when  the  European  Peace 
Congress  assembles,  China  will  seek  to 
have  international  action  in  her  behalf. 
Intimations  concerning  this  purpose 
already  have  been  made.  But  Japan  will 
insist  that  the  treaties  she  has  signed  with 
China  are  not  a  subject  for  action  by  the 
Peace  Congress. 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  139 

A  grave  question  in  this  connection  will 
confront  the  United  States.  Its  interfer- 
ence would  be  resented  by  Japan,  and 
might  even  lead  to  war,  for  that  govern- 
ment is  determined  to  continue  on  the  way 
its  feet  are  planted.  In  this  determination 
probably  it  will  have  the  backing  of  Rus- 
sia, which  is  gripping  northern  Chinese  ter- 
ritory. Nor  are  Great  Britain  and  France 
apt  to  curb  the  ambitions  of  an  ally.  So 
the  American  people  must  consider  care- 
fully how  far  they  are  justified  in  going, 
not  merely  in  behalf  of  China  but  in  sup- 
port of  the  interests  they  have  in  that 
country  and  which  the  future  promises. 
It  is  argued  that  the  real  hope  of  the 
Chinese  people  lies  in  the  preservation  of 
the  integrity  of  so  much  of  their  territory 
as  remains  to  them  and  in  their  develop- 
ment under  the  tutelage  of  Japan.  Con- 
querors have  come  and  gone  in  that 
mysterious  land,  but  China  persists. 
Mongol  and  Tartar  and  Manchu  have 
risen  to  power  and  disappeared.  Japan  is 
at   the    dawn    of    her   day;    but   if    history 


140       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

teaches  anything  it  ought  to  teach  her 
statesmen  that  there  is  a  point  beyond 
which  there  will  be  absorption  of  Japan 
by  China  rather  than  absorption  of  China 
by  Japan. 


chapter  vii 

The  Japanese  Portent 

There  are  portentous  questions  at  issue 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan.  The 
latter  country,  forced  into  the  stream  of 
modern  progress  by  the  frowning  guns 
of  Commodore  Perry,  has  become  in  the 
short  space  of  fifty  years  a  great  power, 
entitled  by  its  military  strength  to  sit  at 
the  council  board  of  nations.  Within 
twenty-one  years  it  took  part  in  four  wars, 
from  each  of  which  it  emerged  with 
greater  renown  and  greater  prestige,  and, 
as  a  result  of  three  of  them,  with  extended 
territorial  boundaries.  Its  rise  necessarily 
has  restricted  the  operations  and  ambitions 
of  other  powers,  including  the  United 
States.  The  keen  sense  of  nationalism 
which  has  been  developed,  the  pride  of 
race  which  achievement  has  intensified, 
and    the    military    character    of    a    people 

141 


142       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

always  bred  to  arms,  have  led  to  an  insis- 
tent  purpose  to  be  recognized  as  the  equal 
of  any  race  in  the  world.  Japan  has 
demonstrated  her  prowess  at  the  expense 
of  two  Caucasian  nations  —  Russia  and 
Germany.  She  has  likewise  demonstrated 
her  prowess  upon  an  Asiatic  nation  — 
China.  Her  troops  acquitted  themselves 
with  distinction  during  the  Boxer  Revolt 
in  China,  when  they  fought  side  by  side 
with  Americans,  Germans,  British,  French 
and  Russians. 

Unquestionably,  the  most  serious  prob- 
lem in  the  intricate  relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Japan  is  that  which  has  arisen 
as  a  result  of  the  attitude  of  the  Pacific 
Coast  states  toward  Japanese  subjects.  This 
question  has  three  angles:  first,  our  policy 
respecting  Japanese  immigration  to  conti- 
nental United  States  and  its  dependencies; 
second,  the  position  of  Japanese  lawfully 
in  the  United  States  and  its  dependencies; 
third,  the  entrance  of  Japanese  into  Latin- 
America.  As  to  the  first.  Secretary  of 
State    Elihu    Root    eflfected    a    temporary 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     143 

adjustment  by  negotiating  a  "  gentlemen's 
agreement,"  under  which  Japan  herself 
controls  emigration  to  the  United  States 
and  its  dependencies.  This  was,  and  is,  a 
makeshift,  though  it  has  worked  well  as  a 
result  of  scrupulous  observance  by  the 
Tokyo  government.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, that  our  policy  is  discriminatory,  dis- 
guise it  as  we  may,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
American  doors  are  open  on  equal  terms 
to  all  Caucasian  races.  Regarding  the 
second  question,  California  in  the  spring  of 
1913  enacted  a  law  prohibiting  Japanese 
from  owning  land  in  that  state.  Japan 
promptly  protested,  declaring  the  law  to  be 
"  unfair,  unjust,  inequitable  and  discrimi- 
natory "  .  .  .  "  primarily  directed  against 
Japanese,  and  prejudicial  to  their  existing 
rights "  .  .  .  "  inconsistent  with  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  in  force,"  and 
"opposed  to  the  spirit  and  fundamental 
principles  of  amity  and  good  understand- 
ing upon  which  the  conventional  relations 
of  the  two  countries  depend." 

The  United  States  insists  that  the  legis- 


144       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

lation  passed  by  California,  and  Arizona 
as  well,  is  not  political  but  economic,  and 
in  no  sense  to  be  regarded  as  part  of  any 
general  national  policy  of  unfriendliness. 
During  the  discussion  which  took  place 
between  the  representatives  of  the  two 
governments,  Japan  referred  to  the  nat- 
uralization laws  of  the  United  States  under 
which,  she  stated,  "  Japanese  subjects  are 
as  a  nation  apparently  denied  the  right  to 
acquire  American  nationality,"  which  was 
"  mortifying  to  the  government  and  people 
of  Japan,  since  the  racial  distinction  infer- 
able from  those  provisions  is  hurtful  to 
their  just  national  susceptibilities." 
w  In  this  last  declaration,  we  have  the  real 
germ  of  Japan's  complaint  against  the 
United  States.  It  is  no  new  issue  for 
Japan.  Under  the  Roosevelt  Administra- 
tion, the  "  school  question "  developed  in 
California,  there  were  assaults  upon  Jap- 
anese, and  there  was  a  movement  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  directed  against  these  peo- 
ple, in  which  the  labor  unions  were 
involved.      President    Roosevelt    earnestly 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     145 

deprecated  the  agitation,  and,  in  order  to 
remove  the  basic  trouble,  he  recommended, 
in    1906,    the   passage   by   Congress   of   an 
act    providing    for    the    naturalization    of 
Japanese     coming    to     the     country    with 
the    intent    to    become   American    citizens. 
The    recommendation    was    not    adopted. 
Flushed  by  the  success  of  its  arms  against 
Russia,  the  Japanese  government  assumed 
a  vigorous  attitude.     For  the  moral  effect 
such  action  would  produce,  the  President 
ordered    the    battleship    fleet    to    make    a 
tour    of    the    w^orld,    proceeding    via    the 
Pacific   Ocean    and   Japan.      Prior   to   the 
departure   of    the   fleet,    the   "  gentlemen's 
agreement "  was  negotiated,  and  after  the 
visit  of  the  men-of-war  to  Japan,  the  Root- 
Takahira  Agreement,  defining  the  policies 
of  the  two  governments  in  the  Pacific  and 
the  Far  East,  was  signed.     Under  pressure 
by    the     President,     Congress     authorized 
American     participation     in     the     Tokyo 
Exposition;    and    though    it   early   became 
apparent  that  the  Exposition  would  not  be 
held,  nevertheless  the  American   Commis- 


146       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

sion  was  dispatched  to  Japan  in  order  to 
show  the  warm  desire  of  the  Washington 
Government  to  maintain  close  and  friendly 
relations  with  that  empire. 

Count  Komura,  one  of  Japan's  Minis- 
ters for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  deserves  a 
high  place  in  international  history, 
describes  the  attitude  of  his  government 
in   1909  as  follows: 

"  As  regards  the  question  of  meas- 
ures    unfavorable     to     the     Japanese 
which  are  pending  in  the  California 
legislature,  the  Imperial  Government, 
relying  upon   the  sense  of  justice  of 
the  American  people,   as  well  as  the 
friendly    disposition    of    the    federal 
government,    confidently    hopes    that 
such   questions  will   not   lead    to    any 
international    complications." 
Count    Komura's    hopes    have    not    had 
realization.      In    order    to    manifest    her 
friendliness  for  the  United  States,  in  spite 
of  the  failure  to  adjust  the  differences  in 
relation  to  Japanese  subjects,  Japan  voted 
$1,000,000  to  participate  in  the  San  Fran- 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTExN  1      147 

Cisco  Exposition.  Hardly  had  this  deci- 
sion been  reached,  when  the  anti-Japanese 
land  ownership  proposal  was  debated  in 
the  California  legislature.  A  personal 
appeal  by  Secretary  of  State  Bryan  failed 
to  stop  the  passage  of  the  bill.  Thereupon 
followed  the  negotiations  containing 
the  quotations  given.  These  negotiations 
reached  such  a  tense  stage  that  Mr,  Bryan, 
when  asked  by  the  Japanese  Ambassador 
if  the  decision  of  the  United  States  was 
final,   replied: 

"  There  can  be  no  last  words  between 
friends." 

The  two  governments  entertained  a  pro- 
posal to  adjust  the  controversy  by  the  con- 
clusion of  a  special  convention.  The  solu- 
tion considered  has  never  been  divulged; 
but  whatever  it  is,  it  became  apparent  that 
it  was  not  approved  in  Japan,  for  with 
a  change  in  ministry  at  Tokyo  a  change 
occurred  in  the  attitude  of  the  government 
there.  The  negotiations  ended  for  the 
moment;  but  there  is  not  the  slightest 
doubt  they  will  be  revived  by  Japan,  per- 


148       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

haps  in  a  manner  that  will  awaken  the 
American  people  to  the  gravity  of  this 
question,  and,  above  all,  to  the  purpose 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Empire  to  assert  the 
doctrine  of  equality. 

That  Japan  postponed  pressing  the 
United  States  to  settle  the  question  she 
regards  as  so  vital,  a  question  which 
directly  affects  her  prestige  in  China, 
where  she  has  been  struggling  to  assert  her 
paramountcy,  may  be  attributed,  not  to  the 
military  power  of  the  American  nation, 
but  to  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain. 
Humiliating  as  it  may  be  to  our  people, 
who  think  they  can  "  lick  the  earth,"  there 
is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  pressure 
from  London  exercised  a  potent  influence 
upon  the  Japanese  procedure.  It  was 
not  to  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to 
have  Japan  and  the  United  States  involved 
even  in  a  condition  of  strained  relations. 
She  needed  her  ally  free  to  protect  her 
interests  in  the  Far  East,  and  events  justi- 
fied the  soundness  of  her  judgment. 

Moreover,  it  was  appreciated  in  London 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     149 

that  the  sympathy  of  the  British  Empire 
would    be    with    the    United    States    in    a 
struggle   with   Japan,    for   identically   the 
same  question  as  to  the  Japanese  exists  in 
the  British  Pacific  dependencies  as  in  the 
western     American     states.     Without     the 
moral  support  of  Great  Britain  and  with- 
out the  ability  to  borrow  money  in  Lon- 
don,  which   lack   of   such   support  would 
mean,    Japan    was    not    in    a    position    to 
force  the  negotiations  to  the  point  toward 
which   they  were   trending.     The  sugges- 
tion  has   been   advanced   that   the   dispute 
might    be    arbitrated    under    the    General 
Arbitration  Treaty  of  1908;  but  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  the  United  States  Senate  would  agree 
to  arbitrate  a  question  affecting  the  internal 
situation    in    the    United    States    and    the 
economic    life    of    the    American    people. 
Mr.  Bryan  desired  to  negotiate  with  Japan 
his  treaty  for  the  investigation  of  all  dis- 
putes.     Japan    declined    to    consider    the 
proposal,    realizing    the    situation    in    this 
country  was  such  that  an  investigation  of 
the  immigration  controversy  would  not  be 


150       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

authorized,  and  that  if  the  treaty  were 
made  it  would  be  made  only  to  be  broken. 
To  pass  now  to  the  Japanese  view  of 
the  American  policy  with  reference  to 
Latin-America.  It  is  difficult  for  the 
Japanese  people  to  regard  this  policy  as 
essentially  different  from  that  of  the 
"  Open  Door "  in  China.  Both  in  the 
broad  sense  have  exclusion  as  their  guid- 
ing principle.  Both  are  directed  against 
the  acquisition  of  territory  by  foreign 
nations.  As  has  been  disclosed,  the 
"  Open  Door  "  policy  in  China  has  been 
undermined.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  how- 
ever, still  maintains.  Japanese  have  found 
conditions  of  life  easier  in  Mexico  and 
other  Latin-American  states  than  at  home 
or  in  China.  The  law  of  gravitation  from 
a  poor,  crowded  land,  to  a  rich,  fertile, 
sparsely-settled  region  set  their  feet  east- 
ward. They  were  told  to  stop  in  1912 
by  the  Lodge  Resolution,  which  was 
inspired  by  reports  of  a  Japanese  settle- 
ment on  Magdalena  Bay,  which  the  Jap- 
anese Government  was  alleged  to  be  pro- 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     151 

moting  through  a  Japanese  corporation. 
The  resolution  declared  the  United  States 
could  not  see  without  grave  concern  the 
possession  of  a  harbor  "  or  other  place  " 
on  the  American  continent  by  any  cor- 
poration or  association  having  relations 
with  a  foreign  government,  provided 
such  harbor  "  or  other  place "  threat- 
ened the  communication  or  the  "  safety  " 
of  the  United  States.  It  is  quite  true  this 
resolution  does  not  discriminate  against 
Japan;  it  applies  equally  to  all  nations. 
But  it  was  provoked  by  a  Japanese  settle- 
ment, and,  therefore,  is  considered  to  have 
been  directed  especially  against  Japan. 

Japan  knows  her  own  situation  and 
aims;  she  is  not  certain  of  the  purposes 
of  the  United  States.  Nor  is  this  surpris- 
ing in  view  of  the  day-by-day  world 
measures  we  adopt,  the  lack  of  a  perma- 
nent, well-thought-out  policy,  which  is 
desirable  not  only  for  ourselves  but  for 
other  nations.  We  were  for  the  integrity 
of  China  in  1899;  we  practically  aban- 
doned that  principle  fourteen  years  later. 


152       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Secretary  of  State  Knox  sought,  or  rather 
the  Japanese  so  believed,  to  deprive  them 
of  the  fruits  of  their  victory  over  Russia, 
by  proposing  the  neutralization  of  that 
part  of  the  railroad  running  through  the 
Chinese  Province  of  Manchuria  which 
had  been  ceded  to  Japan.  Then  came  the 
scheme  of  American  capitalists  to  build 
the  Chinchow-Aigun  Railway  as  a  rival 
to  the  South  Manchurian  Railway.  Next 
followed  the  proposal  of  the  four-power 
loan  of  $50,000,000,  the  interest  to  be 
guaranteed  by  all  the  unhypothecated 
resources  of  Manchuria  and  containing  a 
provision  that  China  should  apply  to  the 
four  powers  for  future  loans,  "  thus  de- 
throning Japan  from  her  primacy  in  Man- 
churia." To  quote  a  Japanese  view:  *'  To 
Japan,  Manchuria  is  hallowed  ground. 
Upon  this  plain  twice  she  fought  for  the 
sake  of  her  national  existence.  Two  billion 
yens  of  her  treasure  were  spent,  and  the 
precious  blood  of  one  hundred  and  thirty 
thousand  of  her  noblest  sons  was  shed  for 
the  honor  of  their  beloved  Nippon." 


'  THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     153 

Under  the  circumstances,  it  was  not  sur- 
prising that  Japan,  as  well  as  Russia, 
which  controlled  the  railroad  in  Northern 
Manchuria,  rejected  the  Knox  neutrali- 
zation proposal,  that  she  prevented  the 
construction  of  the  Chinchow-Aigun  Rail- 
w'ay,  and  that  she  displayed  keen  resent- 
ment at  the  loan  idea.  It  can  be  put 
down  as  a  cardinal  fact  of  Japanese  policy 
that  she  will  never  voluntarily  relinquish 
the  rights  she  has  obtained  in  Manchuria, 
and  indeed  will  defend  them  to  the  last 
extremity.  Likewise,  she  will  defend  the 
additional  rights  she  has  acquired  since 
the  war  began,  and,  as  developments  have 
demonstrated,  she  will  pursue  without  con- 
sideration of  consequences  the  policies  that 
she  deems  her  vital  interests  in  China  and 
the  Pacific  demand. 

That  the  United  States  will  pursue  pre- 
cisely the  same  course  with  reference  to 
its  vital  interests  is  equally  obvious.  What 
then  will  be  the  result?  Are  the  many 
manifestations  of  friendship  this  country 
has  given  to  and  for  Japan  and  that  Japan 


154      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

has  given  to  this  country,  to  be  blown 
away  in  the  swirl  of  war?  God  forbid. 
Japan  does  not  forget  that  the  sword  of 
Perry  was  in  fact  an  olive  branch,  and 
that  the  wisdom  of  Townsend  Harris  was 
the  guide  for  her  youthful  feet  in  the 
early  years  of  her  modernity.  She  recalls 
with  gratitude  our  refusal  of  the  Shimono- 
seki  indemnity,  and  the  willingness  dis- 
played by  us  to  revise  the  old  treaties  and 
thus  make  her  internationally  sovereign 
throughout  her  entire  territory. 

The  statesmen  of  Japan  know  better 
than  the  people  the  great  value  of  the 
moral  sympathy  this  nation  gave  their  land 
in  its  war  with  Russia,  and  above  all  the 
extent  of  the  service  rendered  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  in  imposing  peace  upon 
the  government  of  the  Czar.  It  may  be 
permitted  now  to  say  that  it  was  Japan 
who  asked  for  peace,  not  Russia;  that  it 
was  only  by  the  exercise  of  a  high  order 
of  diplomacy  that  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  able 
to  bring  the  Slav  Emperor  to  the  point 
of  entering  upon  the  negotiations,   which 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT     155 

resulted  in  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 
Yet  the  Japanese  people  were  led  to 
believe  that  it  was  the  United  States  which 
estopped  them  from  securing  an  indemnity 
from  Russia,  and  this  belief  is  responsible 
to  some  extent  for  the  feeling  that  the 
United  States  deliberately  has  endeavored 
to  keep  Japan  poor.  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  say  this  government  had  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  Russia's  rejection  of  the 
indemnity  demand.  Had  Japan  not  aban- 
doned her  attitude  in  this  respect,  the  war 
would  have  continued. 

But  such  hostility  as  exists  in  Japan 
toward  the  United  States  could  be  sup- 
planted by  the  old-time  friendship  if  there 
were  a  real  statesmanlike  efifort  made  to 
compose  our  dififerences.  There  is,  in 
theory,  certainly  no  irreconcilable  differ- 
ence between  the  two  nations.  If  the 
United  States  were  to  authorize  the  nat- 
uralization of  Japanese  as  President  Roose- 
velt recommended,  if  Japanese  were  to 
receive  identically  the  same  treatment  as 
Europeans,    if    there    should    be    general 


156       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

restriction  of  immigration,  applying  to  all 
other  nationalities  the  same  as  to  Japanese, 
it  is  evident  the  fundamental  cause  of  bad 
feeling  would  be  removed.  Whether  this 
remedy  is  practical  is  another  question. 
The  Pacific  Coast  states  regard  the  Jap- 
anese as  an  economic,  even  a  political, 
menace.  It  is  impossible  to  expect  under 
present  conditions  a  congressional  enact- 
ment authorizing  the  naturalization  of 
these  people.  The  hyphenated  situation 
in  the  United  States  has  revealed  the 
necessity  of  placing  a  limitation  upon 
immigration,  and  this  undoubtedly  will 
lead  to  the  passage  of  a  law  raising  the 
bars  against  most  of  the  applicants  for 
admission.  A  policy  amounting  to  prac- 
tical exclusion  would  be  welcome  to 
Europe,  which  will  desire  to  keep  its 
men  and  women  at  home  in  order  to 
repair  the  ravages  of  war.  If  the  policy 
should  be  made  to  apply  to  Japan  in 
precisely  the  same  fashion  as  to  Cau- 
casian nations,  the  stigma  of  racial 
inferiority     which     humiliates     the     Far 


THE  JAPANESE  PORTENT    157 

Eastern  people,  would  be  removed. 
Japan  would  then  believe  we  stand  for 
the  "  Open  Door "  at  home  as  we  have 
stood  for  the  "  Open  Door "  in  China. 
There  would  be,  in  other  words,  legal 
equality;  and  this  would  have  an  impor- 
tant influence  not  only  upon  the  relations 
of  the  two  countries  but  upon  their  poli- 
cies in  the  Pacific  and  in  China.  The 
people  of  the  United  States  frequently 
forget  they  have  as  much  to  learn  from 
other  nations  as  those  nations  have  to  learn 
from  us.  They  can  not  overlook  the  fact 
that  while  geographically,  Japan  lies  in 
Asia,  she  is  the  most  western  of  Eastern 
nations;  that  she  has  a  culture  and  civili- 
zation which  justify  respect;  that  by 
remarkable  energy,  in  the  short  space  of 
half  a  century  she  has  reconstructed  her 
whole  scheme  of  political  and  social  life 
with  standards  approximating  those  of  the 
West;  and  that  she  has  a  strong  govern- 
ment able  to  maintain  peace  and  order 
at  home  and  capable  of  fulfilling  pledges 
made  to  foreign  nations. 


chapter  viii 
The  War  on  American  Life 

Neutral  diplomacy  never  has  had  to 
deal  w^ith  more  intricate  problems  than 
those  arising  out  of  the  European  strug- 
gle. The  introduction  of  novel  engines  of 
war,  such  as  the  submarine,  the  aeroplane, 
the  wireless  telegraph,  asphyxiating  gas, 
and  new  forms  of  explosives,  the  substi- 
tution of  mechanics  for  man  as  motive 
power,  and  the  imperative  need  of  petrol- 
eum products  for  operations  in  the  air,  on 
the  surface  of  the  earth,  and  beneath  the 
sea,  have  created  conditions  unknown  to 
humanity  in  the  past.  The  precedents  of 
prior  wars  frequently  lack  application  to 
modern  incidents;  and  there  is  no  guide 
save  natural  justice  difficult  to  define  and 
practical  common  sense  hard  to  get. 

But  the  underlying  principles  of  hu- 
manity  and    international    law  which   are 

158 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     159 

founded  on  natural  justice,  are  as  light- 
houses in  a  raging  sea  of  blood.  They 
are  immutable,  because  they  appeal  alike 
to  the  conscience  and  the  reason  of  man- 
kind. They  can  not  be  changed  by  new- 
engines  of  destruction.  Let  them  be  vio- 
lated or  infringed,  and  throughout  the 
world  there  is  vigorous  condemnation  of 
the  guilty.  Normal  acts  of  war,  which 
involve  the  killing  of  thousands  upon  thou- 
sands of  men,  the  maiming  of  thousands  of 
others,  and  the  imposition  of  terrible  hard- 
ships upon  noncombatants  in  the  field  of 
operations,  produce  sympathy  and  charity 
for  the  sufferers  —  nothing  more.  But  to 
burn  a  town  like  Louvain,  with  its  uni- 
versity, its  cathedral,  and  its  priceless 
library;  to  damage  works  of  art  like  the 
cathedrals  of  Rheims  and  Soisson;  to  drop 
bombs  from  aircraft  upon  populous  com- 
munities; to  shoot  a  nurse  like  Miss 
Cavell;  to  sink  a  liner  and  destroy  the 
lives  of  innocent  men,  women  and  chil- 
dren—  such  occurrences  provoke  an  out- 
burst of  indignation  not  only  in  the  bellig- 


160       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

erent  countries  injured,  but  in  those  coun- 
tries free  from  war.  It  is  an  honor  to 
humanity  that  this  is  true;  and  that  it  is 
true  is  due  to  the  growth  of  the  public 
conscience  everywhere.  No  sign  of  the 
advancing  times  is  clearer  than  this:  That 
there  exists  in  every  land  a  national  sensi- 
tiveness to  international  opinion.  This 
has  been  shown  by  the  rapidity  with  which 
a  defense  is  offered  to  a  charged  breach 
of  the  laws  of  war. 

Against  the  use  of  the  submarine,  the 
aeroplane  or  any  other  "  humane  "  weapon 
of  destruction  in  strictly  military  opera- 
tion and  in  accordance  with  what  have 
come  to  be  regarded  as  the  customary 
laws  of  war,  there  has  been  and  can  be 
no  complaint.  But  when  these  agencies 
are  employed  in  violation  of  the  recog- 
nized rights  of  the  belligerent  against 
which  they  are  directed,  and  particularly 
in  violation  of  the  obligations  the  employ- 
ing state  is  under  to  neutrals,  wrongs  are 
perpetrated  for  which  redress  properly 
can    be    exacted,    and    measures    taken    to 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     161 

insure  against  their  recurrence.  The 
rights  of  belligerents  are  described  in  the 
Hague  Convention,  and  these  include  ex- 
emption from  the  employment  of  force  in 
so  far  as  it  would  constitute  an  act  of  bar- 
barity or  treachery.  There  may  be  some 
shadow  of  excuse  for  the  violation  of  each 
other's  rights  by  belligerents.  The  anger 
and  bitterness  war  provokes,  the  brutality  it 
produces,  necessarily  mitigate  the  judgment 
humanity  renders.  But  there  can  be  no  ex- 
cuse for  acts  committed  in  pursuance  of  a 
deliberate  policy,  acts  which  strike  at  the 
lives  of  neutrals  and  other  noncombatants 
as  well  as  at  belligerents. 

Such  a  policy  was  inaugurated  by  Ger- 
many in  her  under-seas  campaign.  That 
policy  was  an  expression  of  the  terrible 
German  doctrine  of  Krieysraison,  that  is 
to  say,  that  in  war  the  end  justifies  the 
means.  Deprived  of  the  command  of  the 
sea  by  the  powerful  British  fleet,  and 
fearful  of  the  throttling  effect  British 
maritime  operations  would  have  upon  the 
Central  Powers,  Germany  resorted  to  the 


162       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

use  of  the  submarine  against  all  merchant- 
men trading  with  the  Allies.  Her  Naval 
General  Staff,  of  which  Admiral  von  Tir- 
pitz  was  the  head,  believed  the  inhabitants 
of  the  British  Isles  could  be  terrorized 
and  made  to  feel  the  pinch  of  starvation, 
and  that  an  internal  situation  would 
develop  which  would  be  helpful  to  the 
German   cause. 

Following  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
floating  mines,  lurking  terrors  of  the  deep, 
were  set  adrift.  Each  belligerent  charged 
the  other  with  committing  this  crime 
against  humanity  and  international  law. 
In  this  connection  it  may  be  pointed  out 
that  at  the  second  Hague  Convention,  the 
German  delegation  defeated  an  English 
proposal  estopping  belligerents  from  lay- 
ing mines  in  the  open  sea.  The  British 
government  charged,  moreover,  that  the 
mines  Germany  had  planted  were  not  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Hague  provisions  which  were  adopted. 
Irrespective  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  this 
charge,    it   Is   certain   that   steamers   were 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     163 

blown  up.  The  United  States  made  no 
investigation  and  no  protest,  a  course 
which,  as  a  powerful  neutral  entitled  to 
navigate  the  seas  in  absolute  safety,  it  is 
apparent  it  should  have  followed.  The 
Trent  case  is  in  point  in  this  connection. 
From  this  British  steamer,  Confederate 
agents  were  removed  by  an  American  man- 
of-war.  France  as  well  as  Great  Britain 
protested  against  the  action  of  the  Ameri- 
can naval  officer  on  the  ground  that  the 
rights  of  all  neutral  nations,  as  well  as  the 
specific  rights  of  Great  Britain,  had  been 
violated. 

The  effect  of  Germany's  action,  or  at 
least  the  charge  made  against  her,  was  to 
cause  the  British  government  to  declare 
the  North  Sea  "  within  the  military  zone," 
and  to  notify  neutral  shipping  that  if  any 
other  than  a  prescribed  route  were  fol- 
lowed, vessels  would  move  "  at  their  own 
peril." 

While  avowedly  acting  in  the  interest 
of  the  safety  of  merchant  ships,  it  is  mani- 
fest the   British  government  went  beyond 


164       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

its  power  in  describing  the  North  Sea  as 
a  ''  military  zone."  The  United  States, 
whose  rights,  in  common  with  those  of 
other  neutrals,  were  violated,  again 
refrained  from  protesting.  Its  silence  was 
construed  by  Germany  as  acquiescence  in 
an  unlawful  condition,  as  proof  of  sub- 
servience of  its  neutral  rights  to  the  needs 
of  the  Allies. 

Germany,  although  using  neutral  flags 
herself,  complained  of  the  systematic  use  of 
neutral  flags  by  British  merchantmen  — 
the  case  of  the  Lusitania,  which  hoisted  the 
American  colors  in  February,  1915,  is 
cited,  because  it  led  to  a  protest  by  the 
United  States.  Germany  was  angered,  too, 
by  the  refusal  of  Great  Britain  and  her 
Allies  to  respect  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don, which  had  been  signed  by  British 
delegates  but  not  ratified  by  the  British 
parliament  nor  by  any  other  govern- 
ment; by  the  alleged  unlawful  exten- 
sion by  the  Allies  of  the  list  of  absolute 
contraband  goods;  and  by  the  measures 
taken  by  European  neutrals  to  stop  trade 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE    165 

with  Germany  as  demanded  by  the  London 


government. 


These  various  grounds  were  set  forth 
by  Germany  as  justification  for  the  sub- 
marine campaign  against  merchantmen  for 
which  she  had  been  sedulously  preparing. 
The  German  Admiralty  issued  a  procla- 
mation on  February  4,  1915,  describing 
the  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  including  the  w^hole  of  the  Eng- 
lish Channel,  as  a  "  war  zone."  Begin- 
ning February  18,  it  was  announced  that 
every  enemy  merchant  ship  found  in  the 
''  war  zone  "  would  be  destroyed,  without 
its  being  "  always  possible  to  avert  the 
dangers  threatening  the  crew  and  passen- 
gers on  that  account."  It  was  added  that 
"  even  neutral  ships  are  exposed  to  danger 
in  the  war  zone,  as  in  view  of  the  misuse 
of  neutral  flags  ordered  January  31  by  the 
British  Government  and  of  the  accidents 
of  naval  war,  it  can  not  always  be  avoided 
to  strike  even  neutral  ships  in  attacks  that 
are  directed  at  enemy  ships."  A  memo- 
randum conveyed   to  neutral  governments 


166       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

an  explanation  of  the  reasons  avow- 
edly animating  the  German  government. 
"  Great  Britain,"  said  this  memorandum, 
"  invokes  the  vital  interests  of  the  British 
Empire  which  are  at  stake  in  justification 
of  its  violations  of  the  law  of  nations,  and 
the  neutral  powers  appear  to  be  satisfied 
with  theoretical  protests,  thus  actually 
admitting  the  vital  interests  of  a  belligerent 
as  a  sufficient  excuse  for  methods  of  wag- 
ing war  of  whatever  description.  The 
time  has  come  for  Germany  also  to  invoke 
such   vital   interests." 

One  of  the  "  theoretical  protests "  to 
which  Germany  referred  was  a  note  sent 
December  26,  1914,  by  Secretary  of  State 
Bryan  to  the  British  government  through 
Ambassador  Page,  in  London.  In  this 
communication  the  United  States  pro- 
tested against  the  seizure  and  detention  of 
American  cargoes.  Our  attitude  induced 
no  modification  of  the  British  policy, 
which  later,  indeed,  was  made  more  rigid 
and  effective. 

The  German  "  war  zone  "  proclamation 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     167 

produced  a  feeling  of  irritation  in  the 
United  States  because  it  constituted  an 
assertion  of  belligerent  rights  over  the 
open  seas.  Recognition  of  its  propriety  and 
legality  would  have  meant  that  a  belligerent 
could  declare  the  entire  Atlantic,  even  up  to 
the  three-mile  limit  of  the  United  States, 
as  a  "  war  zone."  Further,  it  was  realized 
the  Germans  had  advanced  the  claim  to 
sink  on  sight  any  merchant  ship  that  came 
within  the  range  of  a  submarine  torpedo, 
without  making  provision  in  accordance 
with  the  solemn  dictates  of  humanity,  for 
the  safety  of  passengers  and  crew.  They 
had  declared  their  purpose  not  to  observe 
the  laws  and  customs  of  war,  among  which 
are  those  of  visit  and  search  of  all  ships 
overhauled,  and  the  destruction  of  prizes 
only  in  extraordinary  circumstances,  such  as 
danger  to  the  safety  of  the  captor  or  to 
the  success  of  the  operations  in  which  the 
latter   is   engaged   at   the   time. 

They  had  determined  to  employ  in  this 
kind  of  warfare,  submarines,  which  by 
their  verv  character  could  not  observe  the 


168       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

principles  of  humanity  and  international 
law;  which  could  not  perform  visit  and 
search  without  danger  to  their  own  safety; 
which  could  not  take  captures  which  they 
made  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  prize 
court,  and  which  could  not  provide  accom- 
modations for  the  passengers  and  crews  of 
large  merchant  ships.  Of  particular  im- 
portance to  the  United  States  was  the  fact 
^that  the  German  "  war  zone  "  proclamation 
was  in  direct  violation  of  Article  XII  of 
the  Treaty  of  1785  with  Prussia  —  a  treaty 
made  by  direction  of  the  Great  Frederick 
and  signed  by  Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas 
Jefferson  and  John  Adams.  That  treaty 
specifically  recognized  our  freedom  of 
navigation  in  the  w^aters  of  an  enemy  of 
Germany. 

Prior  to  the  issuance  of  the  German 
*'  war  zone "  proclamation,  the  German 
auxiliary  cruiser  Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich,  on 
January  27,  1915,  captured  the  American 
schooner  William  P.  Frye,  in  the  South 
Atlantic.  This  vessel  was  laden  with  a 
cargo  of  wheat  consigned  "  to  order  "  for 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     169 

delivery  at  Queenstown,  Falmouth  or  Ply- 
mouth.    The  Frye  was  destroyed,  in  spite 
of  the  position  taken  by  the  German  gov- 
ernment   that    wheat    or    other    foodstuffs 
consigned  to  the  German  civilian  popula- 
tion,   should    be   exempt   from    seizure   or 
destruction,  under  the  Declaration  of  Lon- 
don   and    the    principles    of    international 
law  upon  which  that  document  was  based, 
and  also  in  violation  of  the  express  stipu- 
lation of  the  treaty  of  the  Great  Frederick. 
Moreover,  as  the  crew  of  the  schooner  was 
taken    aboard    the   Prinz   Eitel   Fried vich, 
which  was   liable   to   destruction   if   over- 
hauled by  a  British  man-of-war,   it  could 
not    be    claimed    these    American    citizens 
had  been  put  "  in  a  place  of  safety  "  within 
the  meaning  of  international  law. 

The  case  of  the  Frye  necessarily  did  not 
come  up  for  consideration  between  the 
two  governments  until  news  of  her  destruc- 
tion reached  the  United  States  almost 
a  month  later.  Then  the  negotiations 
dragged  along  for  a  year,  with  a  promise 
of  adjustment  of  the  amount  of  indemnity 


170       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

to  be  paid  by  Germany.  The  case  is  referred 
to  here  merely  to  show  that  Germany 
countenanced  the  very  things  she  com- 
plained of  against  England,  with  the  addi- 
tional failure  to  make  proper  provision 
for  the  safety  of  the  crew  of  the  Frye. 
Berlin's  defense  of  the  action  of  the  Prinz 
Eitel  Friedrich  was  that  the  Frye  was 
en  route  to  one  of  several  fortified  ports, 
which  serve  as  bases  for  the  British  fleet, 
and  that  the  cargo  therefore  was  in  reality 
destined  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy. 
Even  this  contention,  however,  crumbles  in 
the  light  of  the  treaty  of   1785. 

A  consideration  of  all  the  facts  leading 
up  to  the  German  "  war  zone  "  proclama- 
tion as  well  as  the  terms  of  the  procla- 
mation itself,  caused  President  Wilson  and 
his  cabinet  to  formulate  a  note,  cabled  to 
the  German  government  under  date  of 
February  10,  1915.  This  note  pointed  to 
the  critical  situation  which  might  arise  in 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  and 
Germany,  were  the  German  naval  forces, 
in   carrying  out   the  policy  foreshadowed 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     171 

in  the  Admiralty's  proclamation,  to  destroy 
any  merchant  vessels  of  the  United  States 
or  cause  the  death  of  American  citizens. 
It  described  the  limitations  applicable  to 
belligerent  maritime  operations,  denied 
that  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  justi- 
fied any  imputations  upon  its  neutrality, 
and  closed: 

"  If    the    commanders    of    German 
vessels   of   war   should    act   upon    the 
presumption     that    the    flag    of     the 
United   States  was  not  being  used  in 
good  faith  and  should  destroy  on  the 
high  seas  an  American  vessel  or  the 
lives  of  American  citizens,   it  would 
be  difficult  for  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  view  the  act  in  any 
other  light  than  as  an  indefensible  vio- 
lation of  neutral  rights  which  it  would 
be    very    hard     indeed    to     reconcile 
with    the    friendly    relations    now    so 
happily     existing     between     the     two 
Governments. 

"  If    such     a     deplorable    situation 
should    arise,    the    Imperial    German 


172       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Government  can  readily  appreciate 
that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  would  be  constrained  to  hold 
the  Imperial  German  Government  to 
a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of 
their  naval  authorities  and  to  take  any 
steps  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to 
safeguard  American  lives  and  prop- 
erty, and  to  secure  to  American  citi- 
zens the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
acknowledged     rights     on     the     high 


seas." 


Did  this  semi-ultimatum  stop  Germany's 
submarine  campaign?  The  world  knows 
it  did  not.  On  March  28,  1915,  a  sub- 
marine torpedoed  the  British  liner  Falaba, 
and  among  those  drowned  as  a  result  was 
an  American  citizen.  On  April  28,  the 
American  vessel  Gushing  was  attacked  in 
the  English  Channel  by  a  German  aero- 
plane. On  May  1,  the  American  vessel 
Gulflight  was  attacked  by  a  German  sub- 
marine, and  two  or  more  Americans  lost 
their  lives.  On  May  7,  the  British  liner 
Lusitania  was  torpedoed,  and  of  the   1,256 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     173 

men,   women   and   children   drowned,    IIS 
were  of  American  nationality. 

Intense  indignation  swept  over  the  coun- 
try when  the  fate  of  the  Lusitania  became 
known.  What  did  the  government  at 
Washington  propose  to  do  to  hold  Ger- 
many to  that  "  strict  accountability  "  prom- 
ised in  the  note  of  February  10?  President 
Wilson,  a  few  days  after  the  destruction  of 
this  vessel,  delivered  an  address  in  Philadel- 
phia in  which  he  used  the  expression  "  too 
proud  to  fight."  It  was  insisted  at  the 
White  House  the  following  morning  that 
this  expression  had  no  relation  to  the 
attitude  of  the  government  with  reference 
to  the  Lusitania  outrage,  and  action  was 
forecasted  which,  it  was  asserted,  would 
appease  the  wrath  of  the  people.  Prior 
to  this  declaration  appeared  a  statement 
from  Colonel  Roosevelt,  denouncing  the 
attack  upon  the  Lusitania  and  demand- 
ing instant  measures  to  obtain  redress  and 
put  an  end  to  so  barbarous  a  method  of 
warfare.  The  importance  of  that  state- 
ment cannot  be  overestimated ;  for  it  forced 


174       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

the    administration    to    realize    that   some- 
thing must  be  done  and  done  quickly. 

The  negotiations  with  reference  to  the 
Lusitania  and  the  long  list  of  liners  and 
merchantmen  that  followed  her  to  the 
bottom  of  the  sea,  are  now  history.  In 
their  early  stages  President  Wilson  pro- 
claimed sound  principles,  appealing  alike 
to  the  humanitarian  and  the  international 
law  authority.  He  made  polite  but  firm 
demands  upon  Germany,  and  peremptory 
demands  upon  Austria-Hungary,  when  that 
nation  began  her  submarine  campaign  in 
the  Mediterranean.  In  September,  1915, 
he  obtained  assurances  from  Germany  that 
liners  plying  in  the  "  war  zone "  about 
the  British  Isles  would  not  be  sunk  with- 
out warning,  unless  they  resisted  or 
attempted  to  escape,  and  in  January,  1916, 
he  obtained  like  assurances  with  respect 
to  all  merchantmen  plying  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. In  the  case  only  of  the  British 
liner  Arabic  did  he  receive  a  ''  disavowal," 
and  that  in  the  form  of  a  personal  letter 
from  Count  von  Bernstorff  to  the  Honor- 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     175 

able  Robert  Lansing,  who  had  succeeded 
Mr.  Bryan  as  Secretary  of  State,  not  as  an 
official  declaration  by  the  German  govern- 
ment to  the  American  government!     The 
solution   of   the   Lusitania   question   which 
finally   was    determined    upon    but   which 
was  not  adopted  because  of  the  return  of 
Germany  to  her  "  sink  on  sight "   policy, 
was  predicated  upon  the  admission,  rather 
the  reiteration,  by  Berlin   (recall  the  Ger- 
man   memorandum    establishing    a    "  war 
zone"    about    the    British    Isles),    of    the 
view    that   the   sinking   of    the    liner   was 
an  act  of  retaliation,  which  Germany  justi- 
fies   and    which    the    United    States    holds 
to  be  illegal;  and  that  insofar  as  American 
citizens  were  drowned  the  German  govern- 
ment was   liable.     Austria-Hungary  pun- 
ished    the     submarine     commander     who 
shelled  and  sank  the  Italian  liner  Ancona, 
while  defending  his  action.     Not  a  dollar 
of  indemnity  has  been  paid,  though  prom- 
ised.    As   a  matter  of   fact,   the  curse  of 
this   w^hole  wretched   business   lies   in    the 
action   of   the  government  of   the   United 


176       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

States   in   placing  American  lives  upon   a 
monetary  basis. 

Are  neutral  and  noncombatant  lives 
safer  at  sea  as  a  result  of  the  diplomacy  of 
Washington?  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  have  not  abandoned  their  sub- 
marine warfare;  they  have  not  agreed  to 
live  up  to  the  spirit  of  the  principles  of 
humanity  and  international  law.  It  is  of 
first  importance  that  passengers  and  crew 
shall  be  transferred  to  "  a  place  of  safety  " 
before  the  vessel  they  are  aboard  be  sunk. 
Germany  promised  in  January,  1916,  that 
all  persons  should  be  "  accorded  safety." 
Austro-Hungary  about  the  sam.e  time 
declared  that  vessels  "  may "  not  be 
destroyed  without  the  persons  on  boar;] 
*'  being  brought  into  safety."  In  a  prior 
note  relating  to  the  Frye,  Germany  ex- 
plained her  pledge  of  safety  by  stating 
that  persons  found  on  board  a  vessel 
"  may "  not  be  ordered  into  lifeboats, 
except  when  the  general  conditions  —  that 
is,  the  weather,  the  state  of  the  sea,  and 
the    neighborhood    of    the    coasts  —  afiford 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     177 

absolute  certainty  that  the  boats  would 
reach  the  nearest  port.  A  condition  of 
sea  and  weather  and  distance  from  the 
coast  may  mean  one  thing  to  a  submarine 
commander  and  a  totally  difterent  thing 
to  delicate  men,  women  and  children, 
unable  to  prepare  themselves  for  the  ordeal 
thrust  upon  them.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
pledge  was  by  no  means  final,  as  indicated 
by  the  reservation  of  the  right  accom- 
panying it  to  bring  up  at  a  later  period 
"  the  difficult  questions  of  international 
law  connected  with  submarine  warfare." 
It  should  be  observed  further  that  Ger- 
many did  not  abandon  her  "  war  zone " 
about  the  British  Isles,  liners  only  being 
assured  of  security. 

What  little  the  United  States  obtained 
was  taken  away,  and  submarine  warfare 
with  all  its  horrors  restored,  as  desired  by 
the  Central  Powers,  at  the  instance  of  the 
United  States  itself.  On  January  18,  1916, 
Secretary  Lansing  suggested  to  the  Allies 
that  merchantmen  should  be  deprived  of 
guns  for  defensive  purposes  in  order  that 


J78       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

they  might  not  attack  submarines,  and  de- 
clared that  President  Wilson  was  consid- 
ering the  advisability  of  treating  merchant- 
men so  armed  as  auxiliary  cruisers.  From 
the  foundation  of  the  Republic,  the  United 
States  has  recognized  the  right  of  mer- 
chantmen to  arm  for  defense.  This  right 
was  solemnly  upheld  against  the  intention 
of  his  government  by  Chief  Justice  Mar- 
shall in  the  case  of  the  Nereide  and  has 
been  a  feature  of  our  maritime  law.  To 
surrender  it  is  to  place  a  ship  at  the 
mercy  of  a  brutal  commander,  as  was  the 
Ancona,  which,  while  stopping,  was  shelled 
and  some  of  her  passengers  and  crew 
killed.  By  treating  merchantmen  armed 
purely  for  defense,  as  auxiliary  cruisers, 
submarines  thereby  gain  the  right  to 
sink  them  without  warning  and  without 
consideration  of  the  innocent  life  on  board. 
Germany  promptly  took  advantage  of  the 
position  of  the  United  States  and  an- 
nounced that  from  March  1,  1916,  all 
vessels  carrying  guns  would  be  regarded 
as  lawful  war  prey  and  torpedoed  on  sight. 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     179 

Mr.    Lansing's    suggested    change    of    the 
rules  of  war  while  the  war  is  in  progress 
was   deeply    resented    by    the   Allies,   who 
indicated  their  objections  to  any  such  ac- 
tion.     Thereupon    President    Wilson    re- 
sumed  the  view  that  merchantmen  could 
be  armed  for  defensive  purposes.    Congress 
and   the  country  evidenced  division   upon 
the   question,   and   a   legislative   crisis   oc- 
curred over  a  proposal  to  warn  Americans 
against     traveling     in     belligerent    armed 
ships.     Fortunately,  this  proposal  was  lost. 
German  diplomacy,   it  is  apparent,   has 
won    substantial    victories,    and    Herr   von 
Jagow,  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,    and    Count    von    Bernstorff,    the 
German  Ambassador  to  the  United  States, 
deserve,  in  large  measure,  the  credit  there- 
for.    Crises  were  bridged  over  at  critical 
moments  for  their  country.     At  the  time 
the  Liisitania  question  was  at  a  white  heat, 
the  Balkan  situation  was  reaching  a  climax. 
Bulgaria  was  on  the  eve  of  entrance  into 
the  war,  and  Greece  and  Roumania  seemed 
to  be  hesitating  as  to  the  side  upon  which 


180       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

to  cast  their  fortunes.  Germany  realized 
the  tremendous  moral  effect  upon  those 
nations  a  rupture  with  the  United  States 
would  produce.  She  devoted  herself  to 
the  task  of  preserving  relations  with  the 
American  government;  and  it  was  the 
less  difficult  for  her  to  do  this  because 
of  the  terrible  havoc  wrought  among  her 
submarines  by  the  well  calculated  opera- 
tions of  the  British  fleet.  What  effect  the 
representations  of  the  United  States  had, 
therefore,  was  indirect  rather  than  direct. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  disposition  in 
Berlin  and  Vienna  has  been  to  discount 
American  demands.  It  was  not  forgotten 
that  before  Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Bryan  en- 
tered into  power,  they  declared  that  while 
they  were  connected  with  the  government 
there  would  be  no  war.  In  the  foreign  view 
this  was  a  confession  of  purpose  to  avoid 
trouble  whatever  circumstances  might  arise. 
Then  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador, 
Dr.  Dumba,  interpreted  a  statement  of 
Mr.  Bryan  in  connection  with  the  Lusitania 
note,   as  evidence  that  the   President  was 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     181 

acting  to  satisfy  American  sentiment  rather 
than  to  enforce  American  rights.  Again, 
Mr.  Bryan,  the  man  who  made  INIr.  Wilson 
president,  resigned  from  the  cabinet 
because  of  his  expressed  belief  that  the 
course  of  the  Chief  Executive  would  lead 
to  war,  which  he  said  he  intended  to  pre- 
vent by  the  exercise  of  his  influence  as  a 
private  citizen.  Thus  was  apparent  to 
foreign  nations  a  sharp  division  in  the 
councils  of  the  party  in  power.  This  divi- 
sion was  made  the  more  striking  (the 
seriousness  of  the  matter  justifies  repeti- 
tion) by  the  action  of  Democratic  senators 
and  members  of  the  House  in  advocating 
legislation  prohibiting  Americans  from 
traveling  on  belligerent  merchant  ships; 
though  this  right  had  been  maintained  by 
their  government  from  its  independence  to 
the  present  day. 

What  other  course  could  the  United 
States  have  pursued  than  that  which  it 
actually  followed?  How  could  it  have 
done  dififerently  and  still  have  kept  out  of 
the  war?     This  resembles  a  discussion  of 


182      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

the  old  question  of  locking  the  stable  door 
after  the  horse  had  disappeared.  Neverthe- 
less, it  may  be  said  that  from  the  beginning 
Germany  has  not  believed  the  United  States 
really  intended  to  back  up  its  demands. 
Not  only  did  she  know  we  lacked  the  armed 
force  with  which  to  support  our  representa- 
tions, but  she  believed  we  would  have  a  rev- 
olution if  we  pushed  her  too  far;  she  be- 
lieved we  were  so  involved  in  the  Mexican 
imbroglio  that  we  feared  to  precipitate  a 
clash  with  another  nation,  and  she  believed 
we  were  impressed  with  the  danger  of  war 
with  Japan,  and  that  this  would  influence 
us  to  observe  a  policy  of  hesitation.  In 
short,  she  relied  upon  our  timidity,  our 
internal  differences,  and  the  division  in  the 
party  in  power,  to  prevent  us  from  pro- 
ceeding to  extremes,  and  therefore  she  felt 
assured  of  that  freedom  of  operation  which 
she  enjoyed  for  so  many  fevered  months. 
Had  the  United  States  fully  realized  what 
the  "  strict  accountability  "  note  meant  and 
was  determined  to  enforce  it,  or,  rather, 
had  Germany  believed   the  United  States 


WAR  ON  AMERICAN  LIFE     183 

would  compel  respect  for  the  principles 
laid  down  in  that  admirable  document,  it 
is  exceedingly  doubtful  if  the  Lusitania 
would  have  been  destroyed  or,  if  she  had 
been  torpedoed,  that  the  distressing  out- 
rages which  followed  would  have  occurred. 
Drowned,  one  hundred  and  forty-eight 
American  men,  women  and  children.  That 
is  the  price  we  paid  for  the  first  year  of 
the  German  submarine  campaign! 


chapter  ix 
The  War  and  American  Dollars 

Trade  is  life.  A  belligerent  deprived 
of  necessities  from  other  markets  is  brought 
to  his  knees,  unless  a  decision  can  be  had 
on  land,  as  in  the  Austro-Prussian,  the 
Franco-Prussian  and  other  wars  of  a  like 
character.  Napoleon's  brilliant  victories 
were  made  futile  by  British  command  of 
the  sea.  The  Confederacy  was  starved 
into  submission  by  the  blockade  established 
and  maintained  by  the  Union.  Germany 
has  been  uniformly  successful  in  the  land 
operations  of  the  present  war.  Yet  she  is 
struggling,  as  no  other  nation  ever  before 
has  struggled,  to  avert  the  weakness  which 
the  suppression  of  her  trade  with  other 
states  inevitably  will  produce. 

One  of  the  reasons  for  the  rage  of  Ger- 
many at  Great  Britain  for  entering  the 
war,  was  the  realization  of  the  strangling 

184 


AiMERICAN  DOLLARS        185 

effect  of  sea  power.  To  meet  that  danger, 
Germany  endeavored  to  bring  home  the 
threat  of  starvation  to  the  British  people 
and  thus  force  them  to  make  peace.  She 
relied  upon  her  submarines  to  accomplish 
this  purpose,  but  the  activity  of  the  British 
fleet  soon  demonstrated  that  this  reliance 
was  vain.  Then  she  applied  her  wonder- 
ful organizing  powers  to  the  conservation 
of  the  necessities  of  life  and  the  intensive 
expansion  of  her  crops,  and  above  all  to 
their  distribution  so  that  all  should  be  fed. 
Her  blows  through  the  Balkans,  which 
resulted  in  the  crushing  of  Servia  and 
Montenegro,  were  inspired  in  part  by  her 
need  of  obtaining  food  supplies  from 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria. 

In  the  meantime,  there  wxre  slowly 
tightening  about  her  the  invisible  coils  of 
the  Allied  fleets.  Her  commerce,  as  well 
as  that  of  the  nations  fighting  with  her, 
became  greatly  reduced  from  what  it  was 
prior  to  the  war.  Yet  it  has  not  been 
destroyed,  largely  because  of  the  activities 
■   of    neutral    traders.      Where    there    is    a 


186       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

demand,  a  determined  effort  always  will 
be  made  to  provide  the  supply.  In  the 
case  of  Germany  there  are  no  physical 
difficulties  in  the  way.  Surveyors'  lines 
are  the  only  boundaries  between  her  and 
Holland  and  Denmark,  and  a  short  strip 
of  sea  furnishes  easy  access  to  and  from 
Sweden,  which  is  contiguous  to  Norway. 
Modern  means  of  handling  and  transporta- 
tion have  made  Dutch  and  Danish  ports 
as  convenient  for  German  trade,  so  far  as 
geographical  conditions  are  concerned,  as 
the  German  ports  of  Hamburg  and 
Bremen. 

There  are  certain  specified  belligerent 
rights  recognized  by  international  law, 
certain  neutral  rights  which  likewise  are 
recognized  by  international  law,  and  a 
twilight  zone  between,  where  controversy 
flourishes.  A  belligerent  has  the  right  to 
seize  and  confiscate  absolute  contraband, 
that  is,  articles  solely  or  primarily  useful 
in  war,  destined  for  his  enemy's  territory. 
He  has  the  right  to  seize  and  confiscate 
conditional    contraband,    that    is,    articles 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        187 

useful  for  peace  as  well  as  war,  destined  for 
his  enemy's  territory,  if  intended  for  the 
use  of  the  armed  forces  or  the  government 
of  the  enemy  state.  He  has  the  right  to  in- 
stitute a  blockade  of  his  enemy's  ports  and 
coasts  and  thereby  prevent  commercial  in- 
tercourse of  all  kind.  He  has  the  right  to 
visit  and  search  all  neutral  ships  upon  the 
high  seas,  to  take  such  ships  into  port  on 
evidence  of  the  illegitimacy  of  their  con- 
duct, and  to  condemn  the  cargoes  they 
carry  if  the  noxious  character  of  the  voyage 
and  cargo  shall  be  established,  and  even 
the  ship  itself  under  a  recent  practice 
recognized  by  the  Declaration  of  London. 
This  practice  is  not,  however,  law  so  far 
as  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
are  concerned. 

The  neutral,  on  the  other  hand,  has  tlic 
right  to  trade  freely  in  non-contraband 
with  belligerent  territory,  unless  that  terri- 
tory shall  be  blockaded;  and,  indeed,  sub- 
ject to  the  danger  of  seizure  and  confisca- 
tion, he  has  the  right  to  trade  in  contraband 
or  anything  he  sees  fit.     As  peace  and  not 


188       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

war  is  the  normal  relation  of  nations,  he 
has  the  right  to  free  intercourse  with  others 
not  party  to  the  conflict,  and  if  his  trade 
should  be  interfered  with,  such  interfer- 
ence must  be  limited  to  the  imperative 
necessity  of  the  belligerents,  and  then  only 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  a  necessity.  He  has 
the  right  to  insist  that  evidence  and  not 
mere  suspicion  shall  be  the  ground  for 
seizures  of  ships  and  cargoes,  and  that  the 
burden  of  proof  shall  rest  upon  the  captor; 
such  proof  to  be  the  evidence  derived  from 
the  ship  at  the  time  of  seizure.  He  has  a 
right  in  connection  with  all  seizures  to 
full  hearing  by  a  prize  court  and  a  judg- 
ment in  accordance  with  international  law, 
not  in  accordance  with  domestic  or  munic- 
ipal law.  He  has  a  right  to  disregard  a 
blockade  which  is  not  formally  proclaimed 
and  not  effectively  maintained;  and  to 
refuse  to  be  bound  in  any  way  thereby. 

He  has  a  right  to  insist  upon  the  division 
of  all  articles  into  three  classes:  absolute 
contraband,  conditional  contraband  and 
non-contraband.     Under  the  first  must  be 


AiMERlCAX  DOLLARS        189 

included  only  those  articles  which  are  sus- 
ceptible of  use  for  war  purposes;  under 
the  second,  those  which  may  be  susceptible 
of  such  use  or  which  are  consigned  directly 
to  the  enemy  forces  or  the  enemy  govern- 
ment; under  the  third,  those  which  arc 
incapable  of  use  for  war  purposes. 
Further,  the  neutral  has  the  right  to 
belligerent  respect  of  the  principle  that  a 
ship  shall  not  be  sunk  save  under  extraor- 
dinary conditions,  such  as  imminent  danger 
to  her  captor  or  to  the  success  of  the  opera- 
tions in  which  the  latter  is  engaged;  and 
in  this  exceptional  contingency,  provision 
must  be  made  for  the  safety  of  the  pas- 
sengers and  crew. 

There  is  hardly  a  belligerent  right  which 
has  not  been  illegally  extended  during  the 
operations  of  the  present  war,  scarcely  a 
neutral  right  which  has  not  been  violated 
or  infringed.  By  virtue  of  the  fact  that 
conditions  had  made  it  the  "  Great 
Neutral,"  the  United  States  became  the 
chief  protestant  against  unlawful  conduct 
on  the  part  of  belligerents,  and  the  priii- 


190       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

cipal  champion  of  the  rights  of  neutrals. 
We  know  that  German  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  submarines  tore  great  gaps  in  the 
fabric  of  international  law,  and  that  in 
defiance  of  solemn  dictates  of  humanity 
they  willfully  drowned  hundreds  of  non- 
combatants,  including  American  citizens. 
We  know  that  all  belligerents  have  ex- 
tended their  lists  of  absolute  contraband, 
such  extension  being  based  rather  upon 
their  own  views  as  to  the  other's  necessities 
as  well  as  their  own,  than  upon  any  regard 
for  neutral  rights. 

We  know  that  by  her  decree  of  Febru- 
ary 4,  1915,  Germany  sought  to  establish 
a  "  blockade  "  of  the  British  Isles  without 
the  effective  force  to  maintain  it  and  with- 
out respecting,  without  indeed  intending 
to  respect,  the  fundamental  principles  of 
humanity  and  international  law.  Great 
Britain  retaliated  by  Orders  in  Council 
of  March  11,  1915,  which  were  open  to 
criticism  not  so  much  for  their  failure  to 
conform  to  the  technical  requirements  of 
international  law  as  for  their  application  to 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        191 

German  commerce  passing  througli  neutral 
ports.  The  latter  was  justified  b}^  the  exten- 
sion of  the  doctrine  of  "  continuous  voy- 
age "  to  contraband  goods  consigned  to 
neutral  ports  when  their  destination  was 
believed  to  be  enemy  territory.  It  does 
not  or  should  not,  apply  to  goods  of  enemy 
origin  issuing  from  neutral  ports. 

The  United  States,  in  common  with 
European  neutrals,  protested  against  the 
Orders  in  Council  and  a  similar  French 
decree,  declaring  the  measures  appeared 
to  menace  the  rights  of  trade  and  inter- 
course of  neutral  nations,  not  only  with 
belligerent  powers  but  with  one  another, 
and  that  they  constituted  a  "  practical  asser- 
tion of  unlimited  belligerent  rights  over 
neutral  commerce  with  the  whole  Euro- 
pean area,  and  an  almost  unqualified  denial 
of  the  sovereign  rights  of  nations  now  at 
peace."  Moreover,  the  United  States 
claimed  that  the  measures  of  the  Allies 
were  partial  in  their  application,  since  they 
had  no  relation  to  Scandinavian  ports  and 
therefore   did    not   fall,    as    required,   with 


192       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

equal  severity  upon  the  commerce  of  all 
neutrals. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  what  the  Allies 
endeavored  to  do  was  to  enforce  a  block- 
ade against  Germany,  minus  the  heavy 
penalties  visited  for  violation  of  a  pro- 
claimed blockade.  They  delayed  the  date 
of  the  enforcement  of  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil, they  permitted  the  exportation  of 
particular  products  indispensable  to  the 
conduct  of  certain  American  industries, 
they  bound  themselves  to  inflict  no  loss 
on  owners  save  in  the  case  of  contraband. 
It  is  evident  from  a  study  of  the  British 
notes  that  a  sincere  desire  underlay  the 
British  and  French  policy  to  interfere  as 
little  as  possible  with  legitimate  neutral 
trade  and  to  reduce  to  a  minimum  the 
inconveniences  and  hardships  which  en- 
forcement of  the  measures  of  those  govern- 
ments inevitably  inflicted.  It  is  worthy 
of  remark  in  this  connection  that  as  a 
result  of  British  and  French  activities, 
not  a  single  innocent  life  has  been  lost, 
and    there   has   been    no   destruction    of    a 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        193 

single   neutral   vessel   or  property   of   any 
kind  without  due  process  of  law. 

Great  Britain  contends,  and  her  con- 
tention has  been  ably  presented  by  her 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States,  Sir  Cecil 
Spring  Rice,  that  her  course  is  in  con- 
sonance with  the  spirit  if  not  the  letter 
of  international  law,  and  with  reference 
to  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of 
continuous  voyage,  that  it  is  in  accordance 
with  the  practice  of  the  Union  during  the 
Civil  War.  It  is  quite  true  that  through- 
out that  conflict  the  Washington  govern- 
ment maintained  the  legality  of  its  right 
to  suppress  the  over-sea  trade  of  the  Con- 
federacy, not  only  directly  through  a  block- 
ade, which  in  its  early  stages  was  extremely 
tenuous  and  hardly  binding,  but  indirectly 
through  the  seizure  of  goods  en  route  to 
neutral  ports  whence  they  were  to  be  trans- 
shipped and  forwarded  to  the  South.  Sub- 
stantially, this  is  the  policy  of  the  Allies; 
but  the  operations  are  necessarily  of  greater 
magnitude  to-day  because  of  the  tremend- 
ous  growth   in   commerce.     Cargoes   were 


194      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

condemned  for  violating  the  Union  block- 
ade; those  seized  by  the  Allies  have  been 
paid  for  or  restored.  The  precedents 
established  by  our  own  courts  have  been 
cited  by  the  Allies  in  justification  for  their 
procedure,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that 
those  precedents  frequently  embarrass  us 
in  our  efforts  to  assert  neutral  rights. 

The  truth  is,  the  present  war  has  demon- 
strated the  irreconcilable  character  of  the 
conflict  between  belligerent  and  neutral 
rights.  It  is  impossible  for  a  belligerent 
to  intercept  the  trade  of  his  enemy  without 
restricting  the  freedom  of  a  neutral,  and 
it  is  impossible  for  a  neutral  to  enjoy 
freedom  of  trade  without  striking  at  the 
interests  of  a  belligerent.  There  can  be, 
of  course,  no  question  as  to  the  legitimacy 
of  a  blockade.  It  has  been  recognized  by 
the  publicists  of  every  state,  and  it  has 
been  enforced  by  our  own  government. 
Austria-Hungary  proclaimed  a  blockade 
against  Montenegro  in  the  early  days  of 
the  war,  and  the  neutrals  accepted  It. 
There  is  no  ground  either  In  International 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        195 

law  or  practice  for  Germany's  denuncia- 
tion of  a  blockade  as  cruel  and  inhuman. 
Its  purpose  is  to  compel  the  surrender  of 
the  enemy  by  cutting  off  the  supplies  of 
the  civilian  population.  It  was  the  wide- 
spread want  and  suffering  of  the  South 
that  brought  the  Confederacy  to  Appo- 
mattox. But  until  Great  Britain  proclaims 
a  formal  blockade,  until  she  lives  up  to  the 
established  principles  of  international  law 
governing  interference  with  enemy  trade, 
neutrals  not  only  have  the  right  but  it  is 
their  duty  to  refuse  to  respect  her  pro- 
cedure. 

To  obviate  the  development  of  such 
questions  as  have  arisen,  the  United  States 
on  the  outbreak  of  the  war  sought  to  induce 
all  the  belligerents  to  observe  the  principles 
of  the  Declaration  of  London,  an  instru- 
ment in  treaty  form  which  had  been  nego- 
tiated and  signed  by  representatives  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Italy  and 
Japan,  now  fighting  as  the  Allies,  and 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Spain  and 
the  Netherlands.     This  Declaration  failed 


196       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

of  ratification,  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
rules  it  set  forth  conformed  in  substance 
with  the  generally  recognized  practices  of 
international  law.  The  Allies  declined  to 
be  bound  unqualifiedly  by  the  Declaration, 
though  the  Central  Powers  were  willing  to 
abide  by  it.  The  war  has  seen  this  excel- 
lent work  of  able  men  fail  to  stand  the  test 
of  practice.  The  blockade  provision  has 
been  disregarded;  the  difference  between 
absolute,  conditional  and  non-contraband 
has  been  practically  wiped  out,  and  neutral 
vessels  have  been  destroyed  under  pecu- 
liarly horrible  conditions.  There  has 
remained  nothing  for  the  neutral  govern- 
ments to  do  but  to  base  their  protests  upon 
International  law  as  recognized  prior  to 
the  beginning  of  the  w^ar. 

There  are  other  acts  of  the  Allies, 
besides  interference  with  legitimate  trade 
between  ourselves  and  other  neutrals  and 
the  seizure  on  mere  suspicion  and  undue 
detention  of  ships  and  cargoes,  justly 
deserving  of  American  complaint.  Our 
mails  have  been  interfered  with,  our  com- 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        197 

mercial  messages  interrupted,  and  persons 
have    been    taken    from    our   ships.      The 
censorship  of  the  mails  is  supported  by  the 
argument  that  they  serve  as  a  channel  for 
the  conveyance  of  contraband  and  enemy 
information.       The    censorship     of    com- 
mercial messages  is  based  upon  the  possi- 
bility    that     they     may     contain     enemy 
information.    There  can  be  no  justification 
for  the  removal  of  members  of  a  crew  or 
of  passengers  from  an  American  ship;  and 
in  every  case  that  has  arisen,  such  persons, 
upon  demand,   have  been   released.     This 
government,  likewise,  is  justified  in  object- 
ing emphatically  to  interference  with  or 
supervision  over  our  commercial  activities 
when  such   activities  have  no   relation   to 
war  operations. 

It  is  of  course  incumbent  upon  a  nation 
to  insist  upon  respect  for  its  rights.  It 
must  do  so  as  strenuously  in  times  of  pros- 
perity as  in  times  of  adversity.  Neces- 
sarily there  is  a  languid  public  interest 
in  what  the  government  may  do  during  the 
former  period,  and  an  aroused  and  excited 


198       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

public  interest  during  the  latter.  For  sev- 
eral years  before  the  great  war  began,  the 
American  people  were  afflicted  with  hard 
times.  Though  they  always  had  prided 
themselves  upon  their  economic  independ- 
ence, they  suffered  during  the  first  two 
weeks  following  the  declaration  of  war  an 
almost  total  paralysis  of  their  over-seas 
commerce.  Sterling  exchange  on  London 
rose  to  unprecedented  heights,  the  stock 
and  other  business  exchanges  were  forced 
to  close,  and  a  large  number  of  commer- 
cial failures  took  place.  Nothing  could 
have  more  clearly  demonstrated  our 
economic  interdependence  with  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

Fortunately  we  emerged  from  that  ter- 
rific financial  strain  without  being  com- 
pelled to  resort  to  moratoriums  and  other 
measures  which  were  adopted  abroad.  As 
time  passed,  and  the  necessities  of  bel- 
ligerents forced  them  to  turn  to  us  for 
supplies,  an  era  of  prosperity  was  in- 
augurated. From  a  commercially  pro- 
vincial  and   secondary   power   we   leaped 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        199 

in  the  course  of  a  year  to  a  rank  of  first 
importance  among  the  great  nations  of  the 
world  —  economically,  industrially  and 
financially.  Our  international  position  has 
changed  from  that  of  a  debtor  to  that  of  a 
creditor  country.  Our  exports  were  valued 
at  a  billion  dollars  more  during  the 
calendar  year  1915  than  ever  before  in  our 
history  —  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we 
were  cut  ofif  from  trade  with  Germany, 
Austria-Hungaria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey. 
Our  imports,  with  the  exception  of  gold, 
naturally  were  below  those  of  times  of 
peace.  To  meet  their  obligations  in  part, 
belligerents  shipped  us  large  quantities  of 
gold. 

The  United  States  now  has  the  promise 
of  becoming  the  world's  greatest  banker. 
In  order  to  facilitate  trade,  credit  loans 
amounting  to  hundreds  of  millions  were 
negotiated  by  foreign  governments  with 
American  financial  houses.  There  is  not 
the  slightest  objection  in  international  law 
to  the  making  of  loans  by  private  indi- 
viduals   to    a   belligerent;    yet   determined 


u 


200      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

pressure  was  applied  to  the  administration 
to  proclaim  such  a  prohibition,  happily 
without  effect.  Likewise  pressure  was 
exerted  to  obtain  an  embargo  on  munitions 
of  war,  an  act  which  not  only  would  seri- 
ously affect  American  industries,  but  would 
be  tantamount  to  the  adoption  of  a  policy 
of  unneutrality  toward  the  Allies.  It  is 
evident  that  an  embargo  on  munitions,  in 
order  to  be  effective,  would  have  to  be 
complemented  by  an  embargo  on  all  the 
products  entering  into  such  munitions.  In 
other  words,  there  would  have  to  be  a 
prohibition  of  exports  of  cotton,  which  is 
a  base  for  high  explosives,  steel,  etc.  To 
refuse  to  sell  munitions  to  the  Allies  would 
be  to  change  the  rules  of  war  while 
the  war  is  in  progress;  and  unquestionably 
this  would  precipitate  a  crisis  in  our  rela- 
tions with  Great  Britain,  Russia  and 
France.  That  our  position  is  sound  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  both  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  while  at  peace  have  sold 
to  belligerents.  It  follows  that  a  general 
embargo   likewise  would  be   regarded  by 


AMERICAN  DOLLARS        201 

the  Allies  as  an  act  of  unneutrality,  besides 
being  extremely  harmful  to  the  American 
people. 

Thus,  in  spite  of  the  restrictions  which 
have  been  placed  upon  neutral  commerce, 
the  war  has  been  highly  beneficial  to  the 
American  people.  We  are  now  enjoying 
obvious  advantages  w^hich  will  disappear 
when  the  treaty  of  peace  shall  be  signed. 
It  is  important  that  our  government  in  its 
foreign  policies  shall  insist  upon  the  main- 
tenance of  neutral  rights,  and  it  is  likewise 
necessary  that  our  business  men  shall  pre- 
pare for  the  conditions  following  the  w^ar, 
conditions  which  will  involve  sharper  com- 
petition, better  organization  of  industry 
and  an  energy  the  greater  because  of  the 
spur  of  necessity. 

Trade   of    the   United    States   with   the 
world: 

Fiscal  year  1913-14. . .  .$4,258,504,805 
Fiscal  year  1914-15. ..  .$4,442,759,080 


chapter  x 

Where  We  Stand  With  the  Allies 

The  great  moving  factors  in  the  relations 
of  states  are  self-interest  and  sentiment. 
The  latter  is  influential  and  sometimes 
seems  paramount;  but  careful  inquiry 
always  discloses  that  its  development  and 
expression  impinge  on  self-interest.  Pre- 
revolutionary  France  furnished  aid  to  the 
American  rebels  against  England,  not 
because  the  French  monarchy  looked  with 
favor  upon  democrac)^,  but  because  of 
hatred  of  England  and  a  desire  to  weaken 
and  thus  contest  the  latter's  maritime 
supremacy.  In  spite  of  the  powerful  assist- 
ance received  from  France,  and  of  the 
continued  feeling  against  Great  Britain, 
President  Washington  declined  to  pursue 
any  other  policy  than  that  of  strict  neutral- 
ity In  the  war  between  those  countries,  a 
policy  adhered  to  by  his  immediate  succes- 

202 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  203 

sors.  The  Mexican  War  was  precipitated 
by  our  annexation  of  Texas.  The  Civil 
War  was  the  direct  result  of  the  contro- 
versy over  slaves  as  property.  The  war 
with  Spain  was  an  emotional  expression 
by  the  American  people,  but  nevertheless 
had  important  underlying  economic  and 
strategical  causes. 

But  our  history  also  discloses  an  intense 
pro-French  sentiment  in  the  days  of  Wash- 
ington, an  intense  pro-Texan  sentiment 
preliminary  to  our  war  with  Mexico,  an 
intense  abolition  sentiment  in  the  North 
prior  to  the  Civil  War,  and  an  intense 
sentiment  for  "  Free  Cuba "  during  the 
Cleveland  and  McKinley  administrations. 
In  foreign  w^ars,  our  people  always  have 
taken  sides  as  in  the  war  between  Russia 
and  Japan  when  sympathy  went  out  to  the 
latter  as  the  "under  dog."  In  that  in 
which  the  world  is  involved  to-day,  our 
sympathy  unquestionably  is  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies,  largely  because  of  the  Ger- 
man invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  opera- 
tions of  German  submarines. 


204      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

What  is  true  of  the  United  States,  neces- 
sarily is  true  of  other  nations.  Each  has 
its  own  interests,  its  own  culture,  its  own 
aspirations.  Because  humanity  is  what  it 
is,  each  reaches  out  to  advance  its  own 
interests  and  its  own  aspirations  and  to 
spread  its  own  culture.  Clashes  follow, 
usually  of  a  character,  in  the  present  spirit 
of  civilization,  to  permit  an  adjustment. 
When  so-called  "  vital  interests  "  or  ques- 
tions of  "  honor "  or  "  territory "  are 
involved,  war  takes  place. 

It  therefore  behooves  us,  in  considering 
the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  the 
powers  which  began  the  war  under  the 
popular  designation  of  "  The  Allies,"  to 
examine  the  basic  ideals  and  basic  interests 
of  each  country  and  establish  where  they 
conflict,  if  at  all.  The  United  States  has 
a  passion  for  individual  liberty  and  indi- 
vidual development.  So  have  Great 
Britain  and  France.  The  United  States 
insists  on  popular  government.  So  do 
Great  Britain  and  France.  The  United 
States    requires    respect   for   the   rights   of 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  205 

property.  So  do  Great  Britain  and  France. 
In  short,  it  is  the  people  in  each  of  these 
three  countries  who  manage  their  own 
affairs  and  whose  ideals  their  governments 
endeavor  to  express  and  whose  interests 
their  governments  endeavor  to  expand  and 
protect.  Italy's  civilization  is  different 
from  that  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  and  rather  resembles  that  of 
France.  It  is  founded  on  Latin  traditions, 
on  Latin  culture.  The  anachronisms  in 
the  Allied  combination  are  Russia,  Japan, 
Servia  and  Montenegro.  Russia  is  an  autoc- 
racy. Japan  is  a  democracy  springing 
from  feudalism.  Servia  and  Montenegro, 
sturdy  in  their  mountain  independence,  are 
feudal. 

The  United  States  has  no  desire  to 
extend  its  territorial  dominions;  indeed  is 
disposed  to  surrender  the  Philippine 
Archipelago.  Prior  to  the  war,  (jrcat 
Britain  was  equally  content  territorially; 
but  events  of  the  war  have  placed  German 
colonies  in  Britain's  possession,  and  she 
is  likely  to  retain  some  of  them,   parlicu- 


206       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

larly  those  sections  of  Africa  which  will 
enable  the  realization  of  Cecil  Rhodes' 
dream  of  a  Cape-to-Cairo  Railroad 
through  British-owned  land.  France  had 
become  reconciled  to  the  loss  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  but  if  she  should  be  victor  in 
the  present  struggle,  she  will  demand  their 
return  and  will  extend  her  boundaries  and 
control  at  German  expense  in  north 
Africa.  Russia  expects  to  obtain  an  outlet 
on  the  Mediterranean  —  this  may  be  pro- 
ductive of  a  war  with  Great  Britain  when 
that  now  raging  is  ended  —  is  fanatically 
inspired  by  the  doctrine  of  Pan-Slavism, 
and  is  covetous  of  North  China.  Japan 
aspires  to  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific  and 
the  Far  East  and  intends  to  enforce  the 
policy  of  "  Asia  for  the  Asiatics."  De- 
vastated Servia  hopes  for  the  restoration 
of  her  one-time  greatness.  Montenegro, 
now  in  irons,  looks  for  extended  boundaries. 
There  is  no  conflict  territorially  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  any  of  the 
Allies,  with  the  exception  of  Russia  and 
Japan  with  reference  to  China;  and  there 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  207 

is  no  American  who  would  consider  for  a 
moment  the  idea  of  fighting  over  the  ques- 
tion of  Chinese  integrity.     The  rearrange- 
ment of  European  and  African  territory, 
with  the  sole  exception  of  Liberia  in  the 
Dark  Continent,  is  not  a  matter  of  Amer- 
ican   concern;    though   we   unquestionably 
would  give  our  moral  support  to  the  pro- 
gram Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  British  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Afifairs,  outlined  to  the 
author:      Restoration   of    Belgium    to    the 
Belgian  people,  acquisition  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine    by   France,    and    a   decision    by 
each  of  the  small  peoples  of  the  Old  World 
as  to  the  country  to  which   it  desires   to 
attach  itself,  or  to  work  out  its  own  destiny 
as  an  independent  state.    In  the  fate  of  the 
German  Pacific  Islands  we  are  more  deeply 
interested.      We    also    are    watchful    over 
China's     destiny,     largely    because     it    is 
important   for    us    commercially    that    the 
integrity     of     that     country     should     be 
maintained. 

The  war  with  Spain  marked  a  new  epoch 
in  the  life  of  the  American  nation.    Prior 


208       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

thereto  we  had  been  a  potential  world 
power.  Thereafter  we  became  in  fact  a 
recognized  member  of  the  world's  council 
of  Great  Nations.  We  took  part  in  the 
international  expedition  which  rescued  the 
beleaguered  Legations  in  Pekin  and  sup- 
pressed the  Boxer  revolt;  we  brought  about 
the  adoption  by  all  the  powers  of  the  Hay 
principles  of  the  integrity  of  China  and 
the  Open  Door  in  that  country;  we  exerted 
our  good  offices  and  served  as  mediator 
in  the  Russo-Japanese  war;  we  filled 
a  like  role  in  effecting  the  settlement 
of  the  Moroccan  dispute,  which  threatened 
a  European  conflict;  we  substituted  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  for  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty,  and,  freed  from  the  obliga- 
tion of  joint  action  with  the  British  gov- 
ernment, we  acquired  the  Panama  Canal 
Zone  and  constructed  the  Panama  Canal; 
we  forced  arbitration  of  the  claims  of 
Great  Britain,  Germany  and  Italy  against 
Venezuela,  after  those  countries  had 
attempted  to  collect  by  force;  we  were  a 
leader  in  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences, 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  209 

and  in  the  negotiation  of  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration; we  began  an  active  commercial 
campaign,  which  resulted  in  our  foreign 
commerce  jumping  from  $1,850,000,000  in 
1898  to  $4,258,000,000  in  1914. 

In  the  various  things  we  did,  our  ideal 
was  peace,  our  interest  the  extension  of 
our  trade.  Nor  were  we  selfish  in  connec- 
tion with  the  latter  efifort.  We  had  no 
desire  for  exclusive  markets.  We  were 
willing  to  meet  competition,  provided  it 
was  on  equal  terms.  Therefore,  we 
became  the  exponent  of  the  commercial 
"  open  door  "  everywhere. 

This  also  was  the  policy  of  Great  Britain. 
The  government  of  that  empire  gave 
powerful  assistance  to  the  Hay  proposals 
relative  to  the  integrity  of,  and  equality  of 
opportunity  in,  China.  It  seconded  our 
efiforts  to  induce  Japan  to  make  peace, 
just  as  the  German  Emperor  seconded  our 
efiforts  to  bring  Russia  to  Portsmouth.  It 
welcomed  our  peaceful  intervention  in  tiic 
Moroccan  controversy.  As  a  concession 
to  the  United  States,  it  agreed  to  waive  its 


210       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

right  to  cooperate  with  us  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Trans-Isthmian  Canal,  Public 
opinion  in  England  did  not  sustain  the 
government  in  the  Venezuelan  adventure 
vs^ith  Germany  and  Italy,  and  it  acquiesced 
gladly  in  the  Roosevelt  demand  for  arbi- 
tration of  the  claims  against  that  South 
American  republic.  It  negotiated  a  treaty 
of  arbitration  with  us  in  1908,  whereby  all 
disputes  of  a  legal  nature  or  relating  to 
the  interpretation  of  treaties,  must  be 
referred  to  arbitration  at  The  Hague,  pro- 
vided they  do  not  involve  the  honor,  vital 
interests  or  territory  of  either  nation,  and 
subsequently  it  signed  a  Bryan  Treaty  for 
the  investigation  of  all  disputes,  whatever 
their  character.  Similar  engagements  have 
been  made  by  the  United  States  with 
France  and  Italy.  Japan  signed  an  arbi- 
tration treaty  in  1908;  Russia  did  not. 
Russia  signed  a  Bryan  treaty;  Japan 
refused  to  do  so. 

Russia,  and  France  as  her  ally,  was 
reluctant  to  adhere  to  the  Hay  proposals 
regarding     China.       Finally     they     were 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  211 

brought  into  line.  Japan,  realizing  the 
importance  to  her  ultimate  aim  of  a  world 
declaration  in  regard  to  the  maintenance 
of  Chinese  integrity,  promptly  announced 
her  support  of  the  American  doctrine. 
Italy,  deprived  by  American  intervention 
of  Chinese  territory,  did  likewise.  When 
Secretary  Hay  was  felicitated  upon  his 
achievement  and  told  that  he  had  written 
a  new  and  indelible  world  policy,  he 
remarked:  "You  don't  recall  American 
history.  Ten  years  from  now  this  will  be 
relegated  to  the  storeroom  of  discarded 
policies."  Mr.  Hay's  prediction  was 
based  upon  his  realization  of  the  lack  of 
a  continuous  foreign  policy  by  his  country, 
and  had  no  relation  to  the  sincerity  of  his 
belief  that  what  he  had  accomplished  was 
in  the  real  interest  of  the  American  people. 
The  policies  of  all  European  countries 
have  caused  them  sedulously  to  cultivate 
the  United  States.  That  of  Great  Britain 
has  been  marked,  especially  since  the  Civil 
War,  by  a  keen  desire  to  remove  all  ques- 
tions of  dispute  from  her  relations  with  us. 


212       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

She  has  made  billions  of  investment  in 
this  country,  and  desires  us  prosperous  in 
order  that  we  shall  be  able  to  pay  the 
interest  thereon.  She  arranged  the  Ala- 
bama claims,  growing  out  of  the  operation 
of  the  Confederate  cruiser  during  the  Civil 
War,  the  Behring  fur-seal,  the  Fisheries 
and  the  Alaskan  boundary  questions,  in  a 
manner  satisfactory  to  the  United  States. 
She  swallowed  her  pride  when  she  agreed 
to  President  Cleveland's  ultimatum  in  con- 
nection with  the  boundary  of  Venezuela. 
One  of  the  most  fruitful  causes  of  the  hun- 
dred years'  peace  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  is  the  Rush-Bagot 
Agreement  of  1818,  requiring  disarmament 
upon  the  Great  Lakes;  and  an  additional 
cause  for  continued  peace  lies  in  the  Root- 
Bryce  treaties  of  1909,  under  which  all 
pending  Canadian  controversies  were  set- 
tled, and  provision  made  for  the  arbitration 
of  future  controversies. 

There  are  other  mutual  interests  which 
make  for  friendly  relations  between  the 
United    States   and   Great   Britain.      It   is 


WITH  THE  ALLIES         213 

evident  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  inval- 
uable to  the  British  Empire.  Under  that 
Doctrine,  the  United  States  will  not  per- 
mit British  territory  in  this  hemisphere  to 
be  acquired  by  another  government.  This 
likewise  is  true  of  French  territory.  It 
may  well  be  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  a  close  bond  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  and  France.  Another 
matter  of  economic  importance  is  that  the 
United  States  and  the  British  Pacific 
Dominions  have  the  same  objection  to  the 
invasion  of  their  territories  by  the  Mon- 
golian races.  It  was  likewise  to  the  interest 
of  Great  Britain  that  Germany's  sway  over 
Pacific  islands  should  not  be  extended; 
nevertheless,  deep  gratitude  was  evoked  in 
the  United  States  by  the  action  of  the 
British  Naval  Commander  in  notifying  the 
German  Admiral  in  Manila  Bay  that  he 
would  join  Commodore  Dewey  in  resisting 
attack  upon  the  American  squadron.  Nor 
should  the  American  people  lose  sight  of 
the  forbearance  Great  Britain  has  dis- 
played in  connection  with  Mexico.    Britisii 


214       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

subjects  have  been  murdered,  British  inter- 
ests have  been  destroyed  and  injured.  Yet 
the  London  government,  prior  to  the  war, 
steadily  refused  to  listen  to  suggestions  that 
Europe  restore  peace  and  order,  in  spite 
of  the  United  States. 

France's  adventures  in  the  American 
hemisphere  really  ended  when  the  United 
States  assembled  troops  on  the  Mexican 
boundary  and  ordered  Napoleon  the  Little 
to  withdraw  from  Mexico.  Before  the  war 
with  Spain,  France  took  part  in  negotia- 
tions looking  to  the  creation  of  a  foreign 
combination  to  compel  the  United  States 
to  remain  at  peace.  Lord  Pauncefote,  the 
British  Ambassador,  informed  President 
McKinley  of  what  was  going  on;  and  the 
negotiations  became  abortive.  The  real 
inspiration  of  those  negotiations  came  from 
Berlin.  France  has  given  evidence  of 
every  desire  for  our  friendship,  but  in  her 
foreign  policy,  particularly  in  connection 
with  the  Far  East,  she  has  been  handi- 
capped by  her  alliance  with  Russia. 

Russian  statesmen  cannot  understand  the 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  215 

attitude  adopted  by  the  United  States.  As 
proof  of  their  friendship  and  of  their  desire 
for  American  independence  and  strength, 
they  point  to  the  substantial  aid  they  gave 
the  Union  when  during  the  Civil  War 
their  government  sent  warships  to  New 
York  and  San  Francisco  as  a  demonstra- 
tion against  European  intervention;  and 
to  the  sale  of  Alaska.  They  have  found 
us,  on  the  other  hand,  combating  their 
moves  in  the  Far  East  and  insulting  them, 
as  they  regard  it,  by  making  representations 
in  behalf  of  the  Jews  at  Kishniefif  and  by 
denouncing  the  Treaty  of  1833  because  of 
Russian  refusal  to  admit  American  Jews 
into  the  empire,  and  by  certain  commercial 
measures  which  injured  Russian  trade  with 
this  country.  Japan  sees  in  the  United 
States  one  of  the  prime  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  her  necessitous  policies. 

It  is  interesting  now  to  note  what  change 
the  war  has  made  in  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  the  Allied  Powers.  At 
the  outbreak  of  the  struggle  there  is  no 
doubt   England    and   France   looked    with 


216       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

more  or  less  hope  upon  the  translation  into 
action  of  American  condemnation  of  the 
invasion  of  Belgium.  President  Wilson's 
proclamation  appealing  to  Americans  to  be 
neutral  in  thought  and  deed,  shattered  this 
hope.  The  English  and  French  people 
were  grateful  for  the  charity  we  offered, 
but  they  wanted  more  than  charity;  they 
wanted  help.  There  was  general  approval 
of  our  "  strict  accountability  "  note  to  Ger- 
many, and  when  the  Lusitania  was  de- 
stroyed, there  was  an  expectation  that  we 
would  hold  Germany  to  a  complete 
responsibility.  President  Wilson's  "  too 
proud  to  fight "  speech  was  made  at  this 
juncture,  and  its  effect  upon  English  and 
French  public  opinion  was  to  arouse  con- 
tempt for  Americans.  The  peoples  of 
those  two  countries  finally  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  United  States  would 
not  intervene.  A  common  expression  was: 
"  We  are  fighting  for  your  ideals  and  your 
civilization,  and  you  are  chasing  dollars.'* 
The  spectacle  of  a  nation  waxing  pros- 
perous on  the  agony  of  other  lands  is  not 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  217 

one    to    promote    friendship.      Moreover, 
when  that  nation  insists  upon  respect  for 
its   commercial    rights,   when   it  seems   to 
place  injury  to  the  latter  upon  the  same 
plane  as  destruction  of  neutral  life  upon 
the  high  seas,  it  is  natural  for  resentment 
to  develop.    On  the  other  hand,  the  states-   . 
men  of  England  and  France  realized  that 
the  United  States  was  serving,  in  fact,  as  a 
military    and    commercial    base    for    the 
Allies;   that   it  was  supplying  them  with 
foodstuffs,    munitions    of    war,    and    other 
materials  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  the 
war.     These  men  did  not  want  the  United 
States  to  join  in  the  struggle.    They  desired 
it  to   keep   aloof,   to   be   in   a   position   to 
protect  their  nationals  and  their  interests 
in  enemy  territory,  as  far  as  such  protec- 
tion could  be  accorded  by  a  neutral.   From 
their  point  of  view,  it  was  important  that 
the  United  States  should  continue  at  peace, 
though    they   believed    it  should    manifest 
its     sympathy     by     withholding     protests 
against  what  was  conceived  to  be  necessary 
supervision  of  ocean  commerce. 


218       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Advocates  of  an  embargo  on  munitions 
of  war  and  even  a  general  commercial 
embargo,  believe  such  action  would  assure 
American  peace.  Nothing  could  be  more 
erroneous.  If  the  United  States  should 
apply  any  kind  of  an  embargo,  an  ugly 
situation  would  develop  with  the  Allies. 
Undoubtedly  there  would  be  retaliation. 
Rubber,  wool  and  other  products,  which  we 
need,  would  be  withheld.  More  than  this, 
however,  the  probability  is  the  Allies 
would  feel  that  the  United  States  was 
giving  support  to  the  Central  Powers,  and 
they  would  treat  us  as  an  enemy.  The 
American  people  cannot  afiford  to  lose  sight 
of  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  deliberately 
restrained  Japan  from  going  too  far  in 
1913  in  connection  with  the  California 
dispute.  In  case  of  difficulty  with  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain  could  afford 
to  finance  Japan  for  a  war  upon  us. 
Further,  the  fact  should  not  be  lost  to 
view  that  Canada  is  no  mean  military 
antagonist  In  our  state  of  unpreparedness; 
and  that  with  the  British  navy  and  troops 


WITH  THE  ALLIES  219 

operating  upon  our  Atlantic  seaboard,  the 
Japanese  navy  and  troops  operating  on  our 
Pacific  Slope,  and  Canada  menacing  us 
from  the  north,  we  would  be  in  an  exceed- 
ingly dangerous  situation.  This  con- 
tingency is  remote,  fortunately,  and  is  men- 
tioned only  to  show  that  Great  Britain  is 
not  helpless,  whatever  the  view  of  those 
who  believe  we  are  free  from  possibility 
of  successful  attack.  It  is  obvious,  of 
course,  that  such  a  situation  would  be  brim- 
ful of  trouble  for  the  Allies,  for  they  would 
be  deprived  of  our  products.  Frankly,  they 
do  not  w^ant  it  to  arise.  They  prefer  to 
buy  of  us,  to  arrange  loans  with  us,  to  have 
our  friendship  not  only  during  the  war,  but 
during  the  time  when  the  negotiations  of 
peace  shall  be  under  way. 

It  may  be  expected,  therefore,  that  in  all  ^ 
things  not  vital  to  what  the  Allies  consider 
the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war,  they 
will  accede  to  the  wishes  of  the  American 
government.  But  in  those  things  they 
regard  as  vital,  the  absolute  suppression  of 
trade  with  Germany,  for  instance,  they  will 


220      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

not  yield  an  inch.  They  have  not  pro- 
claimed a  blockade,  because  to  do  so  would 
mean  the  condemnation  of  ships  and  car- 
goes; they  prefer,  out  of  desire  to  maintain 
friendly  relations  with  the  United  States, 
to  pursue  an  illegal  policy  which  attains 
the  same  ends  but  which  permits  the  com- 
pensation of  owners  of  ships  and  cargoes. 
But  this  government  cannot  acquiesce  in 
such  procedure,  for  to  do  so  would  be  to 
give  the  Central  Powers  ground  for  com- 
plaining that  while  we  insist  upon  their 
living  up  to  the  conditions  of  international 
law,  we  refrain  from  doing  so  with  refer- 
ence to  their  enemies. 

However  serious  the  dispute  that  arises 
with  Great  Britain  or  France,  or  indeed 
with  any  of  the  Allies,  the  American 
people  may  be  sure  of  this:  The  nations 
of  this  combination  will  exhaust  the 
resources  of  diplomacy  to  effect  a  settle- 
ment, and  if  this  be  impossible,  they  will 
appeal  to  the  treaties  providing  for  investi- 
gation and  arbitration. 


chapter  xi 

The  Central  Powers  and  America 

Two  strikingly  inconsistent,  even  con- 
flicting, policies  have  been  pursued  by 
Germany  in  her  dealings  with  the  United 
States.  On  the  one  hand  she  has  sought 
to  prove  her  disinterested  friendship  to  the 
American  people,  on  the  other,  she  has 
committed  acts  against  their  avowed  inter- 
ests. Prior  to  the  war  we  find  her  shower- 
ing honors  and  courtesies  upon  the  United 
States  and  its  citizens,  and  endeavoring 
earnestly  to  cultivate  close  and  friendly 
relations.  In  glaring  contrast  therewith 
was  her  conduct  in  seeking  to  establisli 
coaling  bases  in  the  American  hemisphere, 
and  especially  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  in  displaying  an  unwonted  activity 
in  Brazil,  Haiti  and  later  in  Mexico,  and 
in  pressing  her  own  interests  elsewhere  at 
the  expense  of  those  of  the  United  States. 

221 


222       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Precisely  the  same  conflicting  policies 
have  been  pursued  since  the  war  began. 
A  propaganda  was  inaugurated  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war  designed  to  gain  the 
sympathy  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Teutonic  cause.  Concurrently  therewith 
were  deliberate  violations  of  American 
peace  and  neutrality  within  the  United 
States,  and  violations  of  our  rights  upon 
the  high  seas.  It  has  been  necessary  for 
the  Federal  Government  to  take  steps  to 
detect  and  suppress  German  conspiracies, 
aimed  at  the  tranquility  and  safety  of  the 
United  States;  to  prosecute  German  agents 
guilty  of  crimes  against  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  dismiss  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  and  the  military 
and  naval  attaches  of  the  German  Embassy, 
because  of  their  connection  with  plots 
affecting  the  sovereignity  of  the  United 
States. 

Is  there  any  deep-rooted  national  differ- 
ence between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many, which  would  justify  the  making  of 
war  by  one  upon  the  other?     We  are  not 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     223 

neighbors.  It  is  quite  true  that  in  Germany 
the  individual  exists  for  the  state,  while  in 
the  United  States  the  state  exists  for  tlic 
individual.  Yet  to  suggest  this  as  a  cause 
of  strife  is  to  suggest  the  ridiculous;  for  in 
both  countries  the  right  of  others  to  live 
under  the  kind  of  government  they  desire 
is  recognized  as  beyond  question.  We 
would  like  to  see  the  republican  form  uf 
government  prevail  everywhere;  the  Ger- 
man government  considers  the  form  it 
maintains  to  be  the  one  best  suited  for  the 
needs  of  a  people.  Similarly,  the  United 
States  believes  in  the  excellence  of  what  is 
known  as  "  Anglo-Saxon "  civilization. 
Germany  is  equally  as  ardent  in  proclaim- 
ing the  superiority  of  her  own  "  kultur," 
and  w^ith  a  commendable  missionary  spirit 
has  sought  to  impose  its  influence  upon 
other  countries. 

We  have  benefited  tremendously  by  the 
mixture  of  German  blood  with  that  which 
has  come  to  us  from  other  lands.  We  arc 
under  a  heavy  debt  to  men  of  German 
origin  for  services  rendered  both  in  peace 


224      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

and  war.  We  have  gained  a  great  deal 
through  the  adoption  of  German  economic 
and  social  principles  and  methods,  and  we 
would  gain  more  by  adopting  others.  The 
nation  would  be  immensely  benefited  by 
patterning  after  the  marvelous  economic, 
industrial,  and  military  organization  of  the 
German  Empire.  Such  danger  as  exists  in 
our  relations  with  Germany,  outside  of 
questions  arising  in  connection  with  the 
war,  is  the  direct  outgrowth  of  the  policy 
Germany  deliberately  adopted,  and  which 
Dr.  Karl  Helfiferich,  at  present  Imperial 
German  Minister  of  Finance,  described 
in  1913  as  follows: 

"  With  the  negotiation  of  treaties  for 
securing  the  interests  of  our  commerce 
and  shipping,  we  have  not  been,  and 
dare  not  be,  satisfied  to  stop.  Our 
dependence  upon  foreign  countries,  the 
counterpart  to  the  great  advantages 
derived  by  us  from  having  taken  our 
place  in  world-economy,  calls  for 
stronger  counterpoises.  Such  a  counter- 
poise can  be  created  by  German  enter- 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     225 

prise  and  German  capital  establishing 
a  field  for  their  activity  beyond  the 
borders  of  our  own  country,  and 
thereby  gaining  a  direct  influence  over 
foreign  territories  that  may  be  im- 
portant to  us  as  sources  of  supply  and 
as  markets.  This  can  be  done  in  an 
effectual  w^ay  by  acquiring  over-sea 
colonial  possessions;  for  in  such  a  case 
economic  influence  is  secured  and 
strengthened  in  the  most  effective 
manner  possible  by  political  domina- 
tion. In  so  far,  however,  as  this  way 
is  limited  or  barred  up  altogether 
our  end  must  be  reached 
by  means  of  a  far-sighted  financial  and 
economic  activity." 

Here  then  we  have,  first,  a  specific 
declaration  that  it  is  to  the  interest  of 
Germany  to  acquire  over-seas  possessions 
and,  failing  in  this  effort,  to  observe  a  far- 
sighted  financial  and  economic  activity.  It 
is  unfortunate  that  in  pursuit  of  the  former 
ambition,  the  German  government  deemed 
it  necessary  to  act  in  such   fashion   as  to 


226       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

arouse  the  suspicion  of  the  United  States. 
With  reference  to  the  latter  policy,  the 
American  believes  in  a  fair  field  and  no 
favor,  so  that  it  has  not  up  to  this  time 
aroused  any  irritation. 

The  prime  motive  of  Germany  during 
the  present  war  has  been  to  prevent  this 
country  from  serving  as  a  base  for  the 
Allies.  It  long  ago  became  evident  that 
the  Germans,  with  their  hopelessly  inferior 
fleet,  could  not  wrest  the  command  of  the 
seas  from  the  British  and  French.  All 
they  could  expect  to  do  on  the  ocean  was 
to  engage  in  sporadic  commerce  raiding  by 
surface  and  under-water  craft.  After  Ger- 
man submarines  had  been  so  relentlessly 
picked  off  by  the  British,  Berlin  came  to 
realize  that  the  results  of  the  war  would 
not  be  affected  by  their  operations,  and 
that  other  measures  must  be  adopted. 
Therefore,  efforts  were  made,  through  the 
agencies  established  before  the  war,  and 
through  propagandists  like  Dr.  Dernburg, 
former  Minister  of  Colonies,  to  preach 
the   German   cause   in   the   United   States, 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     227 

and  to  arouse  a  sentiment  which  would 
force  either  a  change  of  policy  by  the 
Administration  or  legislation  by  Congress, 
which  would  effect  the  same  result. 

Germany  desired,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  United  States  should  insist  upon 
the  right  freely  to  convey  foodstuffs  and 
cotton  to  the  civilian  population  of  her 
empire,  and,  on  the  other,  to  impose  an 
embargo  upon  the  export  of  munitions  of 
w^ar.  She  was  entirely  willing  that  the 
United  States  should  apply  the  doctrine  of 
nonintercourse,  realizing  that  the  English 
people,  cut  off  from  wheat  supplies  from 
Russia  and  foodstuffs  from  the  United 
States,  would  run  the  danger  of  starva- 
tion or  such  grave  deprivation  that  a 
popular  movement  for  peace  would  be 
inaugurated  or,  at  least,  the  London  gov- 
ernment hampered  in  the  conduct  of  the 

war. 

Although  the  doctrine  of  nonintercourse 
has  been  mooted  more  or  less,  it  is  evident 
the  American  people  cannot  afford  to  apply 
it.      They    tried    it    once    against    Great 


228       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

Britain,  and  war  was  preferable  to  its  con- 
tinuance. To  do  so  again  would  be  to 
bring  to  a  sudden  stop  the  prosperity  the 
war  has  given,  to  disrupt  industry  and  pro- 
duce a  condition  of  general  distress.  A 
trade  which  mounted  to  more  than  five 
billion  dollars  for  the  calendar  year  1915, 
cannot  be  summarily  ended  without  pre- 
cipitating a  domestic  cataclysm. 

Great  Britain  years  ago  adopted  the 
doctrine  that  foodstuffs  are  conditional 
contraband;  that  is  to  say,  such  products 
could  be  seized  only  if  an  attempt  were 
made  to  break  through  a  blockade  or  if 
their  destination  were  an  enemy  state  or 
enemy  forces.  It  is  clear  such  a  policy  was 
in  the  interest  of  the  British  people,  because 
of  their  dependence  upon  over-seas  coun- 
tries for  their  supply  of  food.  Likewise  it 
was  and  is  in  the  interest  of  the  American 
people,  because  they  produce  the  wheat, 
corn  and  meat  which  foreign  countries 
require.  President  Wilson  has  protested 
against  the  British  seizure  and  sale  of  such 
articles  in   English  ports,   in  spite  of  the 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     229 

compensation  promised  or  paid  to  Amer- 
ican shippers;  but  the  German  government 
itself  has  embarrassed  our  representations 
by  regarding  foodstuffs  en  route  to  England 
as  contraband  and  destroying  them,  and  by 
the  organization  and  distribution  of  tiie 
food  supplies  available  in  Germany  in 
order  to  prevent  distress  among  its  popu- 
lation. 

The  British  have  advanced  the  claim 
that  as  the  result  of  government  assump- 
tion of  control  and  distribution  of  food- 
stuffs, imports  of  this  character  necessarily 
pass  into  the  charge  of  the  state,  and  under 
such  circumstances  the  British  navy  is  justi- 
fied in  seizing  all  cargoes  of  German 
destination.  Moreover,  the  contention  is 
made  that  in  the  highly  organized  condi- 
tion of  Germany,  where  all  the  healthy 
males  perform  military  service,  imported 
foodstuffs  would  in  fact  be  used  by  the 
military  forces  of  the  enemy.  The  weak- 
ness of  this  latter  argument  is  apparent 
when  it  is  recalled  that  the  principle  the 
United    States    and    Great    Britain    have 


230       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

advocated  was  pronounced  with  the  knowl- 
edge that  a  nation  at  war  necessarily  must 
draw  upon  its  population  for  soldiers. 
Unquestionably,  however,  a  new  element 
is  introduced  into  the  discussion  by  the 
action  of  the  German  government  in  assum- 
ing control  of  all  foodstuffs  imported. 

The  United  States  sought  to  avoid  the 
difficulties  which  have  arisen,  by  proposing 
to  limit  the  consignment  of  foodstuffs  to  its 
own  agencies  in  Germany,  which  should 
supervise  the  distribution  and  see  that  non- 
combatants  only  received  them.  Germany, 
of  course,  assented,  but  the  British  and 
French  governments  declined  to  consider 
the  proposal,  asserting  they  were  moved  to 
act  as  they  were  doing  against  Germany 
in  consequence  of  the  "  unprecedented 
methods,  repugnant  to  all  law  and  moral- 
ity, which  Germany  began  to  adopt  at  the 
very  outset  of  the  war,  and  the  effects  of 
which  have  been  constantly  accumulating." 

Because  cotton  is  an  ingredient  in  the 
manufacture  of  high  explosives,  the  British 
and  French  took  steps  to  prevent  it  from 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     231 

reaching  Germany.  At  the  outset  of  the 
war  they  were  disposed  to  look  upon  it  as 
innocent,  and  permitted  American  ships  to 
convey  the  product  to  German  ports.  But 
as  the  war  proceeded,  they  placed  it  upon 
the  conditional  contraband  list,  and  now 
it  is  regarded  as  absolute  contraband.  The 
United  States  contends  that  raw  cotton, 
because  of  the  many  innocent  uses  to  which 
it  may  be  put,  should  be  regarded  as  con- 
ditional contraband.  The  British  counter 
by  calling  attention  to  the  conduct  of  the 
Union  during  the  Civil  War,  when  all 
cotton  raised  in  the  South  was  seized,  to 
the  great  distress  of  British  industry. 
However,  this  product  was  money  to  the 
South,  for  through  it  only  could  the  Con- 
federates pay  for  absolutely  needed  mili- 
itary  supplies  and  as  such  it  was 
contraband. 

Germany  and  her  ally,  Austria-Hungary, 
early  began  their  campaign  to  prevent  the 
exportation  of  munitions  of  war,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  there  could  be  no  question 
as    to    the    propriety   of    the   sale   of   such 


2Z2      IMPERILED  AMERICA 

products  by  individual  citizens.  President 
Wilson  recognized  it  in  his  proclamation 
of  neutrality  issued  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war;  and  his  recognition  was  sound  in  law 
and  precedent.  Munitions,  by  their  very 
character,  are  absolute  contraband  and 
subject  to  seizure.  Germany  herself,  to 
mention  recent  prior  wars,  sold  such 
products  to  Russia,  during  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War;  to  Turkey,  during  the 
Turko-Italian  War;  to  Great  Britain,  dur- 
ing the  Boer  War,  to  the  Balkan  States, 
during  their  wars,  and  even  to  General 
Huerta  in  Mexico,  when  that  person  was 
in  control  of  the  situation  in  Mexico  City. 
In  a  memorandum  to  the  State  Department, 
the  German  Ambassador  asserted  that  the 
situation  in  the  existing  war  was  different 
from  that  in  any  preceding  war;  that  the 
United  States  was  partial  in  that  it  was 
supplying  only  one  side  of  the  struggle, 
and  that  by  its  development  of  the  arms 
industry,  it  had  in  fact  created  a  new 
industry,  all  of  which  was  in  violation  of 
the  spirit  of  true  neutrality.     In  his  reply 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     233 

President  Wilson  pointed  out  that  any 
change  in  our  laws  of  neutrality  during  the 
progress  of  a  war,  which  would  affect 
unequally  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  nations  at  war,  would  be  an 
unjustifiable  departure  from  the  principle 
of  strict  neutrality;  and  the  placing  of  an 
embargo  as  had  been  suggested  would  con- 
stitute such  a  change  and  be  a  direct 
violation  of  American  neutrality.  Subse- 
quently Austria-Hungary  filed  a  protest 
against  our  traffic  in  arms  with  the  Allies. 
It  was  answered  by  an  admirable  note 
denying  the  existence  of  any  grounds  in 
law  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  contention, 
and  closing: 

"  The  principles  of  international 
law,  the  practice  of  nations,  the 
national  safety  of  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  without  great  mili- 
tary and  naval  establishments,  the 
prevention  of  increased  armies  and 
navies,  the  adoption  of  peaceful 
methods  for  the  adjustment  of  inter- 
national differences,  and  finally,  neu- 


234       LMPERILED  AMERICA 

trality  itself,  are  opposed  to  the  pro- 
hibition by  a  neutral  nation  of  the 
exportation  of  arms,  ammunition  and 
other  munitions  of  war  to  belligerent 
powers  during  the  progress  of  the 
war." 

It  is  evident,  of  course,  that  in  spite  of 
the  conclusive  legal  answers  of  the  United 
States,  the  governments  of  the  Central 
Powers  resent  our  sale  of  arms  to  the 
Allies.  When  the  writer  was  in  Vienna 
and  Berlin  in  December,  1914,  he  was  told 
that  had  it  not  been  for  the  action  of  Amer- 
ican manufacturers  in  selling  munitions  to 
Great  Britain,  Russia  and  France,  the  war 
would  have  been  ended  two  months  before. 
Reports  were  circulated  in  the  two  empires 
that  American  bullets  were  killing  German 
and  Austrian  soldiers;  and  General  von 
Hindenburg  was  quoted  as  saying: 

"  How  can  I  feel  friendly  toward  a 
people  with  whom  we  have  no  quar- 
rel   and   whose    ammunition    is    daily 
killing  my  soldiers?" 
It  is  interesting  to  remark  in  this  connec- 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     235 

tion  that  at  the  time  the  German  papers 
were  publishing  letters  denouncing  our  sale 
of  munitions  to  the  Allies,  the  quantity  of 
such  supplies  crossing  the  seas  was  neg- 
ligible. It  was  only  during  the  latter  part 
of  1915  that  the  exports  began  to  assume 
anything  like  large  figures;  and  from  then 
on  it  was  evident  they  would  be  in  such 
proportions  as  to  have  an  appreciable  effect 
upon  the  war.  The  German  maneuvers 
were  inaugurated  early  in  the  war  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  a  feeling  in  the  United 
States  against  the  sale  of  munitions,  and  by 
this  means  it  was  hoped  an  embargo  eventu- 
ally would  be  imposed. 

Germany  has  complained  that  if  she  vio- 
lates or  infringes  international  law,  the 
United  States  instantly  and  sharply  objects, 
whereas  if  the  Allies  commit  outrages,  this 
government  limits  itself  to  an  innocuous 
protest  or  does  nothing.  The  direct  charge 
was  made  by  the  German  Ambassador  that 
President  Wilson  "  acquiesces  in  the  viola- 
tions of  international  law  by  Great 
Britain."     This  charge  is  untrue.     It  was 


236       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

given  color,  however,  by  the  attention  the 
Wilson  administration  gave  to  the  sub- 
marine operations  of  Germany  and  the 
delay  with  which  it  handled  trade  questions 
with  Great  Britain.  The  policy  Mr.  Wil- 
son adopted  contemplated  dealing  with  one 
thing  at  a  time  —  the  settlement  first  of  the 
submarine  controversy,  and  then  the  trade 
disputes.  The  difficulty  of  pursuing  this 
"  single-track  "  course  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  questions  intermingled,  and  that  inci- 
dents multiplied  with  electric  speed. 

Germany  has  conceived  and  observed  a 
policy  toward  the  United  States  based  upon 
the  belief,  first,  that  any  action  against 
her  would  lead  to  a  civil  war  in  this 
country;  second,  that  we  feared  complica- 
tions with  her  would  seriously  embarrass 
us  in  connection  with  the  Mexican  ques- 
tion; third,  that  we  realized  a  war  with  a 
European  power  would  cause  Japan  to 
spring  upon  our  back;  and  fourth,  that  we 
were  absolutely  unprepared.  Developments 
have  certainly  discredited  the  German  view 
that  there  would  be  a  civil  war.     In  this 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     237 

connection  it  may  be  said  that  evidence  was 
placed  before  the  American  authorities 
alleging  that  the  Germans  have  dis- 
tricted the  United  States,  made  caches  of 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  given  instruc- 
tions to  reservists  and  others  to  report 
at  designated  headquarters  whenever  the 
necessity  arose.  The  prospect  that  we  will 
get  ready  for  trouble  also  is  having  a 
considerable  influence  upon  the  attitude  of 
the  Central  Powers.  Moreover,  it  has 
been  borne  in  upon  the  Berlin  and  Vienna 
authorities  that  it  would  be  highly  unwise 
to  list  the  United  States  among  their 
enemies.  Without  declaring  war,  we  could 
impose  an  em.bargo  on  all  supplies  going 
to  Germany;  and  thus  stop  the  large  quan- 
tities which  pass  through  neutral  terri- 
tories. In  itself,  this  would  be  a  serious 
blow.  Again,  for  the  United  States 
definitely  to  join  the  Allies  would  be  to 
prevent  the  realization  of  the  hope,  always 
in  the  German  breast,  that  we  will  become 
involved  in  a  deadly  quarrel  with  their 
enemies  over  trade  questions. 


238       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

War  always  produces  resentments,  es- 
pecially against  the  innocent  bystander.  It 
is  apparent  Germany  will  not  soon  forgive 
us  for  the  aid  she  considers  we  have  given 
her  enemies,  and  for  our  failure  to  compel 
them  to  live  up  to  the  principles  of  inter- 
national law;  that  Austria-Hungary  will 
not  soon  forgive  us  for  dismissing  Dr. 
Dumba,  her  Ambassador,  and  above  all  for 
our  intimation  in  the  note  relative  to  the 
destruction  of  the  Italian  liner  Ancona 
that  we  looked  upon  her  as  subservient  to 
Germany;  and  that  Turkey  will  not  soon 
forgive  us  for  the  protests  we  made  against 
the  massacre  of  Armenians. 

Moreover,  the  United  States  not  only  has 
furnished  supplies  to  the  Allies,  but  actu- 
ally has  financed  them;  and  the  Central 
Powers  undoubtedly  will  remember  this 
fact  against  us  in  the  future.  It  is  human 
for  them  to  do  so,  for,  given  the  same 
circumstances,  the  American  people  would 
take  a  like  view  against  a  foreign  land. 
But  looking  at  the  matter  from  a  perfectly 
cold-blooded  point  of  view,  it  is  apparent 


THE  CENTRAL  POWERS     2.^9 

the  objections  we  have  ofifered  to  Teutonic 
methods  of  warfare  and  to  the  action  of  the 
Central  Powers  in  fighting  the  war  within 
the  United  States,  were  in  accordance  with 
our  duties  as  well  as  our  rights  of  sover- 
eignty. It  is  only  to  be  regretted  that  our 
words  have  not  been  taken  at  their  face 
value,  and  that  we  have  been  in  the  posi- 
tion of  making  threats  which  we  had  not 
the  intention  to  carry  out. 


chapter  xii 
America  in  the  World  to  Come 

Change  and  adjustments  therewith  are 
laws  of  nature.  They  go  on  in  times  of 
peace  as  an  internal  force  in  nations,  and 
necessarily  meet  and  harmonize  or  clash. 
Wars  are  the  direct  result  of  this  constant 
movement.  They  strike  the  balance  be- 
tween peoples  or  within  a  people,  make 
new  relations  or  rather  certify  the  rela- 
tions which  prior  conditions  produced,  and 
establish  a  different  plane  whereon  the 
process  of  adjustment  continues. 

Mark  what  has  happened  in  the  United 
States  within  the  history  of  the  present 
generation!  Our  thought,  our  needs,  the 
government  under  which  we  live,  have 
been  sensibly  influenced  by  the  influx  of 
immigrants.  The  increased  control  of 
disease  has  destroyed  the  old  theory  that 
a  race  to  be  healthy  must  live  above  the 

240 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      241 

frost  line,  and  a  movement  has  set  in 
toward  the  south.  Our  diet  has  changed. 
Southern  products  are  as  important  in  our 
list  of  foods  as  northern  products.  Our 
commercial  situation  has  changed.  Indus- 
tries once  local  have  become  national. 
There  was  a  time  when  our  wheat,  corn, 
meat  and  cotton  gave  us  a  glow  of  self- 
sufficiency.  To-day  we  need  foreign  prod- 
ucts for  our  maintenance  and  to  reduce  the 
cost  of  living.  Our  exports  were  confined 
to  raw  materials;  now  one-fourth  of  them 
are  manufactured  articles.  There  have 
been  modifications  of  our  standards  of 
social  morality.  The  responsibilities  once 
provincially  limited  to  the  family,  the 
ward  and  the  state,  have  crossed  all 
political  subdivisions  and  even  passed  far 
beyond  our  coastlines. 

The  foreign  policies  of  the  United  States 
have  been  reflective  of  these  changing 
conditions.  A  popular  government  is 
naturally  sensitive  to  internal  developments 
and  consciously  or  unconsciously  is  con- 
trolled by  them  in  its  foreign  conduct.     It 


242       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

is  becoming  more  and  more  important  to 
us  that  the  countries  with  which  we  trade, 
particularly  those  within  our  sphere  of 
influence,  shall  maintain  peace  and  order, 
that  they  shall  develop  agriculturally, 
industrially  and  commercially,  free  from 
exploitation;  that  they  shall  respect  prop- 
erty rights,  including  contracts,  and  that 
they  shall  treat  us  on  precisely  the  same 
footing  as  their  other  customers.  These 
material  necessities  go  hand  in  hand  with 
our  interest  in,  our  sentiment  with  refer- 
ence to,  their  social  development.  In 
Mexico,  for  example,  there  must  be  estab- 
lished, first  and  foremost,  industrial  stabil- 
ity. To  seek  to  impose  upon  that  country, 
so  long  as  it  is  independent,  our  form  of 
government,  our  ideals  of  civilization, 
when  its  people  are  not  prepared  for  any- 
thing of  the  kind,  is  to  endeavor  to  build 
a  monument  from  the  capstone  down. 
V  As  a  matter  of  fact,  disguise  it  to  our- 

selves as  we  may,  the  United  States  is  being 
driven  inexorably  to  the  point  of  exerting 
direct  control  over  Mexico  and  the  coun- 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      24.^ 

tries  of  Central  America.  In  the  establish- 
ment of  this  control,  there  will  be  a  cost  to 
pay  in  lives  and  money.  To  leave  them 
as  they  are  is  to  shirk  our  moral  responsi- 
bilities; to  refuse  to  lift  them  from  their 
social  degradation  is  to  suffer  commercial 
loss  and  to  leave  untapped  the  wealth 
which  could  be  utilized  for  the  benefit  of 
mankind.  To  establish  control  is  to  pay 
the  price;  but  the  American  people  have 
never  refused  to  honor  their  bills  when 
justly  incurred. 

Of  course,  the  United  States  has  no 
divine  mission  to  right  the  wrongs  of  the 
w^orld;  but  it  has  a  direct  interest  in  evils 
elsewhere,  for  those  evils  react  upon  its 
own  happiness,  its  own  welfare  and  its 
own  prosperity.  Therefore,  it  is  manifestly 
concerned  in  the  preservation  and  extension 
of  human  liberty,  the  existence  and  promo- 
tion of  human  welfare;  and  it  is  justified 
in  acting  whenever  and  wherever  broad, 
humanitarian  principles  are  at  stake. 

It  is  imperative,  especially  at  a  time 
when  the  east  and  the  west  are  aflame,  that 


244       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

the  United  States  should  take  stock  of  its 
necessities,  its  duties  and  its  obligations, 
and  determine  whither  they  are  leading  it. 
It  is  imperative  for  it  to  study  and  to  know 
the  conditions  which  the  clash  of  arms  is 
developing,  and  to  be  prepared  against  the 
time  when  negotiations  shall  write  the  set- 
tlement the  war  will  force.  Great  world 
issues  will  be  involved  in  that  settlement; 
and  in  its  terms  the  United  States  will  have 
a  direct  interest.  We  could  not  escape  the 
effects  if  we  would.  In  spite  of  our  non- 
participation  in  the  war,  it  is  important 
for  us  to  figure  in  the  negotiations  of  peace, 
preferably  as  mediator.  That  we  can  play 
such  a  role  is  exceedingly  doubtful;  for, 
as  a  result  of  our  diplomacy,  the  Central 
Powers  will  not  be  disposed  to  confide  their 
interests  to  our  charge  in  the  preliminaries 
leading  to  a  direct  exchange  of  views  with 
their  enemies.  A  like  unwillingness  is 
developing  among  the  Allies. 

If  we  do  not  serve  as  mediator,  we  must, 
through  other  channels,  acquire  accurate 
information  as  to  the  proposals  discussed. 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      245 

Some  of  them  will  touch  the  welfare  aiul 
development  of  the  United  States,  and  call 
for  our  protest  and  even  resistance.   Should 
there    be    a    Peace    Congress,    China   will 
desire  admission  in  order  to  appeal  for  a 
world  guarantee  of  her  integrity.     Japan 
will    oppose    her    admission,    and    in    this 
attitude   is  likely  to  have  the  support  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  Russia  and  Italy  — 
should  those  countries  cling  together  —  in 
view  of  their  general  agreement  to  deter- 
mine  in   common   before   the   negotiations 
the  terms  they  will  lay  down.    The  United 
States  will   have   to   decide  whether   it   is 
advisable,  whether  it  can  afiford,  to  back 
China    and     antagonize    Japan    and    the 
powers  behind  her.     Vast  areas  of  terri- 
tory will   change   hands.     In   the   project 
of   the  Allies   to    restore   Belgium   to   the 
Belgian   people,    the   majority   of   Ameri- 
cans   have    a   sentimental    interest;    all   of 
us  have  a  vital  interest  in  the  fate  of  the 
islands    wrested    from    Germany    in    the 
Pacific.      Our   Americans    of    Polish    and 
Jewish   birth   will   desire   the   support   «)f 


246       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

the  Washington  government  in  the  move- 
ment to  re-establish  the  independent  King- 
dom of  Poland  and  to  obtain  equality  for 
the  Jews  in  Europe. 

It  is  impossible,  of  course,  for  the  Allies 
to  annihilate  the  German  people,  just  as 
it  is  impossible  for  the  Central  Powers 
to  annihilate  the  British,  the  French,  or 
the  Russian  people.  Yet  there  is  certain 
to  be  a  remaking  of  the  map  of  Europe. 
The  way  it  will  be  done  appears  of 
remote  concern  to  us;  nevertheless,  it  will 
determine  the  question  whether  the  peace 
arranged  shall  be  temporary  or  compara- 
tively permanent,  and  it  will  compress  or 
expand  economic  forces  which  will  influ- 
ence our  future. 

The  bitterness  the  war  has  engendered 
will  exclude  Allied  goods  from  German 
markets  and  German  goods  from  Allied 
markets  for  years  to  come.  In  anticipa- 
tion of  this  situation,  the  Allies  already 
are  providing  favorable  exchange  condi- 
tions as  between  themselves  and  their  pos- 
sessions, and  the  British  government  and 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      247 

British    merchants    are    devising   plans    to 
hold   the   trade   left   by   the   war,   and   to 
develop    and    extend    it.      When    the   war 
shall  end,  Germany's  warriors  will  return 
to  shops  and  factories,  and  the  formidable 
industrial  and  commercial  organization  of 
that  country,  perfected  to  greater  efficiency 
and  speeded  with  greater  energy  by  neces- 
sity, will  devote  itself  anew  to  the  peaceful 
conquest  of  world  markets.     The  rapidity 
of  the  flow  of  a  stream  is  determined  by 
the  width  of  its  banks;  and  the  tremendous 
volume   of   output   of   Europe  will   drive 
with     terrific     force     upon     the     United 
States  and  the  markets  in  which  we  trade. 
To  meet  this  danger,  if  we  ourselves  suc- 
ceed in  remaining  at  peace,  there  must  be 
a    more    intensive    industrial,    commercial 
and   financial   organization   in   the   United 
States;  close  co-operation  in  foreign  sell- 
ing; establishment  of  "free  ports,"  similar 
to  Hamburg  and  Copenhagen;  a  scientific 
readjustment  of  our  tariff  rates  in  accord- 
ance with  the  views  of  a  nonpartisan  C(jm- 
mission,  and  a  revision  of  all  our  commcr- 


248       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

cial  treaties;  an  increase  in  our  merchant 
marine  and  the  relief  of  our  shippers 
from  the  disadvantage  of  exorbitant 
charges  and  rebates;  and  the  wise  exer- 
cise by  our  bankers  of  the  power  of 
financing  our  trade  and  extending  foreign 
credits. 

It  is  apparent  there  presses  upon  the 
American  people  the  need  of  a  permanent 
and  continuous  foreign  policy,  not  rigid 
but  fluid,  a  policy  that  will  realize  our 
moral,  our  political  and  our  commercial 
aspirations.  It,  of  course,  should  be  non- 
partisan, lifted  above  the  plane  of  domes- 
tic politics,  and  in  no  sense  the  football 
of  party  expediency  or  the  whim  of  dif- 
ferent administrations.  It  should  be  essen- 
tially national;  laws  should  be  passed 
empowering  the  federal  government  to 
intervene  in  judicial  processes  involving 
foreigners  and  foreign  interests  in  the  sev- 
eral states.  It  should  place  national  honor 
above  national  welfare;  for  to  tarnish  the 
former  is  to  place  a  stain  forever  upon  the 
flag.      It   should    be    careful    of    national 


THE  WORLD  TO  COxME      249 

prestige.  A  country  is  judged  in  the  light 
of  its  past  conduct  and  is  treated  by  for- 
eign governments  accordingly.  It  should 
maintain  the  faith,  for  scrupulous  fidelity 
in  the  discharge  of  obligations  is  as  impor- 
tant to  a  nation  as  reputation  is  to  a  man. 
Therefore,  the  greatest  care  should  be 
made  in  the  negotiations  of  treaties,  to 
bind  ourselves  only  to  those  things  which 
we  intend  to  and  can  observe.  Germany 
to-day  is  suffering  from  the  shame  of 
violating  the  treaty  guaranteeing  the 
neutrality   of    Belgium. 

Our  policy  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
must  be  based  upon  the  enforcement  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  upon  our  vital 
interests  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  upon 
friendly  relations  with  Latin  America; 
and  generally  upon  our  vital  interests  in 
the  Pacific  and  upon  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  throughout  the  world. 
It  is  to  our  interest  to  encourage  the 
creation  of  arbitral  tribunals,  but  we 
should  be  careful  not  to  agree  to  the 
reference  in  advance  to  such  tribunals  of 


250       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

any  question  which  might  result  in  popu- 
lar repudiation  of  the  award  made;  and 
in  this  possibility  lies  the  grave  objection 
to  the  all-inclusive  arbitration  treaties 
negotiated  by  the  TaftAdministration  and 
the  all-inclusive  investigation  treaties 
signed  by  Mr.  Bryan  and  ratified  in 
the  early  days  of  the  w^ar,  when  ''  safety 
first "  was  the  base  refuge  of  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  people. 

How  can  a  permanent  and  continuous 
foreign  policy  be  created  in  the  United 
States?  There  is  nothing  easier.  Through 
our  wonderful  press,  conducted  by  the 
brainiest  minds  in  the  country,  and 
through  other  mediums,  it  is  not  difficult 
for  the  government  to  ascertain  the  senti- 
ment of  the  people  upon  any  important 
issue.  It  is  necessary  only  that  this  senti- 
ment shall  be  grounded  upon  facts  and 
influenced  by  a  knowledge  of  conditions 
abroad.  Before  the  war  our  interest  in 
foreign  affairs  was  impersonal,  casual. 
Since  the  war  began  it  has  become  per- 
sonal, vital.     There  thus  exists  an  oppor- 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      251 

tunity  to  inaugurate  a  scheme  of  educa- 
tion, based  on  broad  lines  of  statesmanship 
and  modern  diplomacy. 

In  the  conduct  of  a  permanent  and  con- 
tinuous foreign  policy,  it  is  essential  that 
we  have  statesmen,  not  politicians,  at  the 
head    of    our    State    Department.      Solely 
because  Mr.  Bryan  aided  him  to  get  the 
Democratic    nomination,    and    because    of 
the     political     power     and     prestige     he 
enjoyed.   President  Wilson  named  him  as 
Secretary  of   State.     For  more   than   two 
years    the    United    States    suffered    from 
amateur    diplomacy,    from    an    effort    to 
apply  domestic  political  methods  to  inter- 
national   affairs.      There    must    be    main- 
tained   a    permanent    force    in    the    State 
Department,    secure,    well-paid,    equipped 
to    apply   to    developments    the    pre-dcter- 
mined    policies    required    by    the    nation's 
needs.     There  should   be   maintained   also 
permanent  diplomatic  and  consular  serv- 
ices,   as    contemplated    by    the    measures 
inaugurated  by  President  Roosevelt. 

The  consular  service  is  well  established 


252       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

since  the  people,  early  in  the  Wilson 
Administration,  indicated  they  would  not 
look  with  favor  upon  the  displacement  of 
tried  men  by  political  workers.  As  our 
diplomats  we  must  have  men  of  the  world, 
aware  of  our  needs  and  purposes,  students 
of  international  law  and  history,  familiar 
with  the  complicated  relations  between 
nations,  including  their  alliances  and 
friendships  and  the  reasons  therefor,  and 
acquainted  with  the  natural  and  inevitable 
tendencies  of  peoples  and  their  laws  and 
customs  and  policies  with  regard  to  finance 
and  trade.  It  is  to  create  dangers  for  our- 
selves to  reward  politicians  by  appoint- 
ment to  diplomatic  office;  for  agents 
abroad  must  be  able  not  only  to  report 
an  event  and  its  significance,  but  to  advise 
as  to  the  attitude  their  government  should 
adopt. 

It  is  a  sign  of  weakness,  save  in  special 
emergencies,  to  send  special  commissioners 
abroad.  Such  action  is  accepted  as  a 
reflection  upon  the  capacity  of  the  man 
duly  and  regularly  appointed,  and  affects 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      253 

his  Influence  with  the  government  to  which 
he  is  accredited.  Mr.  Wilson  pursued 
this  unfortunate  policy,  sending  agents  in 
bewildering  succession  to  Mexico,  and 
from  time  to  time  he  has  dispatched  to 
Europe  a  personal  friend,  who  had  had 
no  experience  whatever  in  the  intricate 
web  of  war  diplomacy.  All  these  com- 
missioners have  ability;  but,  as  indicated, 
their  appearance  was  harmful  to  the  diplo- 
mats on  the  ground.  Moreover,  Congress, 
and  particularly  the  Senate,  is  placed  in 
the  position  of  having  to  act  upon  meas- 
ures advocated  by  the  President  at  the 
instance  of  a  personal  agent  whose  char- 
acter and  capacity  it  does  not  know, 
whereas  in  the  selection  of  diplomatic 
representatives,  it  has  had  an  opportunity 
to  ascertain  their  qualifications. 

President  Wilson  truthfully  described 
our  perilous  situation  when  he  said,  in 
advocating  preparedness,  a  year  and  a  hall 
after  the  war  had  begun,  that  the  develop- 
ments of  a  day  or  even  an  hour  might 
plunge  us  into  conflict.     It  is  unfortunate 


254       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

for  the  country  that  an  effective  program 
of  defense  was  not  immediately  advo- 
cated and  adopted  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  struggle.  A  year  and  a  half  of 
precious  time  was  lost,  and  it  will  require 
fully  that  period  to  create  an  effective 
army  and  to  make  even  a  real  start  in 
providing  an  adequate  navy. 

It  is  obvious  that  if  foreign  nations 
consider  us  able  to  resist,  they  will  be 
disposed  to  respect  our  rights  and  pay 
attention  to  our  wishes.  It  is  equally 
obvious  that  as  the  war  continues,  friction 
with  all  the  belligerents  will  increase.  We 
face  the  grave  danger  of  being  drawn  into 
the  maelstrom  while  it  is  swirling;  we 
face  the  even  graver  danger  of  war  when 
peace  shall  be  restored  abroad.  It  will 
be  no  news  to  the  American  people  to 
tell  them  that  we  are  to-day  without  a 
real  friend  in  the  world.  Our  diplomacy, 
the  utterances  of  our  statesmen  in  office, 
have  not  been  calculated  to  win  the  sup- 
port of   any   nation,   save,    perhaps,    those 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      255 

of  South  America;  and  the  Latin-Ameri- 
cans remain  suspicious  of  our  purposes. 
Not  that  the  United  States  should  have 
alliances  —  the  advice  of  Washington  is 
as  good  to-day  as  when  given.  But 
friendly  neutrality  is  a  valuable  asset  in 
time  of  war,  and  worth  the  efforts  to 
assure  it. 

Will  not  the  debt-ridden  belligerents, 
when  they  have  returned  to  peace  as 
between  themselves,  look  with  envy  upon 
our  riches  gained  from  their  needs? 

President  Wilson  has  proclaimed  the 
view  that  w^e  should  have  the  greatest 
navy  in  the  world.  Is  it  likely  that  Eng- 
land, without  resistance,  will  abdicate  the 
position  of  mistress  of  the  seas?  Would 
it  not  have  been  far  better  from  the  stand- 
point of  national  interest  quietly  to  have 
pursued  the  policy  of  up-building  the 
fleet  until  it  attained  a  size  both  in  per- 
sonnel and  materiel  and  an  expertness  of 
administration  and  operation,  which  would 
assure   the   protection   of   our   home   tcrri- 


256       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

tory,  the  protection  of  our  foreign  posses- 
sions, and  the  protection  of  our  foreign 
commerce  and   interests? 

Pacifists  assert  that  the  belligerents  will 
be  so  exhausted  by  the  end  of  the  war 
that  they  will  be  unable  to  embark  upon 
a  new  struggle.  History  points  to  the 
contrary,  except  in  the  case  of  the  defeated 
which  has  been  saddled  with  a  huge 
indemnity.  When  the  Civil  War  termi- 
nated, the  Union,  which  had  expended  in 
all  about  forty  per  cent  of  its  national 
wealth  (Great  Britain  is  spending  six 
per  cent  annually),  threatened  European 
powers  because  they  had  endeavored  to 
control  Mexico  while  the  United  States 
was  in  the  throes  of  revolution.  Rather 
than  battle  with  our  magnificent  fleet  and 
magnificent  veteran  armies,  those  powers 
withdrew  from  Mexican  soil.  Here  then 
is  evidence  upon  which  to  base  the  state- 
ment that  the  belligerents  in  the  present 
war,  especially  those  who  gain  the  victory, 
will  not  be  so  exhausted  that  they  can  not 
move   against   the   United   States,    if   they 


THE  WORLD  TO  COME      257 

will.  It  follows  that  if  the  United  States 
desires  to  save  itself  from  war  or  to 
protect  its  territory  and  interests,  it  must 
develop  a  sufficient  fleet  before  the  Euro- 
pean struggle  shall  end.  That  fleet  must  be 
supported,  not  by  a  makeshift,  untrained 
force,  but  by  a  regular,  efficient  and  ade- 
quate mobile  army,  backed  by  a  trained 
citizenry.  Under  such  conditions,  the 
navy  will  be  free  to  observe  the  primal 
principle  of  strategy  —  find  the  enemy 
upon   the  seas  and   destroy  him. 

This  is  no  policy  of  militarism;  it  is  a 
policy  of  common  sense.  The  people  of 
the  United  States  are  not  moved  by  any 
spirit  of  aggrandizement.  The  only  vic- 
tories they  want  are  the  victories  of  peace. 
They  have  no  desire  for  conquest,  save  the 
conquest  of  themselves;  no  desire  for  sov- 
ereignty save  the  sovereignty  over  them- 
selves. They  respect  the  independence  and 
sovereignty  of  the  weakest  nations  precisely 
as  they  respect  the  independence  and  sover- 
eignty of  the  strongest  nations.  They  stand 
for  equality,  for  righteousness,  no  less  in  the 


258       IMPERILED  AMERICA 

things  of  the  spirit  than  in  the  things  of  the 
flesh.  They  wish  to  be  prosperous  them- 
selves, to  maintain  law  and  order  within 
their  own  territories,  and  to  exercise  their 
right  of  freely  carrying  out  their  own  des- 
tinies with  due  regard  to  the  destinies  of 
others.  Because  they  realize  there  can  be  no 
permanent  prosperity  and  no  permanent 
happiness  in  one  section  of  the  world  unless 
there  be  permanent  prosperity  and  per- 
manent happiness  everywhere,  they  are 
inspired  by  ideals  which  are  based  upon 
the  doctrines  of  common  justice  and 
common  good. 


INDEX 

American  Cargoes,  Seizure  of i66 

American  Fleet,  Official  Trips 45 

Balkan  Campaign   185 

Belgium,  Invasion  of 35,  41 

Belligerent  Rights 1 86,  1 89 

Violation  of    189,  194 

Blockade,  Use  of  by  U.  S.  During  Civil  War.  ...    193 
Bryan,  William  Jennings — 

Peace  Plan  34 

Treaty  with  Denmark 98 

Castro,  General,  Exclusion  of 77 

China  and  the  Great  War 124-127 

Hay  Policy  in 1 29.  1 3 1 

Cleveland,  Grover,  and  Monroe  Doctrine 57 

Consular  Service,  Weakness  of 252 

Reform  of  250-253 

Cuba,  U.  S.  Withdrawal  from 20 

Danish  West  Indies,  Proposed  Purchase  of. . .  .67,9? 

Embargo  on   Munitions 200, 23 1 

France — 

In   Mexico    214 

Position  in  Pacific '  'O 

Territorial  Situation  of 21-25 

259 


260  INDEX 

Frye  Case i68 

Justification  of 1 70 

Galapagos  Islands,  Attempted  Purchase  of 15 

Germany — 

Activities  in  America 44 

In  Mexico 49 

Diplomatic  Activities  in  U.  S 222-228 

In  Latin  America 22 1 ,  224 

In  China 116 

In  the  Philippines 213 

Pledges  Concerning  Submarines 176 

Points  of  Conflict  with  U.  S 27 

Territorial  Situation  of 21-25 

Trade  with  Holland  and  Denmark 186 

Great  Britain — 

Embargo  on   Cotton 230 

Embargo  on   Foodstuffs 229 

Territorial  Situation  of 21-25 

Treaty  with  Japan 113 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  Peace  Program 207 

Holleben,  von,  Policy  in  America 44 

During  Venezuelan  Crisis 64 

International  Law,  Violations  of — 

By  Submarines 161 

Floating  Mines   162 

Neutral  Flags   1 64 

War  Zone  Declaration 164 

Japan- 
Entrance  Into  War 115 


INDEX  261 

Occupation  of  Kiao  Chou 1 16 

Occupation  of  Pacific  Islands 1 1 7 

Recent  Wars  of U-^ 

Relations  with  U.  S U-2 

California  Complications l4^.  U7 

School  Question ^  44 

Rise  of  14M42 

View  of  Monroe  Doctrine 68 

Visit  of  U.  S.  Fleet  to »45 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  View  of  Monroe  Doctrine.  .53.  54 

Korea,  Acquisition  of  by  Japan 1 14.  1-24 

Lansing  Proposal '77 

Latin-American  Republics — 

Finances  of ^ 

View  of  Monroe  Doctrine 71.95 

Lodge  Resolution  70. 1 50 

Louvain,  Destruction  of '59 

Lusltanla,  Sinking  of '72 

Roosevelt  Stand  on '73 

Wilson  View       '7-+ 

McKlnley,  Stand  on  Cuba 20 

Mexico — 

Feeling  Against  U.  S ^^ 

T.  •  214 

France  in   

Need  of  Intervention  in ^'^>  ^-^^ 

Value  of  Petroleum  in *^' 

Monroe  Doctrine — 

Against  Whom  Originally  Directed 5" 

Against  Whom  Used ^^ 

British  Interest  in 


262  INDEX 

Enforcement  of    249 

Essential  Principles    55 

German  Violations  of 60,61 

Latin-American  View  of 7 1 ,  95 

Purpose  of 51 

Recognition  Accorded 5 1  >  52 

Suggested  by  England 53 

Views  of  the  Doctrine — 

Thomas  Jefferson 53,  54 

Grover  Cleveland 57 

Moroccan  Dispute,  U.  S.  Intervention  in 16 

Netherlands,  The,  Position  in  Pacific 109 

Neutral  Rights 197 

Violation  of    189,  194 

Orders  in  Council 190 

Protests  Against 191 

Oregon  Dispute 56 

Pacific  Ocean — 

Our  Possessions  in 107 

Powers  in    109-1 1 1 

Predictions  Concerning 102 

Strategic  Points  of 108 

Trade  with  Countries  in  and  Bordering 106 

Panama  Canal —  ' 

Defense  of 84 

Dispute  with  Colombia  Over 94 

Guarantees  Concerning 99,  lOO 

Importance  of 85 

Petroleum  Pipe  Line  to 92 

Value  of  in  Pacific 12 1 


INDEX  263 

Piatt  Amendment   88 

Prince  Henry,  Visit  of 4.5 

Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich,  Case  of ib8 

Roosevelt — 

Monroe  Doctrine 62,  67 

Stand  in  Moroccan  Controversy 34 

Root,  Elihu — 

On  Japan 14- 

On  Panama  Canal 87 

Root-Takahira  Agreement   117,145 

Rush-Bagot  Agreement 212 

Russia — 

Ambitions  in  Asia 1  i  2 

Naval  Demonstration  During  Civil  War 46 

Territorial  Situation  of 21-25 

Santa  Domingo,  Financial  Protectorate  Over 16 

Six  Power  Loan '  3  • 

Sternburg,  von,  Policy  in  America 44 

Submarines,  Use  in  Present  War 160 

Justification  For,  by  Germany 161 

Trans-Manchurian   Railroad,   Proposed    Neutral- 
ization of n^.  IS2-I53 

Treaty  of  Portsmouth 1 29,i  55 

Trent  Affair,  The '^? 

United  States — 

Effect  of  Great  War  on "^S 

Foreign-born  Population  of i^ 

Influence   of    -^^"38 

Points  of  Conflict  with  Hi-Higercnts 25 


264  INDEX 

Possessions  in  Pacific  Ocean 107 

Sentiment  in  Present  War 42 

Sentiment  in  Russo-Japanese  War 46 

Trade  with  Countries  Bordering  Pacific 106 

Withdrawal  from  Philippines 15 

Venezuela,  Blockade  of 58 

Washington  on  Neutrality 37 

West  Indies,  Powers  Represented  in 97 

Wilson  Administration,  The — 

And  China   I35,  i37 

And  Lusitania  Case 32,  I74 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


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